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FOREWORD
History of Reliability and Quality Assurance at Kennedy Space Center
Space exploration has been the dream of mankind since he looked at the
heavens. Understanding the stars and planets and our relationship to the
entire universe continues to be a challenge even with significant advance-
ments in rocket technology.
This Kennedy Hisorical Document (KHD) provides a unique historical
perspective of the organizational and functional
-responsibilities for the
manned and un-manned programs at Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
As systems become more complex and hazardous, the attention to detailed
planning and execution continues to be a challenge. The need for a robust
reliability and quality assurance program will always be a necessity to
ensure mission success. As new space missions are defined and technology
allows for continued access to space, these programs cannot be compro-
mised.
The organizational structure that has provided the reliability and quality
assurance functions for both the manned and unmanned programs has seen
many changes since the first group came to Florida in the 1950's. The
roles of government and contractor personnel have changed with each
program and organizational alignment has changed based on that
responsibility. The organizational alignment of the personnel performing
these functions must ensure independent assessment of the processes.
The commitment to excellence by the dedicated professionals, who ensure
the safety, quality and reliability of each mission, is an attribute to all
who have worked so hard throughout this history of launches from Cape
Canaveral and NASA launch sites.
Frank Childers has taken 50 years of history and condensed it into an
interesting reflection of his commitment to reliability and quality
assurance and his passion for the space program.
J.Chris Fairey, Director, Safety and Mission Assurance
NASA, Kennedy Space Center (retired)
DEDICATION
This volume is dedicated to the past and present Kennedy Space Center
Reliability and Quality Assurance managers who gave their dedicated
support over the years of our nation's manned space program, and also
to the past and present members of the NASA Alumni League, Florida
Chapter, for their encouragement and support.
The following list includes the leaders of the KSC Reliability Coordination
Office Chiefs and the KSC Quality Assurance Chiefs in order of service:
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William Rock, 1967 till end of Apollo Program
KSC Quality Assurance Office Chiefs
R.L. Gramer, 1960
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B.L. Jansen, ISS/Payload Processing Division, 1999-2003
R.R. Hammond, Shuttle Processing, 2000
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2003
R.R. Gillett, Safety and Mission Assurance Project Assessment
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2003
Plus the numerous R&QA Surveillance Office Chiefs of the KSC
decentralized R&QA period, such as Dan Collins and John Fike of
Information Systems Directorate, Otto Fedor of Design Engineering, Joe
Bobik of Spacecraft Operations, Doug Black of Space Task Group, Don
Oswald of Launch Vehicle Operations, and others.
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charts, and other important information through the printed word, through
conversation, and by providing NASA and contractor R&QA documents
contributing to the overall goal of this challenging task. Plus I give credit to
my wife, Lois E. Childers, for her editing efforts.
INTRODUCTION AND AUTHOR'S COMMENTS
For centuries, mankind has gazed longingly at the heavens, wishing to be
closer to angels than to be a species doomed to cling, heavy and gravity-footed, to the earth. Poets, dreamers, and scientists, enviously watching
the freedom of birds, all yearned and planned for the day when humans
would join the seemingly-impossible celestial flight.
In 1903 the Wright brothers proved that where man's mind could go, thebody could follow. Following World War ll, the interest in actual space-flight grew, and a talented team was assembled to boost/launch mankindinto the realm we call "space" today. Some of the team were German
rocket scientists and engineers who chose to join American forces in its
missile and space program after World War II.
In order to boost Americans into space, special launch vehicles and space-
craft had to be developed, tested and flown. A talented team of 37 rocket
scientists, engineers, technicians and Army Ballistic Missile Agency(ABMA) personnel from Redstone Arsenal, under the direction of Dr. Kurt
Debus, pioneered the way for accomplishing the successful testing andlaunching of many Army missile flights and the two early manned flights
using the small Redstone Rocket going toward the goal of space travel we
celebrate today. The ABMA Missile Firing Laboratory's first Redstone
missile launch took place from Cape Canaveral, Florida on August 20,
1953.
The work-ethic of this initial team was deemed all the Safety,
Reliability, and Quality Assurance needed in those early days of rocketlaunchings. A formal Reliability and Quality Assurance program was not
adopted until the Apollo Program began to take shape in the 1960's.
The Space Test Group joined the Debus team in January,1965, and theVanguard team joined in October,1965, forming the Kennedy Space Center(KSC). The Launch Operations Center headed by Dr. Kurt Debus was
officially formed July 1, 1962, and renamed to honor President Kennedy in
November, 1963. These groups made history as they continued their
successful work with satellites and with manned space flights underdifferent organizations.
One major goal of these groups sailed majestically through the skies - the
moon. Throughout history, the moon had been the symbol of human yearn-ing, celebrated in mythology, legend, song and poem.
At Rice University on September 12, 1961, President Kennedy set the
mood for the United States to visit the Moon, when he said:
" We set sail on this new sea because there is knowledge to be
gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and
used for the progress of all people. For space science, like
nuclear science and all technology, has no conscious of its own.
Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man,
and only if the United States occupies a position of
preeminence can we help decide whether this new ocean willbe a sea of peace or a new, terrifying theater of war."
Historically, in 1969, the United States became the first to set foot upon
the moon, claiming this ancient mystic symbol "in peace for all mankind."The story of how the lead nation of the free world accomplished this
challenge is a story of dreamers, doers, and the dedication of launch
teams beyond any worldly compensation.
America soared to glory, experienced heartbreak, and daily, kept alive the
commitment to explore new worlds beyond the stars. This history ofReliability and Quality Assurance, this history of man's best efforts
toward a job well done, is dedicated to all those who lost their lives
reaching for the stars - and to those who will continue to carry the flame
of human curiosity, dreams, and intelligence to galaxies yet unknown.
In January 1972, I realized that my files contained a great deal of vitalhistorical data on the beginnings of the Reliability and Quality Assurance(R&QA) Program at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC). In anticipation
of retiring in a few years, I began to research my files and talk to otherQuality Engineers about writing a summary history of R&QA at KSC. I was
encouraged by my manager, Mr. John Fike. So in my spare time, I began
the task. I completed the brief history in January 1974, and had copies
printed by the KSC Reproduction Section for distribution to many ofthe KSC R&QA employees and managers right away.
Early reliability and quality assurance efforts at the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency (ABMA) are important in this study, because personnelfrom ABMA made up the core organization around which the Kennedy SpaceCenter was organized. Their contribution is recorded within Chapter 1 ofthis document, and includes the small-team work ethic and the attention
to detail required by all launch team members during checkout and launch
of the early Redstone and Jupiter missiles. Dr. Kurt Debus' Memoir Paper,
"FROM A-4 TO EXPLORER 1," is important in describing the early interestin R&QAby ABMA managers. The story begins on page 1 of Chapter 1.
This NASA document is an attempt to up-date that brief history. The main
thrust of the effort will be in the area of human space flight at KennedySpace Center. The advent of the Mercury Program was the driving force in
establishing a more classical reliability and quality assurance effort. Thefact that human beings would be propelled into space was concern enoughfor Congress to fund such a program.
I approached the present Director of Kennedy Space Center, Roy Bridges, at
the 1999 annual KSC Christmas Coffee about the idea, and he introduced
me to his Director of Reliability and Quality Assurance (later Director ofSafety and Mission Assurance), Mr. Chris Fairey, who immediately gave me
an appointment at his office to discuss the project. Mr. Fairey was
receptive to the idea and promised support and a review effort after thedocument was completed. Right away I contacted other important Apollo
R&QA participants who promised support and contribution to thishistorical document. I proposed to Mr. Fairey that this effort should beissued as a NASA Historical document and hoped to get an official NASAdocument number and have it printed by NASA or the Government Print-
ing Office.
At the beginning of the manned flight programs in the early 1960's, KSC
and other NASA organizations earnestly began to organize a Reliability andQuality Assurance (R&QA) program, because the goal of placing humansinto space would require very reliable ground support equipment as well
as highly reliable launch vehicles and spacecraft. Admittedly, the problem
of building a reliable product to perform a specific function is ancient.However, as products had become more and more complex, the problem ofbuilding a reliable product had become more difficult. In addition, during
World War II, many types of equipment were developed which had to work
under wide environmental conditions for extended periods of time if the
military mission was to be accomplished. The addition of a time
dimension to already difficult problems, and the increasing complexity of
equipment, posed more design and development difficulties to our military
manufacturers.
During that war, great strides were made in the development of quality
control techniques. However, most of the early applications of quality
control concentrated on manufacturing and inspection phases.
Subsequently, the Atomic Age and Space Age hardware requirements
introduced even more stringent controls on the manufacturing and
inspection phases, and expanded requirements into the installation,
operations and maintenance phases.
Aeronautics technology was ushered in on December 8, 1903, by Samuel
Pierpont Langley with his manned glider fitted with a small internal
combustion engine which failed on launch from its Potomac River
houseboat catapult, and by the Wright Brothers of Dayton, Ohio, nine days
later, December 17th. 1903, at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.
In 1909, the Army purchased its first military airplane. In 1915, the
U. S. Congress established a National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA), after Europe had outstripped the U. S. in aeronautics
leadership.
During the first World War, NACA aided significantly in the
formulation of national policy on such critical problems as the cross-
licensing of patents and aircraft production.
In the 20's and 30's, aeronautical science and aviation technology
continued to advance. During these decades, NACA brought the United
States to worldwide leadership in aeronautical science. NACA worked
closely with the Army and Navy, the National Bureau of Standards, and
with the young and struggling aircraft industry to enlarge the
theory, technology of flight, structural materials, and power plants.
Together with these advancements was the growing field of Quality
Assurance and Quality Control.
During the World War Il period, the concept of mass production was
exploited. Experience proved that American industry was able to respond
to military requirements. Quality Control was essential to obtain reliable
products for the men on the field of battle. Most of the workers were
closely associated with the war effort through their own family members
in the fighting ranks which resulted in a measure of motivation for quality
products. The government, through decentralized military agencies or
departments, upgraded and otherwise caused Military Specifications to be
written for every product required. Quality assurance provisions were
either included in specifications or were written around the
specifications, as required.
Military Specifications and Standards played a most important role in
assuring that the manufacturer had the correct guidelines for building a
product, and that quality assurance had correct acceptance criteria for the
product. Federal Specs and Standards followed the same general format
and were for the same purpose as MIL-Specs and Standards. MlL Handbooks
were another means used in establishing guidelines in many areas of
quality assurance.
One example of how these documents treated Quality Assurance is taken
from ORDM 4-12, 'Quality Assurance Technical Procedure,' as follows:
"The resources and efforts of the Ordnance Corps are devoted to furnishing
the Armed Forces with effective and reliable material which will function as
intended when and where required.
The term "Quality" can, and frequently does, mean different things
to different people. From the standpoint of the Ordnance Corps, total quality with
respect to an item is synonymous with complete attainment of the design
objective, providing, of course, that those objectives accurately reflect the user
requirements and are technically and economically feasible.
The role of the Ordnance Inspector is rather unique. While his
responsibilities may be numerous and varied, his authority is limited. His
primary function is to assure complete compliance with the requirements of the
contract or work order. In this, he must maintain a singleness of purpose. His
insistence upon rigid conformance to all applicable requirements is essential to
assuring effective ordnance material. Even in those instances where drawings and
specifications do not accurately reflect the design objectives, strict compliance
with the requirements will assist in identifying such deficiencies. Only by strict
enforcement of the contract or work order requirements can the adequacy and
completeness of those requirements be ascertained. Pressures to meet delivery
schedules must not influence the inspector to accept something less than specified
in the contract or work order. Furthermore, it is not within his authority to
exercise judgment as to the adequacy or equivalency of substitute
requirements. This role must be reserved for the responsible engineering agency.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the inspector must be an individual of high
integrity and must be unswervingly resolute in the performance of his assigned
tasks.
Contractor and ordnance production support activities are responsible for
controlling product quality for, and offering to the Ordnance Corps for
acceptance, only those items or lots of items which have been determined by them
to conform to contractual requirements.
The Ordnance Corps is responsible for determining that contractual or
project requirements have been complied with before acceptance of the product."
These excerpts from Ordnance Corps ORDM 4-12 give us some insight into
what the Quality Inspector's role was in the Ordnance Corps, and still
remains basically true for a Quality Inspector today in assuring quality
products for space program applications.
Chapter 1.
HISTORY OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
AT THE ABMA MISSlLE FIRING LAB
In the early 1950's, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA)
Laboratories at Huntsville Alabama were in the process of static testing
the Redstone ballistic missile as final design specifications were being
developed for the flight hardware and attendant ground support equipment.Much attention was given to good documentation and configuration control.
Each design organization was held responsible for all quality, suitability,
reliability, etc., for each static test. Major changes were closely coordi-
nated with interfacing elements to preclude operational problems.Committees, working groups, and task groups for specific systems,
maintained sufficiently tight management control of both flight and
ground support hardware.
Quality Assurance as a formal program was not required, but the following
excerpt from Dr. Kurt Debus' Memoir Paper, "From A-4 to Explorer 1"
describes the reliability goals of the Redstone and Jupiter missiles very
well. One can see how the role of reliability and quality assurance was
becoming more important as the Army missile vehicles were being
considered for ventures into space:
"Redstone's development program commenced May 1,1951, and continued seven
and one-half years, terminating with the last research and development launch,
November 5, 1958. Between those dates, many changes in the hardware took
place involving tracking and telemetry systems, fabrication, assembly and
propulsion. The engine contractor supplied seven different versions of the power
plant and introduced such improvements as a liquid oxygen pump inducer to
prevent cavitation, full flow start, gage pressure thrust controller, and absolute
pressure thrust controller. Early Redstone employed an autopilot control system.Components of the inertial guidance system were carried as passengers which
expedited the development of the complete system tested for the first time on
Redstone No. 11, September 21, 1955. Industry supplied fuselages, guidance
components, and many other items. Chrysler Corporation was selected as prime
contractor and fabricated Redstone missiles in a Government-owned plant inMichigan. Missiles 1 through 12, and 18 through 29 were built by the Guided
Missile Center while Chrysler produced Nrs. 13 through 17, and all of
missiles from No. 30 on. Thirty-seven were launched in the research anddevelopment phase but only 1 2 of these were flown exclusively in support of theRedstone program.The others contributed to the follow-on Jupiter missile which
will be discussed later. In all, 62 Redstone missiles including the tactical version
were produced before the program ended in 1960 as the lighter and more mobilePershing missile succeeded Redstone.
Our relations with industry were both challenging and, in the end, highly
satisfactory. We insisted upon quality and reliability standards that were
unprecedented, and specified tolerances and precision that seemed almostimpossible. But there were healthy curiosity and excitement about this new field.Chrysler put engineers in the laboratories at Redstone Arsenal to acquire at first
hand the techniques of fabrication and assembly. Drawings of dies, tools, jigs andfixtures were turned over to the contractor to assist setting up his productionline.
There was good reason for our seemingly arbitrary concern with
reliability. From painful experience during the Peenemuende development, we
clearly understood the direct relationship between high reliability and high
accuracy in the guided missile. The U.S. Army wanted better than 90 percent
reliability in Redstone and specified the maximum circular probable error at the
target. In February l952, I presented Center management a proposal to
elevate reliability functions to top level and install the program in every
organizational element concerned with the Redstone development. The proposalderived from analyzing guided missile systems and any part could be classified as
"parallel" or "series" in operation. Failure of a "parallel" part would probably
not result in failure of the system since its function could be taken over by
another part.
Failure of a "series" part would ultimately result in total failure. For
example, relay contacts, soldering spots, tubes or most structural parts would,if they failed in flight, cause malfunction or failure of the vehicle. The fact was
that overall reliability of the whole system equaled the product of the individual
reliabilities of all series components.
1. A guided missile having 100 series components, each component having an
average reliability of 99 percent, will probably succeed in only 36.5 percent offirings.
2. If there are 300 series components of the same average reliability, the
chances for success are reduced to 5 percent. While this appraisal stirred up
considerable argument, management created a reliability office and the program
was installed within the center and contractor organizations. These initial
beginnings of reliability considerations have evolved into today's management
systems.
During the White Sands period, the prelaunch and launch functions were
performed by a team made up of cadres from several different elements of the
project. No one organization had the overall responsibility for check- out,
assembly, testing and launch operations. Looking ahead to the demands of the
Redstone and subsequent programs, I advised Dr. von Braun that in the long run
we would require an integrated group responsible for the launch phase. As a
consequence, I established the Experimental Missile Firing Laboratory.
Having taken direction of the Laboratory, I drove to Florida in early 1952
with my deputy, Dr. Hans Gruene, the first two employees of today's Kennedy
Space Center, to look over the Joint Long Range Proving Ground which had been
established in 1949 with headquarters at Patrick Air Force Base and launch sites
at Cape Canaveral, Florida, 24 kilometers (15 miles) north on the Atlantic
Coast."
(2)
ABMA management and senior members of the launch team had very good
qualifications to successfully prepare and launch the early missiles since
they had participated in preparation and launch of sixty-six German V-2
rockets at White Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico and of two
modified V2's at Cape Canaveral. Launch checkout and operational
philosophy developed and used for those launches were put into use on the
early Redstone launches. Operational philosophy dictated that each
organizational element of the launch team be responsible for its own
equipment readiness.
Launch preparations consisted of detailed checkout of all flight systems
and ground support equipment, and of coordinated functional tests with all
systems running. Such tests were refined during successive launches
until eventually flights were actually simulated from takeoff to impact on
target.
Detailed checkout of flight hardware involved the use of mobile measuring
units equipped to simulate flight conditions for on-board sensors. Much
care was taken to establish that all measurements were within the
calibration limits provided by design agencies. This was provided by
permanent records made of specified calibration points. Calibration
records of the actual recorders and telemetry systems used were also a
requirement in the process of establishing confidence in actual flight
data.
The following photographs of the Electronic Measuring Trailer, supporting
one of the early Redstone launches, show some of the measurement team
at work performing quality checks on vehicle measurements and ground
voltage measurements, as well as all the vehicle pressure measurements
involved. Each vehicle measuring device was energized with a calibrated
value of voltage, resistance, or pressure in order to assure that eachvehicle signal-conditioning device achieved the proper output back to thetrailer through attached ground cables or through the telemetry systemduring simulated tests.
Missile Measurement Van For Redstone, Mercury-Redstone,
and Jupiter missile launches.
Inside View of Measurement Trailer During MissileMeasurements Checkout
and Verification
(Left to Right: Grady Williams, Wally Wallicer, Carl Jones, Fred
Conneway, Frank Childers, Alex Welhan, Robert Funkhouser)From the very beginning
of the Army Missile Program,
much emphasis was
placed on accurately calibrated measuring and test equipment. The small
Calibrations
and Standards Laboratory
set up at Cape Canaveral provided
the necessary calibration and traceability to the National Bureau
of
Standards for all measuring
and test equipment
used in launch
preparations.
The electrical network and propulsion systems of the Redstone
missile
were thoroughly
checked out by highly-trained
engineers and technicians
who had received most of their experience during the static testing phase
of development. Such experience continuity proved invaluable in assuring
successful launch
missions. During the five-year
span of the Army testing,
thirty-eight Redstones were fired to test the structure, engine
performance, guidance and control, and tracking and telemetric systems.
This work was done entirely under the aegis of research and development
(R&D).
Appendix No.1 documents the type of measurements which had to be
tested, measured and calibrated before each Redstone launch. As the
Redstone launches progressed, the measurement list became longer and
more complex depending upon advancements made in measurement
technology and in the telemetric and tracking systems. The pages
document the measurement program for Redstone (RS-1), which we
launched on August 20, 1953.
At that time in technological R&D (Research and Development) projects,
quality assurance was not a necessary discipline outside engineering and
operational functions. The words, quality assurance, or reliability, were
not a part of operational vocabulary, but rather they were highly implied
in each team member's work area. This high sense of the importance of job
function was initiated at static testing and was maintained throughout
prelaunch preparation and launch of these first ballistic missiles
by
the Army's Missile Firing Laboratory at Cape Canaveral. Thus, the quality
of ground control and missile data was assured by a small-team work-
ethic.
The Army missile team at Redstone Arsenal held to the time-honored
Army-arsenal concept whereby research and development and some
fabrication tool< place in Government facilities. The Army Ballistic
Missile (ABMA) Firing Lab at the Cape had complete responsibility for the
quality of the missile firing effort. The receiving, erection, checkout and
launch activities were performed by the small Army-civilian team with
knowledge due to several of the Missile Firing Lab team having gained
experience with the V-2 rocket launches at White Sands, New Mexico. That
knowledge was useful both at Huntsville and at the Cape when new
employees had to be trained in their support functions. The many
successful Redstone launches qualified the Missile Firing Lab to be ready
for the launching of Explorer 1 on January 31, 1958, the free world's first
satellite, Then later, the first American astronauts of the Mercury
Program were placed into space: Alan Shepard on May 5, 1961, and Gus
Grissom on July 21, 1961.
Some failures were experienced during the five-year Redstone R&D
Program and the Jupiter IRBM Program. Some were due to inevitable human
error and some were due to mechanical and/or electrical failures.
Fortunately, enough measurement parameters were telemetered to the
ground which allowed for thorough analysis and problem evaluation.
Failure data was faithfully fed back to design agencies for corrective
action. The integrity and conscientiousness of dedicated individual team
members were the secret of the R&D mission successes, rather than the
rigid quality assurance methods we know and use today. Much can be
said for the team concept if the team remains small and communi-
cative. As the team grew in numbers and as functions were contracted out
to aerospace contractors, the formal quality assurance concept became
more important.
The advent of the Chrysler Corporation into the design and fabrication
phases of operational Redstone and Jupiter Missiles at Redstone Arsenal
brought on the first formal quality and reliability programs. That fledgling
quality assurance program grew into an honored position in the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency and propagated itself into the Pershing Missile,
manufactured and launched by the Martin Marietta Corporation. The launch
team's role in this instance was to monitor, suggest, and interface with
launch team counterparts, until the Army and contractor teams were
thoroughly trained and experienced in the launch phase of development.
The quality assurance term, "zero defects," was first heard during the
Pershing Project, and that term began a whole new way to look at total
quality assurance in both government and industry.
At this point in the study of Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA), it
is important that terms, reliability and quality assurance be defined.
REL IA B I L ITY: "Reliability is the probability that a system, subsystem,
component or part will perform its required function under defined
conditions at a desiqnated time and for a specified operatinq period with a
stated accuracy. QUALITY ASSURANCE: "Quality Assurance is defined
as: "A planned and systematic pattern of actions necessary to provide
adequate confidence that the end items will perform satisfactorily in
actual operation."
CHAPTER 2
BEGINNINGS OF R&QA AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
R&QA history at the Kennedy Space Center began in the spring of 1962
when a QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICE and a RELIABILITY OFFICE were
established as staff functions to Dr. Kurt Debus, Director of the Launch
Operations Directorate (LOD). The LOD was a part of the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) at that time. Subsequent reorganization action
approved by NASA, established the LOD as a separate and independent
NASA Launch Operations Center (LOC). The LOC officially opened July 1,
1962. And then on November 29, 1963, it was renamed the John F. Kennedy
Space Center in memory of President Kennedy.
The Mercury Project QA team was already established in Hangar "S" at the
Cape and at St. Louis accepting McDonnell work on the capsules prior to
1961. The team was known as the Space Task Group under the management
of Mr. G.M. Preston. Preston's team was later called the Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC), Florida Operations.
During the time of design and testing of the Mercury and Gemini
spacecraft, Florida Operations QA personnel were assigned to MSC-White
Sands Operations where the Apollo launch escape system and the earth
landing systems were man-rated and certified to support the lunar landing
program. MSC QA personnel from Florida were also assigned to El Centro,
California to perform QA functions on all manned capsule parachutes.
Prior to establishment of the Quality Assurance Office at the Cape, the
Launch Operations Directorate relied on MSFC for support, including
quality assurance, reliability, purchasing, and contractor surveillance.
Early in 1962, the LOD set up its own purchasing and contracting office.
Establishment of this office required local quality assurance support in
procurement requests. The first instance of quality support was in the
contract for modifying Launch Complex 36 for the Atlas/Centaur Program.
The policies and directives of General Dynamics were reviewed for
compliance with NASA R&QA requirements. The Army Corps of
Engineers survailed and monitored the build-up of this and other launch
facilities for the LOD, performing all configuration control and
inspection functions during the over-all construction phases. The Corps
support continued through the completion of the Apollo Saturn V facilities
at the Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA).
NOTE:
Since the LOD was not staffed by quality assurance personnel at the
time of the turn-over of Corps work to KSC, Mr. Norm Perry of
Marshall Space Flight Center was detailed to inspect and do the final
buy-off of the Army Corps of Engineer work on complex 34. He had
interesting stories on this task. The work was finished and an
official quality assurance acceptance was performed in this manner.
A Reliability Office was created in 1962, headed, initially by Mr. Robert L.
Body and two young engineers, James Joyner and John Copeland, and a
secretary, Marge Holt. Their emphasis was placed on failure reports and
unsatisfactory condition reports as well as corrective action and failure
mode and effect analyses of ground support equipment. They were housed
¡n a trailer at Hangar D.
Two months after the LOC was established in July 1962, a Quality
Assurance Office was established as a staff function to the Center
Director, and provided all quality assurance support to the Center
Procurement Division.
The History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations called MOONPORT,
NASA SP-4204 was published in 1978. We find reference to the
establishment of the first KSC Quality Assurance Office on p.139:
"....Mr. Russell Gramer, head of the Quality Assurance Office, established
operations in half a trailer at Cape Canaveral with seven employees. When the
staff grew to 13 times that size, his force had to expand into other quarters. The
Quality Assurance people worked in such widely scattered places as an old
restaurant on the North Cape Road, a former Baptist church on the Titusville
Road, a residence on Roberts Road, and numerous trailers." (3)
Mr. Gramer hired Mr. Norm Perry of Marshall to set up an inspection
school at the old restaurant mentioned above. The author remembers
visiting the soldering school at that location early in the R&QA training at
KSC.
The first instance of Quality Assurance support provided by the new office
was during the purchase of the twenty-four foot telemetry antenna for the
Electronic Engineering, Measuring, and Tracking Branch. The QA Office
Chief remembered the congenial conference with the system engineer and
his acceptance of the quality requirements for the contract. Ready
acceptance of quality requirements was not always the rule at the Center.
LOC History showed that reliability and quality assurance made a
continuous uphill struggle for acceptance. Both Design and Operations
thought of R&QA as an intrusion into their areas of responsibility. As
time passed, higher management and the untiring efforts of the R&QA
Offices began to break the open resistance and to gain a degree of
acceptance. We find reference to this on pages 45-46 of MOONPORT:
"As one veteran recalled, "In the 1950's we looked at equipment when it came
down here as not trusting a single thing in it. We were going to check everything
from one end to the other." Consequently, LOD's checkout was precise and
exhaustive, "a laboratory type check on the pad." Basic operating procedures
were established and followed closely. Debus detailed some of these procedures in
a letter to NASA Headquarters shortly after the first Saturn launch. LOD
employed a test sequence that proceeded from components, through subsystems
and systems, to overall tests. . . . The technical checkout of the various Saturn
systems fell to LOD test engineers. Debus considered these engineers "the
backbone of LOD test activities;" they carried full responsibility for preparing a
launch vehicle to the point of launch readiness, and merited equal status with . . .
engineers in design, development, and assembly operations. While an error made
in the design or development phase could be detected by a test engineer, a mistake
by an LOD system engineer would inevitably lead to mission failure."
Conceding that launch site tests were part of a continuous program to
assure reliability and quality, Debus stressed the test engineer's need for
autonomy. "Since the system engineer carries the full responsibility for the
flight-readiness of his assigned system, this responsibility should not be
attenuated by assigninq a separate inspection or quality assurance team to check
on the system enqineer for compliance to test procedures and test performance. . .
A systems engineer had to be kept informed continuously of the status of his
assigned system and all occurrences during the test period." ( 4 )
During the preparation of Pad 34 to launch the Saturn 1 B's, the fledgling
reliability and quality assurance offices felt this resistance very much.
No one felt at home in the blockhouse or on the pad when it was necessary
to perform a quality action or when it was proper to interface with a
system engineer who was working under the above underlined directions."
KSC R&QA efforts came from the highly qualified operations and checkout
team developed during the ABMA days here at the Cape, and from the well
experienced QA team from the Manned Spacecraft Center, Florida
Operations, which was transferred to the Debus team January 1, 1965. The
MSC team had functioned well for all the Saturn 1, 1B, 1C launches from
Pads 34 and 37. R&QA inspection efforts consisted of checking and double
checking of practices to assure that measurements and parameters that
controlled the launch equipment/system's performed as intended.
When Ksc had absorbed Houston's Florida Operations team, KSC was
supposed to have assumed direction of the spacecraft contractors at the
Cape. The North American and Grumman teams at KSC, however, had
continued to look to their home offices, and indirectly to Houston, for
guidance. This old method of operation ended in the aftermath of the LC-
34 tragedy on January 27, 1967. With the support of NASA Headquarters,
KSC took firm control of all spacecraft activities. This gave more
strength to quality assurance surveillance efforts and pad-safety at Pads
34 and 37, and later at LC-39 pads.
Early in the Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA) operations build-up, some
KSC procurements slipped by without R&QA requirements in the
procurement requests. One particular procurement remembered by the
writer was Contract NAS10-1909, dated October 27, 1964. The contract
was let to "Monitor Systems, Inc.," of Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, for
a digital telemetry system called "Data Core." In that instance, NASA
Headquarters' review of the procurement revealed that no R&QA
requirements had been incorporated. KSC was immediately notified of this
and was requested to visit the contractor facility to review their
R&QA standards for possible acceptance for the KSC contract.
Mr. Peter Mindermann, Chief of the Telemetry and Tracking Department,
along with a NASA Reliability Engineer, Frank Childers, and Norm Perry
(KSC QA), were given travel orders to fly to Fort Washington to resolve
the problem. Subsequently, Chapter 7 of Monitor Systems Proposal Number
464202, which outlined their R&QA Program, was invoked in the contract.
Through use of the contractor R&QA standards, in conjunction with the
KSC Quality Surveillance Technical Representative (QSTR), Norm Perry's
visits, an acceptable system was delivered. Norm Perry, remained as the
QSTR after award of contract, where he certified Monitor Systems' special
processes for the KSC contract.
The trouble encountered in this procurement gave impetus to the Center's
responsibility for incorporating proper R&QA provisions into contracts in
accordance with NASA Procurement Regulations, NPC-400 issued in
January 1964. NPC-400 was issued as a separate publication and in-
corporated and superseded all the procurement material published in
Chapter 18 of the NASA Management Manual issued prior to September 18,
1963. Extensive editorial changes were made and new material such as
Sub-Part 50, "Integration of Quality Requirements in NASA Procurements"
and Subpart 51, "Integration of Reliability Requirements into NASA
Procurements" were added.
This particular procurement forced the Center procurement and R&QA
personnel to get involved in the cooperative effort of invoking appropriate
R&QA requirements into contracts for launch critical equipment.
NASA Quality Publications NPC 200-2, "Quality Program Provisions for
Space System Contractor's" and NPC 200-3, "Inspection System
Provisions For Suppliers of Space Materials, Parts, Components, and
Services," issued in April 1962 along with NPC 250-1, "Reliability
Program Provisions for Space System Contractors," issued in July, 1963
came into use at that time as implementing documents. Subsequently the
Center issued KMI 5310. 2, "Incorporation of Reliability and Quality
Assurance Requirements in KSC Procurements," to require such
implementation. Mr. Norm Perry, of KSC QA, remembered that he was on
the Review Board for such documents.
After President Kennedy announced Apollo Program in 1962, the project
blossomed into a national buildup of contractors located all over the
United States. The geographical distribution of NASA contractors/vendors
placed too much demand on the new NASA Center R&QA surveillance effort
for adequate coverage. Whereupon another NASA quality publication, NPC
200-1, "Quality Assurance Provisions for Inspection Agencies" issued in
April, 1962, came into use as the Center began to delegate
quality surveillance to other government inspection agencies located in
the vendor areas or in their plants. This method proved to be successful,
in that reliable equipment with adequate historical documentation was
delivered to Center users for the first time.
Needless to say, all this activity in reliability spurred Center R&QA
training activities. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) with some degree
of history in R&QA concepts, was called upon to present courses in quality
assurance for engineers and technicians who had been transferred into
quality assurance positions early in the Apollo Program.
The following classes were given in the on-going education effort to
qualify all Quality and Reliability Engineers in the Apollo, Skylab, and
Apollo-Soyuz Programs:
Report Writing, Oct. 1963.
Reliability Engineering Seminar For Managers (GE. ASD), Nov. 1965.
NASA Quality Requirements, Dec. 1967.
Contractor Performance Evaluation Seminar, Mar. 1969
Executive Seminar For Scientists and Engineers, Jan. 1970.
Basic Management Techniques I and 11,1970.
U.S. Army Material Corrosion Control Course, March, 1974.
Several other classes were given as needed in a particular work
area.
These courses along with membership in the Florida Chapter of the
American Society of Quality Control (ASQC) was instrumental in educating
the participating Reliability Engineers and Quality Engineers at KSC.
Several of the engineers were given ASQC certification in their fields
after proper qualification through education and experience. KSC policy
allowed administrative leave for attending the Florida Chapter/ASQC
meetings. During this period (1963-1965), Spacecraft Operations and the
KSC Launch Operations and Installation Support Directorates had
organized Quality Assurance Offices. The Center Director for Quality
Assurance was established in 1965. The Director, Quality Assurance,
operated as a staff function to the Center Director. The Director of QA
was charged with developing and establishing policy and developing
methods of surveying and auditing the Center QA Program.
The Spacecraft Operations Directorate's Quality Surveillance Division had
been functional from the very beginning of the Mercury Project in 1961 at
KSC.
Early in the Apollo Program, NASA Headquarters was busy trying to get
each Center to accept help from the NASw-410 contract with General
Electric at Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Pat Mongillo
,of the
Contracts
Office, was tasked to call a meeting for October 21, 1964, at Kennedy
Space Center. Historical data on this meeting are found in Appendix 2.
The purpose of the meeting was to cover the projected manpower levels
which were submitted in the GE Annual Work Program. It was only an
interim Headquarters/Center arrangement until the KSC tasks could be
structured to comply with General Phillips' directive to have the major
emphasis placed on mission orientated tasks in all possible areas.
The
Reliability Office was the focal point for pulling together the R&QA
requirements.
Attachment A to Appendix 2 provided for the coordination and clarifi-
cation of the overall KSC reliability analysis program. Attachment (B) was
an effort to provide several organizations with general guidance regarding
the future use of GE/ASD under NASw-410 in the Apollo Program.
Some level-of-effort tasks could be arranged such as the arrangement
with GE for Reliability Engineers to assist KSC Directorates in overall
Apollo Reliability Profiles for launch critical systems. Profile reports
included failure mode and effect analyses for each Saturn-V launch
critical system. Profiles were formally provided at design reviews, etc.,
as shown on the following APOLLO RELIABILITY PROGRAM chart:
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The Chief of KSC's Reliability Office also functioned as a Staff Office to
the Center Director, and later to the Director of Plans & Programs
Resources to develop and establish reliability policy.
NASA Headquarters issued the NASA Handbook, NHB 5300-lA in July, 1966,
which required each Center to have internal R&QA Plans and Procedures
which Headquarters would audit annually. This action precipitated
establishment of Quality Offices in each Directorate at the Center. Plans
were developed and presented to the KSC Director of Quality Assurance for
approval as the Apollo Program progressed. The Reliability Office, headed
by Robert Body, became the Apollo R&QA Office, reporting to the Director,
Plans, Programs and Resources.
The Director, Quality Assurance instituted the required internal audit
program in 1967 which proved effective in more adequate R&QA programs
being developed and implemented at Directorate levels. Mr. Richard Teti
was remembered as the first R&QA Auditor at KSC. His job was an up-hill
struggle for many months because of reports from System Engineers that
he was interrupting operations. Teti's acceptance was slow in coming, to
say the least.
Also, in that year, NASA Headquarters began the annual audit and survey
program of Center R&QA activities. An additional audit function was
established in April 1968 for the purpose of assuring implementation and
use of approved work procedures. The implementing document for this
function initially was KN 5310.1, "Random Audits of Approved Work
Procedures." It was replaced in July 1970 by KMI 8610.8/QA, "Random
Audit of Work Procedures." Initially the new program was resisted by
Center elements because of concern for interference with important work
progress and launch vehicle testing in process. In spite of resistance to
such a surveillance program, it progressed without interruption of
important tests and became an important tool to management for assuring
that approved procedures were on hand and in use throughout the Center
testing and launching activities.
Mr. Guy Cohen was remembered as the leading Quality Audit representative
from NASA Headquarters. His title was Director, Skylab Reliability,
Quality & Safety. The first NASA Headquarters audit was performed at KSC
in August, 1967 with Random Audits beginning in February,1968. Mr. Cohen
attended all or most of them, and his letters of appreciation were well
received. His letters of audit findings against KSC were not so well
received, but were helpful in finding areas of concern which needed
corrective action. One hundred percent corrective action was required in a
timely manner back to the NASA R&QA Director in Washington before thedefective items were closed out. Such a tight audit program was followed
throughout the Apollo, Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz Programs, and the earlySpace Shuttle Program.
As would be expected in such a vast activity area as launch vehicle
preparations and testing, some quality assurance problems and human
error incidents were bound to happen. A program which began with ninety-five per cent of the problems requiring extensive recurrence action ended
with only three per cent requiring any kind of corrective action. Enabling
R&QA documents such as NHB 5300.4(1B), NHB 5300.4(1C), NHB 5300.
4(1A), NHB 5300. 4(2B) proved to be most helpful in providing and assuring
reliable launch support equipment for the manned programs at the Center.
CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF R&QA
MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION
On July 16, 1958, the U.S. Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act
, creating the National Aeronautics And Space Administration (NASA). The MarshallSpace Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama was made a part of the initialNASA team, who on July 1, 1962, created the Launch Operations Center (LOC) herein Florida. On November 29, 1963, five days after the death of President John F.Kennedy, the Center was named the John F. Kennedy Space Center in his honor.
On November 5, 1958, the Space Task Group (STG) was formed to lead the
satellite program planning, execution of design, and development and
testing of a manned satellite for America. The STG expanded as the task
became more expansive and complex to include more people working indesign, procurement and testing areas. This also included necessary people
experienced in aircraft quality assurance.
Dr. Wernher von Braun's LOC team was transferred to NASA in December,
1959. This action set the stage for the experience of that team to join
with the experience of the Space Task Group to use the Redstone vehicle
and the experienced missile launch team at Huntsville and at CapeCanaveral to launch the first Americans into space in 1961. Before, andduring these actions, the Mercury Atlas was being tested to allow man to
enter into earth orbit after the initial tests with the modified Redstone
vehicle were completed. Effective January 1, 1965, the STG contingent
under Mr. G. Merritt Preston, was transferred to the Launch Operations
Center (LOC) at KSC, headed by Dr. Kurt Debus.
At this point in the history of space flight, a need arose to consolidate
NASA reliability and quality assurance management and requirementdocumentation. NASA R&QA documents from both agencies were adopted,
revised, and improved for the LOC procurement program. In 1961, Quality
Engineering Bulletins QEB-1,
-2, and -3 (Quality Provisions for Govern-
ment Agencies, Prime Contractors and Suppliers) were used. Then in 1962,
NPC 200-1A
- Quality Assurance Provisions For Government Aqencies, NPC
200-1, Quality Provisions For Space System Contractors, NPC 200-3
Inspection System Provisions For Suppliers of Space Materials, Parts,
Components, and Services, NPC 200-4
- NASA Solderinq Specifications,
NPC 250-1, Reliability Provisions for Space System Contractors, and
others were issued.
These were utilized until 19G9, when the following documents were
issued as follows:
NHB 5300.4(1B) was issued in 1969 to replace NPC 200-2.
NHB 5300.4 (28) was issued in 1971, to replace NPC 200-1A.
NHB 5300.4(1A) was issued in 1970, to replace NPC 250-1.
NHB 5300.4(1C) was issued in 'l97°l to replace NPC 200-3.
Mr. Deter Grau (MSFC), in "Quality Progress, "February 1972, presented the
following chart and made this statement:
"Users of these documeitts are aware that what is in them existed before 1961
and could have been found by conscientious and knowledgeable interpretation of
previously existing documents. What is new is the simple language of the mainfeatures and emphasis placed on attention to det:ail in hardware. We emphasized
the necessity of combining theoretical and paper effort and the hardware effortinto an integrated program. We have been going this way since the early '60s and
the concept has been accepted everywhere much faster and better than we had
ever hoped, even if some mumblings were heard and a few stumbling blocks
removed "
Improved
Revised Future
Documents
IIIIB 5300. 4(1A)(Reliability Requirements) Use started in 1970NHB 5300, 4(IB)(Quality Requirements)
NPC 200-1,
-2, and -3(Quality Provislous for Government
Agencies, Prime Contractors & Suppliers) Used from 1962
NPC 250-1 (Reliability Provisions through 1969.
for Prime Contractors & Suppliers)
uality Engineering Bulletius
-
DEB-1,
-2, and
-3(Quallty Provisions for Govermnent Agencies, Used duringPrime Contractors & Suppliers 1961
'l
Mr. Grau continued his statement:
" When we laid out the pattern for the quality assurance area, we realized
that the next step would be to set the frame for a reliability effort based on the
same fundamental principle: marriage of the theoretical and hardware efforts.NASA Document NPC 250-1 spells this out. This step was not easy since the
theoretical approach prevailing at that time emphasized apportionment and
prediction of numerical probability of success. Placing this approach in proper
perspective provides a tool that enables us to zero in on problem areas requiring
many different engineering disciplines for their resolution. Applying these
documents mainly to the Saturn-Apollo project and working with all contractors
involved, we found areas requiring clarification and improvement. The combined
efforts of NASA Centers, together with input from industry, resulted in revised
versions (NHB 5300. 4(1B) and NHB 5300. 4(1A) which became available in
1969." (5)
In the latter half of 1959, as the Space Task Group's quality monitoring
effort gathered momentum with various manufacturers, the urgent search
for ways to reduce the ultimate risk of sending a man for a ride in an
artificial moon lifted by a missile, gradually became more systematic and
better organized. It then became clear to all involved that reliability had
to be built into the equipment in order to advance the symbiosis of man
and missile, of astronaut and capsule.
What about that word, RELIABILITY? Mr. Grau of ABMA Quality Assurance
mentioned early in his above statement that the next step would be to set
the frame for a reliability effort based on the same fundamental principle:
"marriage of the theoretical and hardware efforts."
The quote from THlS NEW OCEAN, NASA SP-4201, 1966 page 178, shows
this step being undertaken at the Saturn-Apollo level:
"Reliability was a slippery word, connoting more than it denoted. Yet, as
an engineering concept, it had basic utility and a recognized place in both aviation
and missile technology. The quest for some means of predicting failures and
thereby raising the odds toward success began modestly as a conscious effort
among STG and McDonnell engineers only in mid-1959, after design anddevelopment work on major systems was well under way. Other engineering
groups working in support of Project Mercury also began rather late to take
special care to stimulate quality control and formal reliability programs for
booster and spacecraft systems. Mercury would never have been undertaken in
the first place if the general state-of-the-art had not been considered ready, but
mathematical analyses of the word "reliability" both clarified its operational
meaning and stirred resistance to the statistical approach to quality control.The fifties had witnessed a remarkable growth in the application of
statistical quality control to ensure the reliability of weapon systems and
automatic machinery, The science of operations analysis and the art of quality
management had emerged by the end of the decade as special vocations. " ( 6 )
The next logica\ step in the evolution of mission reliability was to Man-
Rate the Machines. This quote on man-rating the overall Mercury space
program was taken from THIS NEW OCEAN, A History of Project Mercury,
NASA SP-4201, beginning on page 179. The following quotes do form a
good history of the struggle made in establishing a closer quality and
reliability program for the United States' manned launches:
"In view of the fact that estimates showed over 40,000 critical parts in the Atlas
and 40,000 more in the capsule, the awesome scale and scope of a reliability
program for Mercury; made it difficult to decide where to begin. To organize
engineering design information and data on component performance, someone had
first to classify, name, or define the "critical parts." To create inter-related
systems and to analyze them as separate entities at the same time was difficult.
The Space Task Group and McDonnell worked on creation at the expense of
analysis through 1959. Gradually NASA Headquarters and Air Force systems
engineers steered attention to certain "semantic" problems in the primitive
concepts being used for reliability analyses. For instance, what would constitute
a system? How should one define failure? What indices or coefficients best
'measure' overall system performance from subsystem data?
These and other features of reliability prediction were so distasteful to
creative engineers that many seriously questioned the validity and even the
reliability of reliability predictions. Reliability Engineering, admitted one
apologist in this field, may seem to be more mysticism and black art than it isdown-to-earth engineering. In particular, many engineers look on reliability
prediction as a kind of space-age astrology in which failure rate tables have been
substituted for the zodiac. Around STG this skeptical attitude was fairly
representative. But at NASA Head-quarters, Richard E. Horner, newly arrived inJune 1959 as Associate Administrator and third man in command, had brought in
a small staff of mathematicians and statisticians. It was led by Nicholas E.
Golovin, who transferred from the Air Force to NASA some of the mathematical
techniques lending quantitative support to demands for qualitative assurance.
Theory-in-Washington Versus practiced-at-Langley were in conflict for a year
until the nature of "reliability" for pilot safety on the one hand and for mission
success on the other became more clearly understood by both parties. The
pressure exerted by Golovin and NASA Headquarters to get the Task Group andMcDonnell to change its approach to raising reliability levels became a
significant feature in redesign and reliability testing during 1960.
Scientists, statisticians, and actuaries, working with large populations
of entities or events, had long been able to achieve excellent predictions bydefining reliability as a probability, but in so doing they sacrificed any claim toknow what would happen in a unique instance. Engineers and managers
responsible for a specific mission or project entities or events, had long been
able to achieve excellent predictions by defining reliability as a probability, butin so doing they sacrificed any claim to know that would happen in a uniqueinstance. Engineers and managers responsible for a specific mission, or projecttended to ridicule probability theory and to call it invidiously "the numbers
game." Being limited to a small set of events and it invidiously forced by time to
overlap design, development, test, and operations phases, they could not acceptthe statistical viewpoint. They demanded that reliability be redefined as an
ability. The senior statistician at Space Technology Laboratories for the Atlas
weapon system, Harry Powell, recognized and elaborated on this distinction whilehis colleagues became involved with man-rating the Atlas. His remarks indicated
that Space Technology Labs (STL) and Convair/Astronautics faced the samedivergence of opinion that NASA Headquarters and STG confronted.
If reliability is to be truly understood and controlled, then it must be thought of
as a device, a physical property which behaves in accordance with certain
physical laws. In order to insure that a device will have these physical propertiesit is necessary to consider it first as a design parameter. In other words,
reliability is a property of the equipment which must be designed into the
equipment by the engineers. "Reliability cannot be tested into a device and it
cannot be inspected into a device; it can only be achieved if it is first designed into
a device. " Most design engineers are acutely aware that they are under several
obligations; to meet schedules, to design their equipment with certain space and
weight limitations, and to create a black box (a subsystem) which are fed into it.It is imperative that they also be aware of of their obligation to design a device
which will in fact perform its required function under operation conditions
whenever it is called upon to do so.
There is a rule in Probability theory that the reliability of a system is
exactly equal to the product of the reliability of each of its subsystems in series.The obvious way to obviate untrustworthy boxes in parallel to perform the samefunction was the technique most often used to ensure reliability.
After the cancellation of Mercury-Jupiter, Kuettner and others at ABMA
set about a serious effort to develop a parachute system to recover the RedstoneThey also began to concentrate on the simplification necessary for the sake of
reliability to custom-build a man-rated Redstone. Starting with the advanced,
elongated version of the rocket, which had been renamed the "Jupiter-C" in l956for the Army's ablation research on reentry test vehicles, Kuettner called uponthe expertise of all who could spare time from the Saturn program to help decidehow to man-rate their stock. The fundamental change made to the Jupiter-C
airframe was the elimination of its staging capability. Other modifications
stripped it of its more sophisticated components while permitting it to retaingreater Performance characteristics than the original single-stage Redstone.On July 22, 1959, STG engineers received a group of reliability experts
from von Braun's Development Operations Division at Huntsville. Three decades
of rocket experience had ingrained strongly held views among the 100 or so of
rocket leaders of this organization about how to ensure successful missions. TheABMA representatives told STG that they did not play the "numbers game" but
attacked reliability from an exhaustive engineering test viewpoint. Their
experience had adequacy of their own reliability program, carried out by a
separate working group on a level with other engineering groups and staffed by
persons from all departments in the Development Operations Divisions of ABMA.In conference with design engineers, ABMA reliability experts normally set uptest specifications and environmental requirements for proving equipment
compliance. STG felt sympathetic to this approach to reliability, but systems
analysts at NASA Headquarters did not.
As for the prime contractor's reliability program, in the first majortextbook studied by the astronauts, McDonnell's "Project Mercury
Indoctrination" manual, distributed in May 1959, the pilots read these
reassuring words: " The problem of attaining a high degree of reliability forProject Mercury has received more attention than any other previous missile or
aircraft system. Reliability has been a primary design parameter since theinception of the project." ( 7 )
As the space program advanced into the Mercury-Atlas phase, more faith
was placed in quality assurance procedures and in redundant systemdevelopment, than in mathematical models or reliability prediction duringdesign. This concept prevailed throughout the manned space flight
program, in spite of counter recommendations by the General Electric
Apollo Support Department (ASD), working under NASA contract,
NASw-410.
The Launch Operations Center (LOC) {which later became Kennedy Space
Center (KSC)}, reliability personnel placed emphasis on analysis and non-
quantatativa techniques for identifying critical parts and systems in lieu
of mathematical models and prediction. The heart of the reliability
analyses became the failure mode and effect analyses, and rigorous
evaluation of actual failures, and assisting design engineers in
establishing redundant and back-up systems and components.
Much good was accomplished by GE-ASD, but not in the area of math
modeling and recommended prediction programs. R&QA Surveyors' Training
Course, designed and conducted by GE A. S. D., was well received by NASA
personnel needing such training. The course was tailored toward people
who visited hardware contractor facilities for audit and survey
purposes. The course was designed around the NPC series of R&QAdocuments, and GE-ASD contributed substantially to NASA/Industry's
understanding of the documents.
Reflecting back to the importance of Reliability & Quality Assurance
surveillance of the contractors providing support to the space program,
one may wonder how this was accomplished in the real world of
government contracting.
The U.S. Government MEMORANDUM, dated May 16, 1968, found in Appendix
3 shows how this was accomplished. It was accomplished through
appointment of a Contract Technical Manager and a Reliability and QualitySurveillance Alternate Technical Representative for each Center contract
which required such formal monitoring and evaluation of contractor
performance. A typical Acceptance letter is shown on page 5 of the
Memorandum.
The Position Record, dated October 19, 1966, found in Appendix 4, showshow the Quality Surveillance Representative was tasked in writing toimplement the numerous detailed responsibilities at the Center
Directorate level.
The Memorandum, dated March 17, 1965, Subject: Reliability Program
Requirements for Hydrogen Fire Detection System, found in Appendix 5,
shows correspondence between the Reliability Engineer and the Design
Engineer which ultimately went into the contract for a Hydrogen Fire
Detection System. Even though the system was made up of off-the-
shelf sub-systems, the overall detection system was "launch essential,"
which then demanded reliability elements (a) through (m) be invoked in the
contract. The second paragraph on page 3 shows that the KSC Quality
Assurance Office would provide the appropriate quality assurance
requirements for the contract; paragraphs (b), (d), (f), (g), and (h).
This division of responsibility for reliability and quality assurance was
followed throughout the buildup of the Saturn and Apollo support systems
at KSC. Reliability Engineers were tasked to cover reliability require-
ments and contractor surveillance in their respective Directorates, whileQuality Engineers were tasked to provide quality assurance requirements
and surveillance of contractor work across the Center, after the Army
Corps of Engineers completed their work at KSC.
Both Reliability and Quality Engineers followed KSC's Kennedy Management
Issuance (KMl 1710.1) in day-to-day responsibilities. Quoting from that
document:
........"that it is KSC policy to incorporate appropriate reliability and quality
assurance requirements in procurements. It further states that requirements
will be tailored to the criticality, complexity, state-of-the-art, cost, schedules,
and the amount of research and development required by the contractor." (8)
The assigned KSC Reliability Engineer, working with Design and
Procurement, reviewed each contract for launch critical systems, and
recommended the following reliability elements to be invoked in
accordance with the above policy:
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Off-the-shelf boilerplate requirement
Contractor reliability statement
Design Specification
Reliability Prediction/Estimation
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis
Maintainability
Design Review
Failure Reporting & Correction
Parts and Materials Program
Parts Selection
Equipment Logs
Reliability Testing
Reliability Assessment
Reliability Progress Report
Reliability Program Report
This reliability requirement matrix of the above NASA Apollo ground
support equipment, shows what detailed planning and follow-up with
hardware contractors was required by KSC Reliability officials. The
assigned Reliability Engineer followed up procurements and visited most
of the manufacturers for survey and coordination purposes. Contract sign-
off was also required by the R&QA representatives. (See Appendix 8)
The KSC Quality Assurance Office provided and coordinated all quality
requirements directly with the Technical Directorates and invoked quality
assurance requirements in appropriate contracts in their areas of
responsibilities. They followed up procurements with either visits to the
manufacturer's plant or coordinated with Government Agencies on site fortheir assistance in monitoring a KSC contract.
The following NASA documents were followed in performing this veryimportant government function as launch-critical systems/equipment
were purchased and subsequently survailed by KSC engineers:
KMI 5310.12A/QA: Incorporation of Reliability and Quality
Assurance Requirements in KSC Procurements
NHB 5300.4(ED): NASA Procurement Regulations
Appendix 6, "A Technical Paper, Incorporation of Reliability Requirements
into KSC Procurements," provides detailed implementation instructions
for each important reliability requirement paragraph used in KSC
contracts. This Technical Paper was written in 1975 as an aid toReliability Engineers working with procurement personnel at KSC.
Quality Inspection Is a key implementing activity for making sure
that engineers and technicians are doing their jobs responsibly. Early in
the Saturn-V program many qualified technicians were transferred to
quality assurance offices. They were given the required training todo their job of quality inspection. Structured training in all aspects ofR&QA were required for each newly assigned quality analyst/inspector. Quality Assurance Status Stamps shown below were issued and
controlled by each KSC R&QA Office's Stamp Custodian. Notice that each
analyst/inspector was assigned a number for identification back to
the official quality action taken by the individual:
Conformance Stamo
-
Triangle stamp ( v.T ) used to
indicate that articles and/or accompanying documents satisfy
NASA requirements and conform to prescribed criteria.
Nonconformance Stamp
-
Hexagon stamp ( ) used to
indicate that articles and/or documents have been inspected
and/or tested, but do not conform to requirements. Such
articles and documents are subject to further corrective
action, inspections, tests, investigations, processing, or
contractor actions.
NASA
Void Stamp
- D-shaped stamp ( av ) used to indicate
that previous Government inspections, tests, and
accompanying documents are void.
Surveillance Inspection Point (SIP) Stamp
-
A square
NASA
stamp ( ) used real time to identify certain tasks,
operations, or processes on future work steps that NASA
Quality must verify.
NASA Quality Inspection Stamps
The assigned Stamp Custodian maintains a secure listing of all persons
who have custody of a set of quality assurance status stamps and lead-
wire pliers. He or she investigates all loss of stamps and pliers, and
records the re-issuance of new ones. All lost stamps or pliers are
thoroughly documented and records kept in case they are found. The
issuance of these important tools-of-trade for qual¡ty inspectors sealedforever their importance and status in assuring a disciplined quality
assurance program at KSC.
A most important Apollo and Shuttle R&QA function Is the audit and
survey of R&QA activities within both NASA and in the contractor day-to-
day work. The audit and survey organizational evolution is documented in
the Quality Assurance Office Chief, Mr. R.A. McDaris' memorandum ofOctober 3, 1980, shown in Appendix 7. The following data taken from thatdocument shows major audit and survey activity for McDaris' staff:
a. Conducts formal configuration management, safety, reliability, and quality
assurance program surveys of KSC organizations, on-site government agencies,
and on-site contractors.
b. Documents and reports the status and results of the formal surveys to KSC
management. Presents deficiencies at closeout sessions with government/
contractor personnel, recommends corrective action, and performs follow-up
audits as required.
c. Conducts special investigations of safety and reliability and quality assurance
requirements and program problems.
d. Performs random audits of work procedures throughout the KSC work areas
and reports result to KSC government/contractor management levels asdetermined necessary.
e. Participates in surveys of other NASA centers upon request of NASA Headquarters.
f. Participates in, or assists NASA Headquarters in surveys of KSC.
g. Develops the KSC master survey schedule. distributes quarterly to the
appropriate organizations a planned six-month survey schedule of on-site andProcurement Office off-site surveys.
h. Assists in the preparation and maintenance of the necessary plans, procedures,
and controls for implementing an effective safety, reliability, quality assurance
and configuration management survey and audit program.
i. Assists in the review of government/contractor configuration manage-
ment, safety, and R&QAManagement instructions and procedures. (9)
This KSC audit and survey program during Apollo launches was carried
over into the preparation of handling and launch support facilities, andground support equipment for the first Shuttle launch planned for the
early 1980's.
The handling, storage, and preservation of materials, from the early
missile launches at Cape Canaveral until today, has been a very important
element of launch operations. Early Redstone and Jupiter launches by theMissile Firing Laboratory from Redstone Arsenal, recognized theimportance of assuring the integrity of spare parts and materials for the
preservation and integrity of all flight spare parts, and Line ReplaceableUnits (LRU's). Mr. Robert Green was assigned as the first person to lead
the way. A special building was erected in the Hangar"D"/Hangar"R"
compound at the Cape just for assuring proper handling, storage, trackingand preservation of important spare missile parts and materials. The
effort became more important as the space program opened up to mannedventures into space. Many improvements were made as the activity called,"Logistics," was given more attention and more efficient and securesystems were instituted at KSC.
Issues of the KSC SPACEPORT NEWS have shown a trail of qualityimprovement actions which are important in the history of KSC's R&QAprogram over the years of operation at Cape Canaveral and at KennedySpace Center. The first remembered action took place when in 1983-84,KSC adopted the program for Productivity improvement and QualityEnhancement (PlQE). Copying from the February 17, 1984 issue ofSPACEPORT NEWS:
"There's a new acronym making the rounds of KSC -- PlQE, short forProductivity Improvement and Quality Enhancement.
Destined to become familiar to all employees, it is NASA's response toPresident Regan's call for all federal agencies to improve America's competitiveability in the world marketplace through increased productivity and quality ofwork.
PlQE's objective is simple: to stimulate and increase employeemotivation, commitment and capability towards getting the job done better, faster
and more economically.
KSC, as the nation's major launch facility for space flight, has theopportunity to become a pacesetter for PlQE, because of its varied functions andits interrelated work force that combines the best of government, industry andthe educational community.
PlQE is guided at KSC by the center's Productivity Council, which servesas a catalyst for productivity improvements. It consists of representatives fromthe line directorates and the American Federation of Government Employees(AFGE), plus ex-officio members from Executive Management, Legal,Personnel, Public Affairs and Safety staff offices.
Current council members are Dallas Gillespie, AC; Steve Harris,DD-MED; Jim Summa, Sl-PRO-4; Bill Huseonica, SM-ANA; Tom Martin, CM; SaulBarton, PM; Dick Mundy, CC; Bill Schick, SF; Ray Corey, PA EAB; Warren Camp,EX-MPR; and Gatha Cottee, PA-PlB, representing AFGE.
in addition to implementing and monitoring the PlQEprogram at KSC, the
council is responsible for keeping the KSC Senior Staff informed of its activitiesand plans. Gillespie, who serves as chairmen, interfaces with David Braunstein ofNASA Headquarters, named Executive Director of Special Projects byAdministrator, James Beggs. Beggs chairs NASA's steering Committee for PlQE,a group including all center administrators and assistant administrators.
Some of PlQE'smajor objectives at KSC are:
l. Increasing Civil Service productivity motivation through seminars, lectures
and workshops, and wider training.
2. Revitalizing employee suggestion and award systems.3. Encouraging and supporting NASA Employee Teams (NETS)and Quality Circles.4. Holding contractor workshops to deal with impediment issues and to discussproductivity programs.
5. Initiating concentrate efforts to make use of automation.6. Recognizing employees for their productivity accomplishments.
KSC employees are being encouraged to participate in a significant way inproductivity and quality improvement. Gillespie emphasized, "It is a realopportunity to utilize the innovative ideas of our work force as a means to
upgrade and extend our capabilities.
In future issues, Spaceport News will explore in detail the six focus items
of KSC's PlQEprogram, and report on their progress." (1 0)
A new concept first promoted by Dr. Edwards Deming, an American leaderin Total Quality Management (TQM), was first reported in the November 2,1990 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS, pages 1 and 4. (Dr. Deming visited KSC
when the push was on to develop a cadre of R&QA engineers to organize
and lead an effective R&QA program for the Apollo Program. Dr. Deminghelped the Japanese automobile industry and electronics industry to set
new standards for quality and production after World War ll):
"Our task, together, is to turn our vision of the future into reality...to carry outour missions with the utmost attention to total quality and productivity...(and) toapply unwavering standards of excellence: Admiral Richard H. Truly, NASAAdministrator, told approximately 700 agency and company representatives atthe Seventh Annual NASA/Contractors Conference last week.The conference, with a theme of Total Quality Leadership, was held Oct.24-25 at the Grenelefe Resort and Conference Center, 30 miles west of Orlando.The annual meeting provides a forum for NASA and contractors to exchange
strategies for quality and productivity improvement.
Truly told the participants that the space program today stands at a
crossroad. He said, "We are entering a new age of space exploration where we
will find countless doors of opportunity...to learn more about this precious planetwe live on, about our neighboring planets, and about what lies beyond our solarsystem. We have the opportunity to establish a permanent presence in space,colonize the moon and explore the planet Mars."
Whether or not America actually chooses to pursue this effort will dependon the people in this room," he cautioned the Conference participants. "If we are
to place humans on the planet Mars by 2019, then each of us must be committedto total quality leadership in everything we do.....leadership and quality and
excellence will be the key to this new age."
Citing George Low as the example for conference attendees to follow,Truly said that the former acting NASA Administrator's personal commitmentto quality and excellence was the driving force behind the historic first landing
of men on the moon during the Apollo program.
"George Low represented quality and excellence like few others," Truly
emphasized. "He practiced TQM long before it became the management word. Our
charge at this conference is to discuss ways to build on the legacy that George Low
left us."
To reaffirm NASA's commitment to Low's philosophy, Truly said that hehad changed the name of the agency's annual Excellence Award, presented eachyear to NASA contractors during the conference, to the, "George M. Low Trophy."
The 1990 recipients of this award are Rockwell International Space Systems
Division and Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc.
"Since 1958, contractors have been an integral part of NASA and our
stunning successes," Truly pointed out.
However, the NASA Administrator also stressed that along with the pridein past accomplishments there must be a commitment to continued excellence in
the great challenges that lie ahead.
"If we all take part and share with each other our best ideas, we will
remain the world's leaders in space," Truly emphasized. "If we mutually commit
to continued total quality excellence, as a management philosophy and as a way of
doing our daily business, there will be no limit to our achievements." (1 1 ).
This was a large goal that Administrator Truly laid out for NASA
employees in this study in Total Quality Management. In the same issue of
the SPACEPORT NEWS, page's 1 and 7, we found evidence of how KSC
viewed Truly's challenge as he talked about how KSC would attempt to
challenge and prepare KSC employees to embrace TQM:
"The quality of the work force, and the work performed by the Kennedy Space
Center team has always ranked with the best in the world, Center Director
Forrest McCartney told a gathering of NASA and contractor managers recently.
"However, maintaining that excellence and improving on it is a never-ending
process and Total Quality Management (TQM) will help us achieve that goal."
McCartney has appointed Deputy Director Gene Thomas to oversee all of
the TQMefforts at KSC and serve as chairman of the TQM Committee. "TQM is a
work philosophy which has led to dramatic quality and productivity improve-
ments at NASA, other governmental agencies and big business. It has been so
successful that President Bush has advised all government agencies to adopt it,"Thomas reports. "In response, NASA Administrator Richard Truly has issued
instructions for all NASA centers to establish TQM plans."
The TQMSteering Committee at KSC, chaired by Thomas and consisting of
eight other senior NASA/KSC managers, is tasked with the overall leadership and
development of TQM policies and direction.
McCartney appointed Warren Camp as chief of the TQM and UniversityLiaison Office within Bill Rock's Advanced Projects and Technology Office. Dr.Albert Koller, from that office is chairing the TQM Action Committee that ischarged with implementing the steering committee policies.A third committee, the TQM Integrated Working Group, is comprised ofsteering committee members and representatives from nine major KSCcontractor companies. This group held its kickoff meeting Oct.1, and will work tointegrate the KSC TQMplan throughout the center.
TQM is the outgrowth of the work which W. Edwards Deming did in helpingthe Japanese industry emerge from almost total devastation during World war llto setting new standards of quality in automobiles and electronic products,"Thomas points out. "It focuses on the customer, both internal and external, and aprocess of continual improvement. It stresses training of every employee,empowerment of employees to effect change, a team approach, measurableperformance and a philosophy of doing the right thing the first time.We're now in an early phase of implementing TQM," Thomas stated. "AKennedy Management instruction is presently being completed that defines theTQM responsibilities of everyone at the center. Also, we have begun educating top
management in the TQMphilosophy."
"TQM will fail without the total commitment of management at alllevels, and especially at the top," he emphasized.
Dr. Koller attributes the success of TQM to its ability "to significantlyincrease the individual's influence on the product or service." With TQM, Koller
says, "employees can see that they do make a difference and have the means to do
so.
Moving from the present to a TQMculture is an evolutionary process that
will take several years, Koller believes. The KSC goal is to provide TQM trainingto every employee.
"TQM has already garnered the largest body of industry supporters of anymanagement approach I have ever known," Koller says. "Its popular because it
combines all of the sound management theories into one vehicle."Camp points out that several major aerospace corporations have initiated
successful TQM efforts to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Other large
companies such as IBM, Westinghouse, Xerox and Hewlett-Packard have alsoembraced this concept to successfully reverse their downward business trends.Stil other companies can credit their survival to the adoption of TQMprinciples.
"Although KSC management can learn much from the successful way
others have implemented TQM, the center cannot adopt their plans," Camp
emphasizes. Instead, he says, the KSC plan must be tailored to specific KSC needs.KSC management does not see TQMas a totally new concept, Camp says, ltis viewed as building on the work of the past and a natural evolution of the qualityprocess that has always existed at the center.
"TQM also fits in here because it is strongly team oriented, " Camp says."Teams are a way of life here at KSC. The difference is that the TQMprocess is an
opportunity to create teams not just for problems solving but for continuous
improvement as well."
"TQM is also oriented toward the individual," Camp says.
"For each individual to make the process work best for them, employees shouldthink about what they can do to provide a better product or service to a customer,In TQM, everyone is a customer, from a co-worker who asks for information, to
a company that needs to know how to become a KSC contractor," he explains.
"TQM is a better way to generate new ideas and interest about quality andthe saving of limited resources. In these times, everyone at KSC needs to be
working toward these goals," Camp concludes." (1 2)
This November 1, 1990, issue of SPACEPORT NEWS here at KSC has beenhelpful to historians in faithfully providing the detailed information ofthe beginning, and of the need to embrace TQM as a management
philosophy. The "small-team-work-ethic of the original launch teams atthe Cape was embracing TQM before we heard of Dr. Deming, but in large
organizations like KSC and most of industry who are trying TQM, thephilosophy should work much better in establishing a quality-conscious
work force.
In Chapter 3, we have tried to document the evolution of R&QA at KSC. The
proceeding quotes from KSC'S newsletter, SPACEPORT NEWS, has been
most helpful in that evolution.
The PlQE program that was established early in the Shuttle Program is
still going forward at KSC. The February 10,1995 issue of Spaceport News
gives an account of the President's Quality Improvement Prototype Award
to KSC:
"Kennedy Space Center employees welcomed last week's announcement madeby the Federal Quality Institute to Center Director Jay Honeycutt that KSC hasbeen selected as a winner of the President's Quality lmprovement Prototype
Award.
In announcing the award to KSC employees, Honeycutt praised thethousands of KSC workers who have been involved in improving processes and
safety, and reducing the cost of the program to the American taxpayer. "It is an
effort we are committed to continuing," he said.
Gene Thomas, deputy center director, said upon hearing the news, "Thisis significant recognition of our focus on quality, adding value for our customers
and making our center's civil service and contractor work force the best in the
world.
"Last year, KSC was a finalist for the quality prototype award. After continuing to
make significant improvements, KSC has now been recognized as a winner,"Thomas said.
James l. Jennings, director of Human Resources, also recognized KSC
employees and added that JoAnn Morgan, director of Safety, Reliability andQuality Assurance, and Mike Winchell, chief counsel, played a key role in leading
the center's efforts in getting ready for and hosting the on-site visit by the
examiners of the Federal Quality institute.
The president's Quality Improvement Prototype Award recognizes federal
organizations that are leading the way in implementing quality management and
achieving high standards of customer satisfaction. In receiving this award,Kennedy Space Center joins a select list of top federal agencies that havedemonstrated outstanding achievement and quality management.
Dick O'Brien of the Federal Quality Institute said that KSC was one of five
of the 32 applicants for the President's Quality Award to receive an award. It'shighly competitive and a big distinction for an organization to be recognized," he
said.
While only one organization was nominated for the Presidents Award, andthat nomination is subject to President Clinton's approval. "KSC is a 'high-
performance organization' to receive the Quality Improvement Prototype honor,"
he said. The Award will be presented to Honeycutt by Vice President Al Gore at
the Eighth Annual Conference on Federal Quality in Washington, D.C. in July.
One can see great continuity in the President's Quality Award program as
we look at the KSC SPACEPORT NEWS of October 24, 1997:
"Nine NASA and contractor employees of Kennedy Space Center were honored this
year with the Quality Assurance Special Achievement (QASAR) award for
exemplary performance in contributing quality products and/or services to
the space program." Richard Carlson of Rocketdyne, Clark Creery, of Boeing,Patrice Henson of USA, James Keller, I-NET, James Davis of NASA, David Law ofUSA, Timothy Wright of USA, J. Mica Parenti of NASA, and Gary Hendrickson of
Boeing received the award." (1 4)
The evolution of R&QA continues today under Continual Improvement (Cl).
This whole process of harnessing management and space employees into a
close launch team, is called, "Continual Improvement." It has the same
goals as the Productivity lmprovement and Quality Enhancement program(PlQE), established in 1984, Total Quality Management (TQM), establish-
ed in 1990, and the Structured Survaillance Program, established in 1993.
The following brief history of Quality Management was provided by theContinual Improvement Representive:
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER History of Quality Management
Quality management has evolved as an integral part of operations sincethe Center was established in 1962.
Top KSC executives recognized that we should improve our quality andprocedures while emphasizing safety as our number one priority.Improvement activities focused on four areas:
• reduce the number of shuttle and payload activities,
• strengthen partnerships with our customers and suppliers
• expand employee empowerment, and
• use the Total Quality Management/Continual improvement (TQM/Cl)
process to accomplish these changes.
1987 The first formal KSC Strategic Plan was developed.
1990 KSC participated in a NASA internal assessment, using the
President's Award criteria but elected not to submit an
application to the Federal Quality Institute.
1991 KSC Strategic Plan was rewritten with more specific goals and an
added emphasis on TQM/CI and Kennedy Management Instruction(KMl) on TQM/Cl was implemented.
1991 KSC contracted with the Cumberland Group, a national consultingfirm, to provide a basis for TQM implementation. By the end of the
year more than 80 percent of our employees had participated in
workshops and received TQM training
1992 The KMI was revised.
1993 A NASA-KSC team developed a new mission statement while
another team formulated a new Strategic Plan. A third team
developed and published the first CI Plan.
1993 The Center Director wanted an external assessment of progress inCl, and KSC applied for the Improvement Prototype Award and was
selected as a finalist.
1993 KSC Structured Surveillance Program implemented (discussed in
chapter 5).
1995 KSC received the President's Quality Improvement Prototype
Award. KSC was also named a finalist for the Florida Governor'sSterling Award.
1996 KSC was named a winner of the Presidential Award for QualitySpecial Achievement.
As one reads about the NASA effort to improve safety, reliability andquality assurance, it is clear that KSC has continued to make progress inthe Continual improvement management concept in our country'simportant business of space exploration which deserves the appreciation
of all our people.
The latest SR&QA management system is implemented by combining theKSC Business Management System Manual (KDP-KSC-M-1000), and the KSCSafety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual Operating Agreement (AOA)For FY 2002 and Out-Years (KCA-1702, Rev.A). "The Introduction" to theAOA includes these guidelines:
(1) Plan S&MA functions to meet the institutional, program and projectcustomer requirements; (2) establish a basis for negotiating at the Center andAgency level a resource allocation necessary to meet program requirements; and(3) provide metrics for management of the Center S&MA resources. The AOAprocess encourages continuous improvement and program and projectfeedback.(15)
The KSC Business Management System Manual, (Rev. G) beginning on page15, provides the following major Mission Assurance program elements:
Control of Customer-supplied Product
It is KSC's policy to control customer-supplied product from receipt untilreturn to the customer or until the incorporation of the product into higher-level assemblies. Identification of product defects upon receipt of hardware is
recorded, investigated and reported to the customer upon identification of aproblem. Loss or damage to hardware during processing is dealt with in a similarmanner. Customer-supplied product problems caused by KSC personnel are
recorded in the KSC corrective action system.
Product identification and Traceability
Where contractually specified or in line with KSC policy, identification andtraceability subsystems are established to control materials, including their
source data. Controls are initiated at the contract award stage and, in many cases,
extend through manufacturing and acceptance for incorporation into higher-level
assemblies.
Controls are maintained to incorporate engineering changes that alterproduct configuration. As required, additional documentation is generated
reflecting new product identification and corresponding re-identification of the
part while maintaining traceability.
Process Control
Procedures and instructions are developed on an ongoing basis by functional
managers to ensure assembly, processing, mission and support activities are
performed under controlled conditions. Process control procedures include
contract management activities and administration of award fees, as well ashands-on processing. Process control requirements are met for each specific
area as follows:
• development of procedures to control activities
• use of suitable equipment
• conducive environment for performance of work
• compliance with internal and external documentation
• process monitoring
• approval of new equipment and processes as they are implemented
• workmanship standards
The activities subject to control and management oversight include:
Assembly processing
Award fees
Biomedical operations
Contractmanagement
Customer Opportunity
Equal opportunity
Expendable Launch Vehicles.
Finance
Independent Assessment
Information technology
Installation operations
International Space Station processing
Laboratory practices
Legal
Logistics
Payload carriers
Payload processing
Personnel
Public relations
Safety and quality
Shop operations
Spaceport Services
Space Shuttle processing
Space Station Hardware Integration
Special projects
Special processes are operated both at the Center and at the facilities of our
contractors.There are controls to ensure that special processes are performed
under suitable environmental conditions by qualified people. Control points are
established during the contract award phase, which includes the assessment of the
contractors' abilities to meet contractual requirements.
Inspection and Testing
KSC personnel are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to perform
receiving inspection on procured items prior to use. This regulation does not
permit the bypass of material inspection when items are urgently required;
therefore, a subsystem for this activity does exist.
Documented procedures for all inspections and tests are established or aredeveloped, as required. Inspections and tests on items produced through
experiments and laboratory activity are performed by both KSC and contractor
personnel.
KSC's final acceptance of previous inspection and test results is performed in
accordance with individual program plans. Authorization by close-out and sign-
off of all associated documentation is completed prior to transfer to a contractor
of final release of the product.
Individual directorates and prime contractors jointly hold records of inspections
and tests. Contractors in various locations retain completed records across theCenter. In addition, Certificates of Flight Readiness (COFR)are completed prior
to vehicle launch and retained by KSC.
Integrity of Inspection and Testing Equipment and Verification ofTest Application Software
The integrity of equipment and software is an extremely important aspect ofKSC's activities. Accurate instrumentation and application of verified software
are critical to mission success. To this end, calibrations and verifications are
performed by onsite laboratories and in contractor laboratories when required.The intervals for hardware calibration have been established. These intervals aremonitored and amended on the basis of laboratory results. In some cases,infrequently used items are calibrated on each occasion prior to use. Appropriate
operational and storage conditions are maintained to continue accuracy through tothe use period of the equipment.
Test Status
Various methods of demonstrating test status of hardware or verification ofsoftware are utilized at KSC. Inspection, test, and verification records are asecondary indication of the inspections, tests, and/or verification performed,the test status of the item, and whether the item is acceptable for use.
Nonconforming Product
KSC personnel are involved in the administration and decision-making ofdisposition of contractors' nonconforming products. In some cases, KSC personnelare solely responsible for the disposition, resolution, and treatment of a defectiveproduct. Since KSC is primarily a nonmanufacturing environment, KSC'sinvolvement in product treatment is limited.
The problem reporting systems are managed by the Center, but are primarilyused by contractors to communicate the status of nonconforming products. KSCpersonnel are responsible for monitoring contractor problems and theirrespective corrective actions, and for reporting adverse trends or conditions tomanagement.
Corrective Action
KSC developed and operates an extensive corrective action subsystem. This coversbusiness management system improvement, control of government contractors'
nonconforming products, and general customer complaints. Corrective action isimplemented to improve operations and the communication among employees,senior management, and contractors. Problems found during internal audit aredocumented in the Internal Audit System (!AS) while all other problems,including external customer complaints, are reported in the Customer Forum(Opportunity for improvement) System.
Preventive Action
All managers are responsible for analyzing available data to assess when action isnecessary to prevent a problem. Preventive actions are formally reported andevaluated for Center-wide impact and for further action during managementreview.
Continual Improvement
Continual improvement is an integral part of the business policy. Civil Serviceimprovement activities at KSC are primarily initiated by either internal audit orCenter personnel when opportunities for improvement are reported tomanagement. When required, management creates teams to investigate
opportunities for improvement and to develop innovative solutions. Criticality,
risk, cost, cost reduction, safety, and feasibility are the criteria used todetermine when corrective action will be taken.
Material Handling, Storage and Holding, Protective Packaging,Material Maintenance, and Transportation
Material Handlinq
Extensive handling operations of component hardware, equipment, chemicals, andliving organisms are used at the Center. Protective measures are required whenpreparing these materials in readiness for movement. Replacement andprocurement of handling systems are important elements of these operations.
Storaqe and holdinq
Adequate holding facilities for stored materials are established, including secure
conditions. Materials are identified and given storage locations for ease ofretrievaL Environmentally controlled conditions are maintained whereappropriate to preserve those materials subject to deterioration and/or limitedlife.
Protective packaqinq
Suitable packaging is either designed or procured by the Center to protectmaterials. This protection is extended to include storage, holding, movement,
and/or transportation to other Center locations, vendor facilities, and spacemissions. Where required, instructions are issued to handlers to ensure
material integrity is maintained. Labeling of material while packaged is anintegral aspect of the packaging process.
Material maintenance
in many cases, materials require maintenance before being installed,
utilized, or incorporated into higher-level assemblies. Controlled maintenance
recall systems are in operation by our contractors to inform custodians whenmaintenance of materials should be performed.
Transportation
Where the Center is responsible for movement of materials, the nature of thematerial is assessed to determine the protection required to maintain integrity.Controts extend to vehicle selection and securing and transportation conditions.Transportation instructions are developed to maintain the integrity of materials
while in transit.
Record Collection and Retention
Each director has the responsibility to document the KSC Business Record Matrix
with required collected data to be retained by their staff. The record matrixincludes staff responsibilities, retention periods, storage, and archive locations
with the minimum required data with regard to record collection and retention.However, it is an acceptable practice for directorates to add additionalinformation to the matrix.
KSC's record retention arrangements established by KSC's record
manager, in accordance with NASA AND NARA Regulations (reference NPG
1441.1), enable effective management review of this system to maintain the
confidence of management, customer and internal and external auditors.
Internal Audit
A program of internal audit is established at KSC to evaluate the ongoingimplementation, applicability, and value of this business management system.Internal audit schedules are developed through the management review process
upon request, by each directorate's/office's management. Nonconformaties are
immediately documented in the Internal Audit System (IAS) and, following
corrective action, are also subject to management review.
All KSC audits are performed by auditors outside their directorates or
program offices.
It is KSC's policy to reserve audit resources for those areas where
problems occur or where operations are viewed as critical to mission success.
Matrics information is used to assist in determining where audit resources are
required.
All KSC internal auditors have undertaken a minimum of 24 hours offormal auditor training.
Traininq
KSC's policy is to provide training for all NASA personnel at the Center. Training
requirements are divided into required and development training elements.Employees are not permitted to perform all aspects of their work until required
training needs for each aspect have been satisfied. Required training is
documented on the Center-wide Required Training Plan for all employees who
require training following assignment to a position. The plan gives the minimumdata with regard to required training; however, it is an acceptable practice fordirectorates to add additional iriformation to the matrix if it proves helpful. In
addition, directorates have databases that enable them to monitor developmental
training which is not subject to the requirements of ISO 9001-1994.
Personnel training needs have been established for all work activities. Training
is performed both on-the-job and through formal instruction, including
academic training, in order to further fulfill the needs of the Center for
specialized skills and expertise. Training records for on-the-job training are
maintained by each directorate for its employees. Records of formal training are
maintained in procurement and training records. Employees were previously
qualified on past experience; and therefore, training records for required (on-the-job) training performed before April 23, 1998, have been retained.On an annual basis, the Center Director determines appropriate training
to be mandated for the fiscal year. Mandatory training in some cases is necessary
to fulfill legislative requirements. This training includes any pertinent training
that is required to fulfill the needs of the Center in a given year.Individual career enhancement training requirements are identified in
Annual Training and Development Surveys and Individual Development Plans.
Records of completed developmental training are contained in the ASTAR
automated training system that is managed by the Workforce and DiversityManagementOffice.
The procedure for personnel training can be found via electronic mediathrough the Business World web page or the Technical Documentation (Tech Doc)database.
Servicinq
The Kennedy Space Center civil service employees do not perform servicing
activities on KSC's products.
Performance Indicators
KSC does not use the application of statistical techniques to confirm process
capability.
Statistical techniques, however, are deployed in some directorates for the
purpose of assessing contractor performance. In this case, the activity is managed
through Process Control. (1 6)
The methods used in all these Mission Assurance functions are found via
electronic media through the Business World Web page or the Technical
Documentation (Tech Doc) database.
These implementing documents do not require the usual KSC "R&QA
Program Plan," as such. Instead the Kennedy Space Center Business
Manaqement Manual and the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual
Operatinq Aqreement (AOA) For FY 2002 And Out-Years are deemed
adequate to implement R&QA programs for the center. Appropriate
elements of these manuals are included in KSC support contracts as
appropriate.
CHAPTER 4
HISTORY OF R&QA IN THE SATURN-APOLLO
PROGRAM
On July 16, 1958, Congress passed the Space Act of 1958, creating theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Space oriented Army facilities and personnel resources were merged with
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to form the
nucleus of NASA. Thus NASA was born
- an agency especially formed to
establish and pursue a program of peaceful space exploration. At the same
time NACA's original aeronautics research program was to be pursued. The
amalgamation of these agencies, along with additional personnel from
phased-down programs, brought together able scientists and engineers toform the new agency.
The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) personnel at Cape Canaveral
under Dr. Kurt Debus, were transferred to NASA as part of the MarshallSpace Flight Center's Launch Operations Directorate (LOD) in December,
1959. The LOD began to organize itself to support the NASA programs as
well as supporting the continuing ABMA launches such as the Redstone,
Pershing, and Jupiter missiles, as well as the beginning Mercury-Redstone
science and primate launches. On July 1, 1962, the Launch Operations
Center (LOC) was formed at Cape Canaveral.
Among the first R&QA efforts within the LOC was establishment of a testinstrument calibration and recall system. This was accomplished within
the Electronic Engineering, Measuring and Tracking Branch under Mr. KarlSendler. The author was assigned to help with that effort, and was also
responsible for establishing an automated ALERT program. The ALERT
system utilized the IBM card system for expediting the response to
ALERTS which could affect the Telemetry and Tracking systems in Hangar(D) at the Cape. Each piece of equipment in both of the launch mandatory
systems was inventoried for critical components. The identity of each
component was fed into the IBM card reader so that ALERTS from
Huntsville or other Centers could be found quickly and corrective action
taken.
The ALERT System proved to be an effective way to share defective
component data to other NASA Centers and contractors. The ALERT system
also proved to be an effective element of R&QA through the rest of theRedstone/Jupiter programs and into the Saturn Project. Each KSC
technical directorate treated ALERT notices in their own manner.
By 1964, the Kennedy Space Center management was assigning R&QAduties to each Center Directorate. They were to work under their own
management, but also under the Project Director, or the Apollo R&QAOffice for guidelines promulgated by NASA Headquarters.
NASA was being noticed more and more by private industry and by the
educational institutes as a place where high technology was taking place.They wanted more information on any progress being made in space
technology and operations. Because of shortage of Public Affairs
personnel, the author was asked to give a presentation on KSC's R&QA
progress to graduate students of the University of Miami on July 23, 1965.
The presenter ended the session with the following message from Dr. Kurt
Debus, the first Center Director of the Kennedy Space Center.
"Let us proceed to even more challenging tasks which lie ahead with
renewed enthusiasm and confidence. We must always be mindful that what we dohere will affect the destiny of the nation and of our children for generations to
come."
The following flip charts, provided by the KSC Apollo R&QA office were
used in the presentation to show operational responsibilities at the time:
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- Reliability Engineering
QUAL/Di ASSUPANCE
• QUALITYA99Uf?ANCEPULICIES,REQUlkElvlENTV,
9TAMPhi?PGANP Pl20GEPUEEG
• QUAlliV A49URANCE PROGI?AMPLANG
• QUALilY A99URANCETEßlMIMCs ŸI?0Crl?AMS
• QUßLflV A94URAMoli GTETUVAMPTECUkliCALPRQBLEMGA99E99MENT
• QUALIIVA99URAMGEPEAGTICEOASID TECW-NIQUEG AUDIT9
• QUALflV A99URANCElìEGOUf?CE I?EQUlF/E
-MEMTS AND JUSTIFICATION
Flip Chart 2B
- Quality Assurance
A//SS/ON REL/AÐ/L/D/
e MISSION SUCCE99 AND SAFEly REQUIREMENTO
• Ml?GIONI i?ELIABILW PGLiciBF, STANPM2pc ANDPECCŒPU!?ES
• MiCGIGN RELIABILTIV MÄTHEMKflC MODELS
• '9]ANPARP" MlúSION PROPlLE
• Ml9910N RELIABILOY APPUffl0AIMENT
• MISSIDM RELIABILlW TRAINIMG PROGl2AM
• RELIABILffV PRACBGE9AWD TECWNIGUESAUDDS
• Ml9910N RELIABILITY RESOU2CE REQU\REMENTSAND JUfflFIGAfl0N
?-C
Flip Chart 2C
-
Mission Reliability
SC P A PROR4M MANAGEMENT/WTE254dES
ADNINISTilATION
FRENCINifflN HFORNATION' ¢0NSTRUCTOND SWTENS
LAUNGI(UPPORT Ed00kdE5 AUN¢H VillI¢LE
A½URANCEDIN EQPTENR DIV
.T
Flip Chart #3
- KSC R&QA Program Management Interfaces
The KSC Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance Office interfaced withNASA Headquarters for KSC Apollo Program R&QA matters. This office
established, defined, and coordinated KSC Apollo Program R&QA policy and
management outside Spacecraft Operations. The office also interpreted
and assured NASA Headquarters policy, and assured cornpatibility amongKSC organizations concerned with reliability and quality assurance.
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Flow of KSC Quality Assurance, Standards,
procedures, and Support Requirements.
The task of implementing the KSC reliability program rested with the
various operating Directorates and Divisions as shown in the Flip chart#4. This chart shows the flow of KSC R&QA Standards, Procedures, andSupport Requirements.
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- Information Systems Directorate Reliability
and Quality Coordination Office
Inforrnation System's particular responsibilities were carried out underthe direction of the Chief of the Information Systems Technical Staff as
shown on Flip Chart #5. Mr. Dan Collins was Chief of the R&QACoordination Office. Mr. Robert Body succeeded Collins, then Mr. John Fike
continued as Chief of the Information Systerns Directorate R&QASurveillance Office well into the Space Shuttle era.
One of the most important organizations was Launch Vehicle Operations(LVO). This organization gave close support during vehicle handling,fueling and day-to-day operations. The QA Division's responsibilitiesbelow are taken from page 6 of the May 25, 1967, copy of the SpaceportNews:
"KSC'S Quality Surveillance Division of Launch Vehicle Operations aim forperfection and approaches it according to Don Oswald, division chief.Oswald speaks for an organization that was formed in July 1966 by KSC
under his guidance, to supervise the quality and reliability of the updated Saturn
and Saturn V programs.
'We try to make sure all equipment is as close to perfection as humanly
possible by inspecting on a 100 percent basis all modifications and engineering
changes incorporated into the vehicle and associated launch support equipment,'
said Oswald, 'and by continually inspecting the vehicle stages, the ground
support and the electrical support equipment for defects and deficiencies ofany nature. Our effort is to get the launch vehicle perfect.'Findings during inspection have not only corrected malfunctions inhardware, but in addition, the records from these inspections are used to evaluatethe performance of the contractors' reliability and quality assurance efforts.Oswald's division also reviews and approves the stage contractors' quality
and reliability program plans under the KSC contracts. Besides, the divisionperforms survey and quality reviews of the contractor's quality control
operations.
The division, originally staffed 66 inspectors from various KSC
engineering sections, now has approximately 90 employees distributed amonglaunch complexes 39, 34 and 37.
The first 66, all having been involved in Saturn programs as technicians,
were converted to inspectors and were given a training program by NASA to teachthem reliability and quality control functions.
The division prepares many quality control procedures for theinstruction of their reliability and quality assurance personnel and technicalinstructions that affect contractors as well as launch vehicle operationspersonnel.
The success of the Surveillance Division is due in part to the supervisors.The top five have over 100 years experience in civil service and over 80 yearsin reliability and quality control work.
They are Oswald, M.H. Camomilli, Deputy Division Chief; George Senical,Branch Chief of Updated Saturn Quality Surveillance; Robert Abbott, BranchChief of Saturn V Quality Surveillance; and Wayne Priddy, Chief of theReliability Staff.
The KSC branch maintains a close working relationship with the MarshallSpace Flight Center's quality control organization to maintain continuity of
quality from inception of the hardware to launch." (1 7)
Chart #4 also shows the importance of another key organization who
reported just how that office conducted business at KSC during the Apollo
Program. Robert A. McDaris headed up that office and played a major rolein the overall implementation of quality assurance across the Center. His
own account of that ma.jor effort follows from page 3 of the August 31,
1967, SPACEPORT NEWS:
"KSC'S Quality Assurance Division is a staff function responsible for
establishing Center-wide plans and policy in quality assurance andimplementation of these programs in the field.
As Director Robert A. McDaris explains it, each major Center element
either has its own quality assurance organization, or is serviced by one.
'Look at it this way,' McDaris says. 'KSC can be compared to a corporate
structure with each major directorate representing a company within that
structure. Each director is responsible for management of one or more major
mission support contractors and one of his most important "tools" for effective
management is his quality assurance organization.
"It'sour job, as a corporate staff office, to see that all directorates followthe overall KSC plan for quality assurance, and advise the Center Directoraccordingly? To carry out this part of the program, McDaris has split his smallwork force into two offices: Plans and Policy under Andy Mayse, and Audits andStatus , headed by Joe Mayer.When we started,' McDaris recalls, 'there were very few publishedguidelines for a Center-wide quality assurance program. Our Plans and PolicyOffice has since published 15 documents in specialized areas of Reliability andQuality Assurance..These serve as policy 'ground rules' for the various directorates tofollow. Mayer's Audit and Status Office then makes periodic checks in the field toinsure that the quality assurance programs are being carried out in accordancewith Center policies.
Though McDaris' staff is small, he says there are several hundred civil
service and contractor employees working in the reliability and quality
assurance field at the Center.
'Contractors have their own quality people;' he says, 'but since NASA has
mission responsibilities, it becomes a KSC function to provide effective
management over the contractor's quality assurance program.'
Joe Bobik's people do this in Spacecraft Operations, for instance,
checking contractor quality work on the Command and Service Module, and LunarModule, among other things. Launch Vehicle Operations, under Don Oswald, has
similar responsibilities for all Saturn stages.
It is McDaris' job, in simplest terms, to obtain an overall consistency and
uniformity of Q.ualityAssurance throughout KSC.
More specifically, the objective is to 'provide for the consistent
application of NASA quality assurance philosophies and practices, and to ensure
that the quality levels of all facilities, hardware, software, and services used by
KSC fulfill the requirements of which they are part, or which they support.
There are, at present, seven KSC Directorates with quality assurance
line organizations of their own. They are:
1. Launch Vehicle Operations, Quality Surveillance Division, D.R. Oswald, Chief.
2. Spacecraft Operations, Quality Surveillance Division, J.M. Bobik, Chief.
3. Unmanned Launch Operations, Operations Support Branch (R&QA),W.
Brinkley, Chief.
4. Design Engineering, Technical Staff, Otto Fedor, Chief.
5. Information Systems, Quality Surveillance Office, D.D. Collins, Chief.
6. Support Operations, Quality Surveillance Office, Dr. J.B. Gayle, Chief.
7. Installation Support, Quality Engineering and Control Division, R.A. Gramer,
Chief.
Additionally, there are three program and project managers with
responsibilities for developing and establishing their requirements for inclusion
in the KSC Quality Assurance Programs. They are: Apollo Program Manager,
Apollo Applications Program Manager and a manager for unmanned projects, tobe performed by ULO. R. L. Body is Chief of the Apollo Applications Reliability
and Quality Assurance Offices.
McDaris said KSC is aided in the implementation of its quality assurance
policies by the Air Force Test Site Office. This group which acquired valuable
experience in the Gemini program, helps in the Unmanned Launch Operations and
receipt of Center-procured hardware.
As a staff office, my own people have no line direction authority. We can,
therefore, better channel our efforts toward the development and use of Center
quality assurance policies." ( 1 8).
The following KSC Organization Chart depicts the Director of KSC Quality
Assurance reporting to the KSC Director, Dr. Kurt Debus. Mr. R.A. McDaris
was the Director of KSC Quality Assurance across the Center. He co-
located his Quality Engineers to give support in procurement quality
requirements and surveillance of off-site contractors who provided
hardware and software support for KSC installations and up-grades. He
also provided support in all receiving inspection actions for the Center.
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The following chart shows the Quality Assurance Inter-orgarlization
Relationships during the early Apollo Program. The note at the bottom
right of the chart states that the Quality Engineering Directorate and
Control Division provided support to the Design Engineering Directorate,
and Quality Engineering to all other organizations.
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Each directorate provided their own quality assurance and reliability
program office and staff. A Design Engineering Technical Assistant
provided reliability oversight of reliability studies and contract
provisions under Mr. Fedor as shown on the chart. In this manner, every
operations and technical organization carried out a tight R&QA effort with
NASA policy direction from the KSC R&QA Office who reported directly to
Dr. Kurt Debus, the KSC Director.
Since most of the Apollo support systems were designed and
manufactured by industry, it was KSC's responsibility to ensure that
adequate, consistent reliability requirements were invoked in the
procurement contracts. Each directorate's R&QA personnel participated in
the selection of suitable contractors and coordinated with the Quality
Assurance Division to ensure that adequate quality requirements were
invoked in the contracts for both technical equipment and services.
To assist in the reliability requirements area, the NASA document NPC
250-1, Reliability Program Provisions For Space System Contractors, was
followed. Kennedy Management Instructions (KMI's) were issued to cover
this function. Four areas were covered in the documents: Program
Management, Reliability Engineering, Testing. Reliability Evaluation and
Documentation. Reliability Engineering is the area where most effort was
required:
1. Design Specifications
2. Reliability Prediction and Estimation
3. Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis
4. Unattainability and Elimination of Human-induced Failure
5. Design Review Program
6. Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA)
7. Standardization of Design Practices
8. Parts and Materials Program
9. Equipment Logs
All of these reliability requirements were considered for each critical
launch support instrumentation system. Item #6, Problem Reporting and
Corrective Action, and item #9, Equipment Logs were most important
in that in establishing life history at the factory, these two elements
were a very important reliability data base for the particular system. If
any testing or checkout time was expended at the factory, these two
elements were very important. The reliability data base for that
particular equipment or system began with power-on at the factory
and continued through checkout and operation at KSC. Such data was
required of the contractor and factored into the reliability program of
that system at KSC. Contractors and subcontractors were monitored to
assure compliance with KSC reliability requirements by monitoring
performance through Quality Assurance and Reliability Program Surveys,
Each contractor was visited at least once during the design, manufacture,
or test phases. Most of the small contractors did not have a formal
reliability organization as such. Much coordination, training and guidance
were needed so that a particular contractor could respond to the contract
R&QA requirements.
Quality Assurance for the technical Directorates was implemented by the
Quality Assurance Division Representatives. To assist in the Quality
Assurance Program, NASA published the following documents for use in
invoking appropriate requirements into procurement contracts at the
NASA Centers. Other implementing documents were added as required as
the Apollo Program progressed:
NPC-200-1, Quality Assurance Provisions For Inspection Agencies, April 1961
NPC-200-2, Quality Program Provisions For Space System Contractors,
April 1962
NPC-200-3, Inspection System Provisions For Suppliers of Space Materials ,
Parts, Components, and Services, April 1962.
NPC-200-1A, Quality Assurance Provisions For Government Agencies, June
1964
KMI 5310.11, Nonconformance/Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
System
NHB 5300,4(2B), Reliability And Quality Assurance Provisions For Government
Agencies, November 1971
NPC-250-1, Reliability Program Provisions For Space System Contractors,
July,1963
NPC-200-4, Quality Requirements For Hand Soldering of Electrical
Connections, August, 1964
NHB 5300-2, Apollo Metrology Requirements Manual, December 1965
NHB 5330.7, Management of Government Quality Assurance Functions For
Supplier Operations, April, 1966
NHB 5300.1A, Apollo Reliability And Quality Assurance Program Plan,
July 1966
NHB 5300.3, Handbook for Contamination Control On The Apollo Program,
August, 1966
NHB 5300.5, Apollo Applications And Quality Assurance Program Plan, May
1967
NHB 5300.4 (3A), Requirements For Soldered Electrical Connections, May
1968
NHB 5300.6, Apollo Applications Parts And Materials Program Plan, July 1968
NHB 5300.4(1B), Quality Program Provisions For Aeronautical and Space
System Contractors
NHB 5300.4(1A), Reliability Program Provisions For Aeronautical And Space
System Contractors (Formerly NPC 250-1), April 1970
NHB 5300.4(3C), Line Certification Requirements For Microcircuits, May 1971
NHB 5300.4(3F), Qualified Products Lists Requirements For Microcircuits, June
1972
KSC R&QA developed, directed, and performed reliability analysis of
launch critical systems; analyses such as Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis, Criticality Rankings, Failure Analysis, Alternate Modes of
Operation, and Contingency Plans.
A Failure Reporting System was instituted at KSC early in the life of each
Apollo support system to report, analyze, correct, and feed back
information on all failures or malfunctions recorded. The first reporting
form was called the "Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR)." This form
was completed for each problem occurrence whether it was a minor or a
major unsatisfactory condition. This UCR System was used until it was
replaced by the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) system.
Minor problems historically have been reported on the Discrepancy Report
(DR) throughout KSC. Other important problem documentation were, the
Open Items List, the Squawk, the Interim Problem Report (IPR), the
Constraints List.
Each document was followed up for resolution and correction in a timely
manner. Failure reporting is one of the most important tools for
reliability determination of an operating system. The Bathtub Curve is
widely used to show where the system stands in its failure record. The
first section is usually called the region of "infant mortality." This region
is characterized by a sharply decreasing failure rate. The failures in this
region are usually due to serious defects introduced during the
manufacturing process.
The second region is one in which the failure rate is relatively constant.
This is called the "useful life" region, and it is popular with probabilistic
reliability professionals, because being constant, it can be used to predict
failure rate. A common term for expressing a constant failure rate is
mean-time-between-failures (MTBF). The failure distribution in this
region is also the sum of a series of smaller failure distributions. In most
cases, random events are assumed to dominate this region, and failures
here are often called "extrinsic" because they result from events external
to the item or system.
The third region is characterized by an increasing failure rate, and is
called "wart." This is the region in which a major failure mechanism
progresses to the point where it causes failure of all remaining items or
subsystems. The "bathtub" curve shown below shows the sum of the infant
mortality, random failure, and wart curves:
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NASA Headquarters established the Parts Reliability Information Center
at Marshall Space Flight Center as the official parts information data bank
for all of NASA. KSC was tasked to supply reliability data to the data bank
as failure history was developed. Each critical work station was required
to keep an equipment log for recording all failures and corrective action
on launch essential systems. Such information allowed reliability
personnel to determine these reliability elements: non-perfect repair,
operating time, down time, meantime to failure, meantime between
failures, meantime to repair, and configuration changes to the system
being logged.
In spite of good R&QA requirements invoked in hardware and services
contracts, many costly mistakes were made in the Apollo Program. The
NASA Safety Newsletter of March 1971 presented the following case
studies which were of interest to all who worked on manned space
programs:
HUMAN ERROR PRIME CASE STUDIES SPOTLIGHT LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
As NASA moves into its newer programs, it is incumbent on us not to
repeat costly mistakes.To discover the specific lessons to be learned from bitter
experiences of the past, the NASA Safety Office commissioned a contractor to
survey all the prime contractors to obtain summaries of what had happened
during the development years of the Apollo space program in the U. S. The
results were published in an "Orange Book" officially titled "Manned Space
Program Accident/Incident Summaries." The "Orange Book" could be used in
training programs.
Of some 10,000 case documents reviewed, 508 mishaps were selected for
closer scrutiny. As might have been expected, forty-seven per cent of these
accidents occurred during operational test and checkout. Procedural
deficiencies constituted the single largest contributor to accidents, forty-six per
cent. In addition, seventy-four per cent of the cases involved human error as a
contributing factor. Obviously then, many accidents contained several types of
errors.
The list which follows skims from the top of the compilation the largest
number of mishaps:
Lesson to be Learned Occurrences
Inadequate Check List 48
Engineering or QCdid not verify 41
component installation instructions
Hazard analyses not conducted 40
Lack of personnel certification 36
Design deficiencies in equipment 35
Cross-connected cables or fluid lines 32
Test started without approved procedures 24
Inspection of work performed was lacking or inadequate 21
Designate all pressure and propellant tests as hazardous 18
Place protective nets over flight hardware 17
No relief valve or burst disc in closed pressure systems 17
Require QCverification of materials and components 1 6
before installation
At shift changes, provide transfer of information 1 3
Keep excess people out of hazardous test areas 1 3
Don't conduct concurrent tests without QCapproval 1 3
Establish a LOX-compatible material list 13
Restrain flex lines at terminations and every 6 feet 12
Supervision was inadequate 1 2
Reduce pressures prior to removal of parts 10
Require all hoisting equipment to be verified periodically 10
Operator error 10
Important studies such as these are often filed instead of being put to
practical use. The "Orange Book" was given limited distribution to all
Centers and prime contractors during the early years of the space
program.
At launch complex 34's dedication on June 5, 1961, it was proclaimed as
the free world's largest launch facility. Four months later on October
27th, Saturn 1 (SA-1) was launched as the first of four vehicle
development launches from LC-34.
Early Saturn-1 vehicles and spacecraft modules required many
modifications of equipment and procedures to be worked at Launch Pad-34
prior to launch day. This was true with many of the NASA launch vehicles
including the Space Shuttle after arrival at KSC. The North American and
Grumman teams at KSC continued to look to their home offices, and
indirectly to Houston for guidance as work proceeded at Pad 34 of the SA-
1 launches through preparations and testing of the the AS-204 spacecraft
module in January 1967. On January 27, 1967, problems developed within
the Command Module and a fire broke out in the spacecraft resulting in the
loss of three Apollo astronauts.
This old method of quality assurance ended in the aftermath of the LC-34
tragedy. With the support of NASA Headquarters, KSC took firm control of
all spacecraft activities. This gave more strength to quality assurance
surveillance efforts at LC-34 and LC-37 launch areas.
After much investigation by the Congress Tragedy Review Board, Dr. Debus
was asked if he would like to make a short statement for the record. His
statement is taken from MOONPORT, pages 398-399:
"As director of the installation I share the responsibility for this tragic accident
and I have given it much thought. It is for me very difficult to find out why we did
not think deeply enough or were not very inventive enough to identify this as a
very hazardous test.
I have searched in my past for safety criteria that we developed in the
early days of guided missile work and I must say that there are some that are
subject to intuitive thinking and forward assessment. Some are made by practical
experience and involved not only astronauts but the hundreds of people on the
pads.....
It is very deplorable but it was the known condition which started from
Commander Shepard's flight....from then on we developed a tradition
that....considered the possibility of a fire but we had no concept of the possible
viciousness of this fire and its speed.
We never knew that the conflagration would go that fast through the
spacecraft so that no rescue would essentially help. This was not known. This is
the essential cause of the tragedy. Had we known, we would have prepared with an
adequate support as humanly possible for egress.
" (20)
No Information Systems Directorate R&QA personnel were assigned to LC-
34 during the actual checkout and launch of the first few launches at LC-
34. Russell Gramer's Quality Assurance Office was asked to cover certain
functions. During these early vehicle development launches, the System
Engineer had complete responsibility for the proper functioning of his
system as Dr. Debus insisted to the R&QA people. This story is told in
Chapter 2, page 18, as taken from the Apollo History, MOONPORT. Dr.
Debus' confidence was totally upon his tried-and-true launch team. His
quote f rom MOO NPORT was: "This responsibility should not be attenuated
by assigning a separate inspection or quality assurance team to check on
the System Engineer or compliance to test procedures and test
performance..."
As the buildup of the Apollo Program progressed in the 1962-1968 era,
both contractor and NASA civil service R&QA teams grew larger, and more
extensive interfaces/relationships in carrying out their functions were
necessary. After the Apollo fire, mission essential systems required
double inspection and quality stamping on all tests and launches.
Spacecraft Operations double-stamped everything. The Saturn launch
vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft were the largest and most complex
systems ever put into space. Consequently the reliability and quality
personnel also grew and organizations had significantly stronger backing
and support from Dr. Debus.
Activation of the Saturn-V launch facilities at the Merritt Island Launch
Area (MILA) was supported by KSC R&QA personnel in all work areas as
progress was made through installation, checkout and launch of Apollo
vehicles, and then later for the Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz missions.
The Apollo-Soyuz Test project (ASTP) was provided by the U.S. and
Russian agreement concerning cooperation in the exploration and use of
outer space. President Nixon and the Soviet Chairman signed the
agreement in Moscow on May 24, 1972. This summit accord also pledged
both countries to fulfill the NASA-Soviet Academy of Science's agreement
in January 1971 for cooperation in space science and application. Among
the application programs was the possibility of space rescue for each
other's space teams. The ASTP launch was subject to the usual Apollo
program R&QA requirements for checkout and launch activities, and were
very successful in assuring a successful launch and mission.
Two R&QA activities throughout the Apollo launches were "Integrity
Control" and "Nitrogen Purge Verification." Quality inspectors/analysts
were to be commended for keeping these two surveillance activities
uppermost in mind during preflight tests and launch preparations.
Integrity control assured good configuration control and purge
verification of all electrical enclosures which lessened the possibility of
explosions at the pad.
One very important quality assurance tool was the Walk-Through
Inspections performed either by schedule or on random occasions which
did not interfere with operations during important tests. It was helpful in
assuring the system engineer that his or her system was in a position to
support a critical test. It also was helpful in motivating employees to
keep all station-set operations in order according to applicable
procedures and responsibilities.
Configuration Control during Saturn/Apollo launches was an important
function which assured that changes were fully approved and that actions
taken were well documented by both the technical workers and Quality
Assurance. Configuration Control Boards (Level I, level ll, and level Ill)
were established with controlling authority for "dispositioning" (deciding
upon or recommending) proposed changes to its documentation, hardware,
and software - to the extent that the change did not conflict with
requirements, schedules, budgets, etc. established by a higher level Board.
R&QA representatives played an important role in providing quality
assurance data from their records, and in providing a paper trail to the
final actions taken by the affected technical area, or areas.
During the SKYLAB program, the KSC launch team had little trouble with
establishing spacecraft procedures with Houston, since the command and
service module differed little with the Apollo counterparts. Coordination
with MSFC was another matter. It took about a year for the two agencies
to resolve the problem. The launch team ended up conducting the tests
required on the pad. That meant that Don Oswald's Quality Assurance
inspector stamped all test procedure inspection points along with the
Contractor inspector. This proved acceptable for the overall Skylab except
the telescope mount. The story of this problem was found in NASA SP-
4208, LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE, A History of Skylab, starting on
page 242:
"A second dispute concerned preflight tests of the telescope mount. Its checkout
represented the first time that a manned space flight center was to perform tests
at the launch site (previously contractors had done the actual testing), and some
misunderstanding was likely. The full extent of the disagreement came to light in
December 1970 at a review of telescope mount flight procedures. Gene Cagle,
engineering manager for the telescope mount, took immediate exception to the
Kennedy position that his group would perform as a contractor. Even had
Huntsville been willing to assume the subordinate role--and it was not-Cagle
lacked the manpower to meet Kennedy's requirements. The preflight procedures
listed 73 forms that the test team would maintain, many of which required
several signatures at various levels. Cagle contended that he had barely enough
people to do the actual checkout, much less fill out the paper work. He also
objected to the requirement for quality assurance. He estimated that it would take
700 men, three times the number he had, to comply with Kennedy's rule that an
inspector must verify each testing step. Furthermore he objected to the launch
center's applying its philosophy of quality control to a Marshall operation. At
Huntsville, the testing organization assured the quality of its own work.
Kennedy officials turned a deaf ear to Cagle's criticisms. Their procedures
embodied wisdom acquired over many years in the launch operations business.
The atmosphere at the Cape before a major launch was quite different from
the relatively relaxed conditions of checkout at Huntsville. With thousands of
people pushing towards the same deadline, a formal system of paper work was
essential. Short cuts inevitably brought on bigger problems. Besides, contractors
managed to work within the system. Cagle's request for manpower assistance
from Kennedy was denied, since it violated the center's checks-and-balances
philosophy. Neither side appeared willing to give an inch, and the meeting was
temporarily adjourned.
It took nearly a year to bridge the gap. Spacecraft operations helped by
lending Cagle some system engineers from its liaison then in Huntsville. That
group followed the telescope to Houston and then to the Cape, working as part of
Huntsville's test team. Kennedy also agreed to perform quality checks, as Houston
was doing for the thermal vacuum tests. Marshall, in turn, attempted to meet
Kennedy's other requirements. The actual checkout of the telescope mount went
very smoothly: afterward Debus recognized the test team's work with a letter of
commendation." (2 1 ).
The ASTP launch on July 15, 1975, was the last launch from the MILA pads
39 A and B until the launch of Shuttle Columbia (STS-1) on April 12, 1981
from pad 39A.
Before venturing into the history of the Space Shuttle Program, notice
must be taken of that most important Gemini Program which preceeded
the full-blown Apollo Program implementation and its successful
missions to the Moon. The following FOREWORD portion from the history of
the Gemini Program, "On The Shoulders Of Titans," NASA SP-1203
explains that importance:
GEMINI was the intermediate manned space flight program between America's
first steps into space with Mercury and the amazing and unprecedented
accomplishments achieved during the manned lunar expeditions of Apollo. Because
of its position between these two other efforts, Gemini is probably less
remembered. Still, it more than had its place in man's progress into this new
frontier.
Gemini accomplishments were manifold. They included many firsts: first
astronaut-controlled maneuvering in space; first rendezvous in space of one
spacecraft with another; first docking of one spacecraft with a propulsive stage
and use of that stage to transfer man to high altitude; first traverse of man into
the Earth's radiation belts; first extended manned flights of a week or more in
duration; first extended stays of man outside his spacecraft; first controlled
reentry and precision landing; and many more.
These achievements were significant in ways one cannot truly evaluate even
today, but two things stand out: (1) it was the time when America caught up and
surpassed the Soviet Union in manned space flight, and (2) these demonstrations
of capability were an absolute prerequisite to the phenomenal Apollo
accomplishments then yet to come.
America's first manned space flight program, Mercury, involved a careful
buildup of flight duration to slightly beyond one day with accompanying concerns
about man's physiological response to weightlessness and other aspects of his
safety and well being. In the meantime, the Russian effort had achieved durations
of five days, flight of a multiple crew shortly after the Mercury Program had
terminated, and the first extravehicular operation by a cosmonaut shortly before
the first manned Gemini flight. The question at that time was who would perform
the first rendezvous, seen as a very complex operation but absolutely needed for
future space endeavors. (2 2)
As the history of Gemini unfolds in NASA SP-1203, one can see that
critical decisions had to be made about spacecraft, about landing
possibilities such as the paraglider method that was being tested, and
about a the final design and recovery of a Gemini spacecraft. Opposition to
the paraglider came from the MSFC's Flight Operations Division under
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., where questions of reliability took second place
to the operational problems posed by the paraglider being in the Gemini
program. The many delays, budget crunches and poor testing results
finally ended in the cancellation of the paraglider concept of spacecraft
recovery. Final testing confirmed that the paraglider method would not
meet reliability requirements for manned flight.
To meet the goal of the Gemini Program's rendezvous and docking
missions, another spacecraft had to be developed, On January 14, 1963,
MSC took charge of the Atlas-Agena program, and after many hardware
crises and budget crunches, a reliable target vehicle for the Gemini to
rendezvous and dock with was accomplished.
No mention of quality assurance was noticed in SP-1203, but the
word "Reliability," appeared several times indicating that R&QA
surveillance of all hardware, software and qualifying tests were
sufficient for manned flight with the Titan-Gemini and Atlas-Agena
programs.
Chapter 5
HISTORY OF R&QA IN THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
The loss of Skylab on July 11, 1979, was a sad day for all of NASA and those of our
nation who loved the space program. The new space adventure with the Space
Shuttle began in earnest at that point. An early mission was supposed to visit Skylab,
strap an especially designed motor assembly to Skylab and boost it to a higher orbit in
a planned effort to save it for future visits with the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle was not
ready in time to make that visit.
The Space Shuttle was a whole new approach to gaining access to space. To
continue the exploration and utilization of space on a permanent basis, a more
economical way to reach orbit was urgently needed. This had become apparent well
before the end of the Apollo era, and work had already started on a new type of space
vehicle. It had to more nearly resemble the airplane, where the reusable orbiter could
fly again and again. The goal was that each orbiter be able to withstand at least 100
missions.
The new orbiter required a new philosophy of operations. No longer would a vehicle
be prepared for a single flight. In the future, the same vehicles would return again and
again to the Kennedy Space Center, to be processed and launched once more.
The Space Shuttle was very different from the Apollo vehicles, and it was far more
sophisticated and technically complex. It was designed, tested and built with limited
funds. To help keep costs down, our engineers adapted the Apollo launch facilities,
rather than building all new ones. The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) was
converted to handle Shuttle components. The three mobile launchers used for the
Saturns were modified to stack and carry the new vehicle, and Pads 39-A and 39-B
were given new above-ground configurations to accommodate the new hardware and
interfaces.
Some new facilities were mandatory. A three-mile-long landing strip was one of the
first constructed. The orbiter landed several times at Edwards Air Force Base in
California until the safety of the KSC orbiter landing was established. Once the safety
of landing activities was established and the Microwave Scanning Beam Landing
System (MSBLS) was installed and thoroughly tested, Kennedy Space Center then
became the primary landing site for the Shuttle.
The last Shuttle facilities completed at KSC were the Orbiter Processing Facilities
(OPF) near the VAB. Remaining assembly work and modifications to the orbiters are
performed in the OPF's prior to transferring to the VAB for assembly with the solid
rocket boosters and the external tank. Quality assurance procedures were
developed for all major operations within the OPF's and at the VAB.
In December 1972, NASA Headquarters issued NHB 5300.4 (1D). "Safety, Reliability,
Maintainability and Quality Assurance For The Space Shuttle Program." This
document was built from NHB 1700.1, NASA Safety Manual, Volume 1, NHB
5300.4(1A), and NHB 5300.4(1B). These were proven base-line documents, and their
implementation assured a successful transition to Shuttle S,R&QA efforts.
In the Shuttle era, Reliability Engineers assure that Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA's) are performed on Ground Support Equipment (GSE) which interfaced with
flight hardware items at the launch sites to identify hardware items that are critical to
the performance and safety of the vehicle and the mission, and to identify items that do
not meet design requirements.
The FMEA's began with an identification of the functional units of each system and a
determination of the potential modes of failure for each unit. Each possible failure
mode is analyzed to determine the resulting performance of the system and to
ascertain the worst-case effect that could result from a failure in that mode. These
items are categorized according to the worst-case effect of the failure on the GSE
being studied.
It is the System Engineer's and/or the Quality Engineer's responsibility to develop the
Quality Assurance documents required for each system or work area. This may consist
of a large loose-leaf notebook or files, containing the R&QA Program Plan, the
attendant quality procedures and instructions for the assigned quality assurance
personnel.
QA Specialists make periodic walk-through inspections of his or her quality assurance
area('s). Important things they look for during the walk-through inspections are
problem reporting (PRACA), equipment logs or station logs, calibration status of test
equipment, integrity controllbreak-of-inspection, job certification if required, and
evidence of an orderly and safe work area. Appendix 7 documents the KSC R&QA
survey and audit activities which the R&QA Engineers are responsible for.
R&QA Engineers participate in Design Certification Review's (DCR's) and in the Flight
Readiness Reviews (FRR's), and they are assigned R&QA positions at the Launch
Control Center (LCC) during flight preparation and launches.
Shuttle Columbia, STS-1, arrived in March 1979. A great deal of work remained to
be done. Both Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers were very busy for the next 610
days in the OPF. They had to perform remaining assembly work and a series of major
modifications. The orbiter then spent 35 days in the VAB and 105 days on Pad A,
before finally lifting off on April 12, 1981. All affected NASA and Contractor work was
monitored by QA as assigned during the preparation stages.
It was during this period of STS-1 preparation that KSC R&QA learned that
"Cannibalization" became an issue, and Quality Assurance was tasked to track the
removal of parts from another STS element to fulfill spares requirements in STS-1.
This became more common as the Shuttle flights progressed to the extent that this
practice was discussed in the" Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk
Assessment and Management." The following comment was taken from page 65 of
that document:
"By the time of the Challenger accident, "cannibalization" the removal of parts at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) from one operational STS element to fulfill spares requirement in
another, had become a prevalent feature of STS Logistics, thus introducing a variety of
failure potentials associated with human error. Cannibalization is not evaluated as a
producer of potential failure in either the hazard analysis (where it would be most
appropriate) or the FMEA." (23)
The Risk Assessment and Management document shows that the incidence of
cannibalization at KSC was one-third of the Orbiter Line Replaceable Units (LRU's)
flown on some missions. A NASA official at KSC told the Committee that the problem
of spares had become so acute that, if Shuttle flights had continued uninterrupted,
KSC would not have been able to sustain STS operations. With transfer of
responsibility for spares to KSC, and with increases in logistics budget, the picture
improved. A state-of-the-art spares warehouse was built near the Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB) in 1985, enhancing logistics operations.
The latest of logistics undertakings was recorded in the December 15,
2000 issue of Spaceport News, starting on page 4:
"Keeping Kennedy Space Center and other Shuttle support centers supplied with
parts for the orbiters and ground operations - from huge fuel cells to timely nuts
and bolts - is a massive undertaking.
It's no wonder that the Logistics facility, the building that houses
administrative support and approximately 140,000 plus spare line items,
measures in excess of 472,000 square feet.,
The facility was built in 1985 south of the Vehicle Assembly Building on
Contractor Road to consolidate logistics functions near the processing area.
The Logistics facility includes warehouse space, storage platforms,
chemical storage area, yard storage and office space.
The value of supplies contained within the warehouse and storage areas
at any one time is estimated at about $1 billion.
While some supplies replenished and kept on hand with the facility are
manufactured and periodically delivered by vendors, a number of the parts are
about 20 years old, as old as the Shuttle program.
A constant stream of parts and other materials are ordered,
stored, processed and delivered to the customers. Parts must be inspected, sorted
periodically verified and sometimes repaired.
An automated storage and retrieval system speeds processing requests.
Damaged or worn items are also processed at the facility, then sent to the vendor
or the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot for repair.
Orders for parts not only come in from KSC, but also from other Shuttle
support sites including Dryden Flight Research Center, the Transatlantic Abort
Sites and The Boeing Co. plant in Palmdale, Calif. where Columbia is being
refurbished.
"Customer service and satisfaction are essential in what we do," said
Eddy Walters, manager of Storage and Distribution for United Space Alliance.
"We've got about 6,000 to 7,000 different customers - that's anyone who might
order something from us."
About 500 KSC team members, primarily United Space Alliance
employees work in the facility. About 100 work in the warehouse area and about
400 in the facility's office space.
Employees work in a variety of departments including Processing
Operations, Storage and Distribution, Transportation, Procurement,
Engineering, Customer Support, Commodity Management and Quality Assurance.
The major processes carried out in the facility include flight spares
distribution, receiving, delivery, packaging and crating, kitting and repairable
processing.'
So much happens here. It's like a world within a world," said John Kelly,
manager, Vehicle Processing Storage area." (24)
The first Shuttle (STS-1) was launched on April 12, 1981. It was a most exciting day
for all the people who supported that grand liftoff and flight. That launch was long
awaited by the dedicated Shuttle launch team, and the satisfaction of work well done
was felt by all in the Launch Control Center (LCC) on that Palm Sunday of April 12,
1981.
Twenty one (21) launches later, on January 28, 1986, the accident of Space Shuttle
Challenger, mission 51-L, interrupted for a time one of the most productive space
projects of all times. The story of what happened is well documented in the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION reports of investigation.The Commission's initial report
to the President, dated June 6, 1986, called, REPORT AT A GLANCE, made this
observation about the accident:
"The unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an accelerating flight schedule might
have been adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted upon exactingly thorough
procedures that were its hallmark during the Apollo program. An extensive and
redundant safety program comprising interdependent safety, reliability and quality
assurance functions existed during and after the lunar program to discover any potential
safety problems. Between that period and 1986, however, the program became
ineffective. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the checks and balances
essential for maintaining flight safety." (25)
This clear finding of the Commission was a hall-mark "lesson learned," which instituted
a close look at both NASA Headquarters and the operating Centers like Kennedy
Space Center. Records show that KSC was not in the communication loop that made
the decision to launch, nor were the facts available to KSC elements until after the
tragic event. The teleconference was between only Marshall and Thiokol, on that
fateful launch day, when the o-ring problem was discussed and a decision was made
to launch on that cold day. The Commission called it; "THE SILENT SAFETY
PROGRAM."
Further criticism of Kennedy Space Center R&QA was made when the
"Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Organization Task Team Review
Report of September 1986" was issued. It was issued by the Office of the
NASA Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability & Quality
Assurance. The KSC portion is shown as follows:
"The Kennedy Space Center has a nominal single point of contact for S,R&QA,
located in the Safety, R&QA, and Protective Services Office. The office reports
directly to the Center Director. Although there is a nominal single point of
contact, the KSC S,R&QAorganization is the most decentralized of the Centers
visited. Substantial S,R&QAresponsibilities reside in three of the five first line
directorates. The S,R&QA personnel in these directorates have independent
reporting channels through the directorates to the Center Director. Within these
three directorates, S,R&QA responsibilities are spread across nine second level
directorates, with three each under GM, DE, and CM. The S,R&QApersonnel at
KSC, however, have the clearest understanding of the distinction between quality
assurance and other functions.
The "self-sufficiency" concept for the Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC)
and the Base Operations Contract (BOC)have resulted in specific Safety and R&QA
organizations in each of the support contractor organizations. The SPC and BOC
contractors have assumed the day-to-day responsibilities for Space and Base
related activities. The Lockheed Director of S,R&QA for the SPC contract
(Lockheed) reports directly to the Lockheed Director of the KSC launch site. The
BOC contractor (EG&G) has separate Safety & Protective Services, and
Reliability & Quality Assurance organizations, report directly to the EG&G
General Manager. In the transition, personnel predominantly changed organi-
zations, leaving in place the long standing inter-personal relationships between
the Safety and R&QAwork force.
The change to contracted consolidated Space and Base operations has
modified the direct civil service involvement and intimate oversight from
"hands-on"/supervisory functions to surveillance functions. Lines of
responsibilities for S,R&QAwithin the KSC civil service work force, and as they
flow to the contractor are not clear. Responsibility for instrument calibration
were found to be particularly confusing, and overlapping capabilities were
identified and growing as part of the " self sufficiency" concept.
Staffing, both within the civil service and contractor operations in
S,R&QAhas declined modestly as a percentage of the work force, dropping from
11.7% and 8.5% respectively in 1970 to 7.9% and 5.9% respectively in 1986.
The major impact at this time is under staffing for sustained operations, forcing
extensive shift durations of 12 hours and more for extended time periods. Action
recommended:
Separate the Protective Services elements from S,R&QA and Protective
Services Office.
Consolidate all elements of S,R&QArelated to Quality Assurance in the
SR&QAoffice to provide a central focal point.
Consolidate the Systems Safety Engineering and Operational Safety
Policies and Procedures in the KSC engineering organization to be responsible
for the total processing of the Shuttle and its payload. This organization
should also be responsible for the systems safety of the ground installations
required to process the shuttle elements and the payloads.
Co-locate appropriate S,R&QApersonnel in the operating divisions and in
the S,R&QAorganizations of the SPC, BOC, and other on-site contractors, as
appropriate, to insure adequate penetration in depth of S,R&QAmatters. Review
the overlapping calibration programs to minimize duplication and divergent
procedures and practices.
Strengthen the capability to compile historical data on systems/
subsystems/components requiring replacement, maintenance or repair to
improve the ability to establish trends in a timely manner, and provide adequate
inputs to the logistics pipeline.
Review permissible overtime for all personnel involved in critical
operations. Revise policies to minimize fatigue related incidents and accidents.
(26)
The following organization charts show decentralized relationships. Chart
1 is dated September,1976, showing the decentralized organization
mentioned above. Chart 2 is dated December,1985, and shows the Safety
Office, the Engineering Office, Security Office, and Policy and Compliance
Office breakdowns. Then Chart 3, dated July 1986 depicts the
decentralized organization mentioned in paragraph 1 of the QA
Organization Task Team Review:
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After the Challenger accident, a PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION was
established to investigate the failed mission. Code Q of NASA
Headquarters was highly involved in obtaining answers on many fronts,
including the "Silent Safety Program" mentioned on page 73. Here are the
questions asked by the Presidential Commission along with answers to
each by KSC officials:
KSC INPUTS TO POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONSFOR CODE
Q RESPONSE
1. What has NASA done to counteract the Presidential Commission's conclusion of
"The Silent Safety Program"?
Answer: The NASA Administrator appointed Mr. George A. Rodney to the position
of Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
(S,R&QA) on July 8, 1986. The responsibilities of this office include the
oversight of safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions related to all
NASA activities and programs and the implementation of a system for anomaly
documentation and resolution to include a trend analysis program. One of the
first activities underway is an assessment of the resources required, including
work force, to ensure adequate execution of the safety organization functions. In
addition, the new Associate Administrator will assure appropriate interfaces
between the functions of the new safety organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel.
2. What has KSC done in counteracting the commission's report that S,R&QAis
under the supervision of the very organizations and activities whose efforts they
are to check?
Answer: KSC has established a new organization called the Director of Safety,
Reliability and Quality Assurance headed by Mr. James A. (Gene)Thomas. Gene is
formally the Director, Launch and Landing Operations for the Space Shuttle
Program. He will bring a unique combination of engineering experience in
preflight testing and checkout of flight hardware, as well as experience as a
Launch Director, to this important new post. The new S,R&QAorganization at KSC
will centralize safety, reliability, and quality assurance, and will ensure
consistent application of standards by certified specialists co-located within the
operating Directorates. It will provide an independent assessment of launch
readiness and a strong reliability/quality analysis capability. The new
Directorate will include the Quality Assurance Offices currently in the Payload,
Center Support, and the Shuttle organizations as well as separate functions' for
system assurance, reliability, safety, policy and compliance, and quality
inspection.
3. What other realignments has KSC made to strengthen operations?
Answer: Thomas E. Utsman, KSC Deputy Director, will take on the additional
responsibility for the newly established position of Director of Space Trans-
portation System (STS)Management and Operations through the next few Shuttle
flights. In this capacity, he will be responsible for engineering management and
technical direction of preflight launch, landing, and recovery activities for
Shuttle vehicles. This new organization will provide a single focal point to
interface with Headquarters program officials; elevate the Launch Director and
Engineering Director, and relieve them of day-to-day operating
responsibilities; provide a single Contract Manager, and insure clear channels of
communication.
The new Launch Director will be Robert B. Sieck, who will report to the
KSC Deputy Director. Mr. Sieck is the former Director of Shuttle Operations.
His recent assignment and earlier experience as the first KSC Shuttle Flow
Director, and as Director, Launch and Landing Operations, make him the optimum
choice for the new assignment. As Launch Director, he will be responsible for
the operational management and direction of prelaunch, launch, landing, and
recovery for Space Shuttle vehicles.
George T. Sasseen, Jr., will be the Engineering Director in STS
Management and Operations. He will be responsible for the engineering
management of activities in the new Directorate in support of the Space
Transportation System.
Marvin L. Jones, who currently serves as the Director of S,R&QA and
Protective Services, will head a new Protective Services Office which will report
directly to the KSC Director. The Protective Services Office will plan, manage,
and administer vigorous National Resource Protection, over-all security, law
enforcement, and the fire and rescue programs under KSC jurisdiction. This
emphasis is in line with the increasingly critical need for implementation of the
National Resource Protection Plan and KSC's responsibilities for security and
protection of the Space Shuttle and its associated equipment and facilities.
4. S,R&QAmust have the authority to not only stop a particular flight, e.g.,at a
Flight Readiness Review (FRR),but the whole mission. What measures have KSC
instituted in this area?
Answer: KSC believes that wherever pressures on the work force are of such a
nature that it begins to effect safety, such observations will be made known
immediately. These observations will occur many weeks prior to the FRR which
is usually held about 10 days prior to launch. Pressures must be surfaced and
relieved much earlier than the FRR if adverse mission preparations are to be
avoided. S,R&QA has, and always has had, the authority to stop any work on
mission planning if safety is jeopardized.
Problems and their solutions are usually discussed at the FRR. However,
surprises sometimes surface at this meeting. KSC will not hesitate to inform the
new Associate Administrator for Safety of unsolved safety problems that may be
presented by other KSC Directorates. However, we will continue to endeavor to
solve problems involving safety matters prior to this review. (27)
Item 2 of the "KSC INPUTS TO POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR
CODE Q. RESPONSE" explained how KSC was reorganizing S,R&QA after
the Challenger accident. Mr. Gene Thomas began his new job as
Director of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, by issuing a
brochure as both an incentive and a goal setting thrust for S,R&QA at
KSC
-
Gene's lead-in statement in the brochure is as follows:
"To the NASA Kennedy Space Center Team:
Very few activities in life are ever fulfilling unless we first
establish goals to strive for and use as standards to measure
our success.
The organizational goals contained in this brochure are the
objectives that I would like for us in the RQ Directorate to
pursue. Without your dedicated efforts, we cannot be
successful. Please review these goals and keep them in mind as
we strive to reestablish America as the world leader in Space.
You are the nucleus of our Space Program - the people who
really count.
Thank you, signed Gene Thomas."
His Motivational Brochure highlighted the Goal: To establish excellence in
the conduct of the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance programs at
KSC:
o Through planning and effective management.
o Assure Safety as our first priority.
o Produce a quality product.
o promote job satisfaction.
The Organizational Goals were as follows:
Teamwork, Attitude, Communications (bottom up, top down), Visibility,
Involvement, Development, Delegation, Job Enhancements, Personal
Initiatives, Rewards, and Sustenance.
The NASA Headquarters Report of the SRM&QA Functional Management Review at
the Kennedy Space Center, dated November 4-8, 1991, documents some important
findings worthy of including in this history of the KSC's R&QA program. The report not
only tells of the findings, but it also gives knowledge of the on-going NASA
Headquarters audit function and the Center internal audit tasks in effect in the 1991
era. The Chairperson's Summary follows:
REPORTOF THE SRM&QAFUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW AT KSC
Chairperson's Summary
This report summarizes the results of a Functional Management Review (FMR)of
the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) conducted during November 4-8, 1991. The
review focused on safety and quality assurance (QA) disciplines, and consequently
was divided into two teams. In comparison to previous Safety and Mission Quality
Code Q) surveys, this review focused on assessing the efficiency and effectiveness
of the operations, and not just compliance to requirements. Emphasis was placed
on identifying areas in management systems where efficiency and effectiveness
could be improved. This report describes symptoms of systemic problems and
recommends corresponding corrective action.
In the Quality Assurance area, Code Q is planning to reduce the intensity
and frequency of compliance surveys of the field centers, if effective internal
self-audits are instituted at the field center level. For this reason, the QA Team
focused on the KSC internal audit program as well as the KSC audit of their
contractors. The QA Team also evaluated the implementation of the Code M Report
on Assessment of Human Error Incidents at KSC (The John Young Assessment),
dated June 1991, the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA)System,
and horizontal payloads processing. The Safety Team focused on an assessment of
workplace safety, safety performance of site contractors, open findings from
previous surveys, and the implementation of KSC requirements, policies, and
procedures.
The results of the review indicated that the Safety and Quality Assurance
functions are being satisfactorily performed; however, several conditions were
noted and recommendations made that would improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the KSC operation. (2 8)
On May 10, 1992, Mr. Alan J. Parrish, Kennedy Space Center's Safety
Reliability and Quality Assurance Director issued a document entitled,
"Kennedy Space Center SRM&QA Strategic Ten Year Plan, K-RQ-0001.12,
which added "Maintainability" to their title. It was an effort to centralize
safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance that would
ensure the consistent application of standards by co-locating personnel
within the operating Directorates. The idea was to strengthen the
role, responsibility, and authority of the four disciplines of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA). It would
enhance NASA's monitoring and oversight capabilities, improve
communications and coordination, and provide SRM&QA at KSC with the
involvement, authority, and independent check and balance that is
essential to maintain the Space Shuttle flight readiness, as well as
Payload, Space Station and Base Support Operations.
The background for this change in organization was given on page 1 of the
Ten Year Plan as follows:
"Prior to December 1986 at KSC, the Safety program was centralized as a staff
function and the Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA) Programs were
decentralized in the respective line organizations. Since that time, SR&QAhas
been reorganized and centralized as a line operating directorate under the
Director of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (RQ). In 1991, a third
second-level Directorate was formed titled the Mission Assurance Directorate.
The Director of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance now has four
organizational elements reporting to him. These elements are designated as the
Director, Safety and Reliability (RT), the Director, Quality Assurance (RO), the
Director, Mission Assurance (RM), and a staff office called the Administrative
Staff (RQ-ADM)." (29)
Beginning in 1986, the centralized SR&Q.Afunctions were under the
leadership of the following individuals:
Marvin L. Jones
Gene Thomas
Al Parrish
JoAnn Morgan
Tom Breakfield
Chris Fairey
The following chart depicts the (RQ) centralized organization:
SR&QA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
RQ
Director of Safety,
Reliability and Quality
Assurance
RM RQ-ADM
Director,
-
Administrative
Mission Assurance Staff -
RT RO
Director, Director,
Safety and Reliability Quality Assurance
This KSC SR&QA Directorate was composed of four distinct organizations under the
Director of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance as shown in the preceeding chart.
The following quote from K-RQ-0001.12, Kennedy Space Center SRM&QA Strategic
Ten Year Plan records responsibilities:
1. RQ-ADM (Administration Staff) - provides administrative management, advisory
services and a centralized administrative support program for the directorate.
2. RT (Director, Safety, and Reliability) - manages and directs the safety, reliability,
maintainability, and pressure vessel programs at KSC, including performing assessments
of safety and reliability engineering analyses, surveillance, audits, and evaluations of
safety, reliability, maintainability, and pressure vessels/system (PV/s)certification activities
of support contractors and serves as the SR&M Contract Manager Representative (CMR)
on selected contracts.
3. RO (Director, Quality Assurance - manages and directs the quality assurance
program at KSC, including performing surveillance, audits, and evaluations of the quality
assurance activities of support contractors and serves as the QA CMR on selected
contracts.
4. RM (Director, Mission Assurance) - manages and directs the overall independent
assessment programs at KSC, including independent technical surveys/audits/
assessments of facilities, systems, flight and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) system
processes, engineering analysis of trends, policy and assurance requirements integration
and assessment, SRM&QA project management for new programs, progress level
assessment of flight and ground systems operational status for Launch Readiness Review
(LRR's), Flight Readiness Review (FRR's), and System Requirements Review (SRR's).
(30)
The Structured Surveillance Program was implemented on November 8, 1993, by
issuance of K-RQ-0001.3 by the Director of Quality Assurance (RO), in accordance
with requirements of KMI 1050.7, 'KSC Structured Surveillance Program Plan.' The
Structured Surveillance Implementation Plan gave guidance for NASA Civil Service to
implement the structured surveillance program. The plan identified and provided for
more SR&QA interfaces with Program Management, Operations, and System
Engineering, as well as internal SR&QA interfaces. Implementing documents provid-
ed guidance and standard procedures for SR&QA personnel only and did not attempt
to guide Project Management, Operations, or System Engineering in their
implementation. The following paragraph is taken from the INTRODUCTION of K-RQ-
0001.3:
'The purpose of this document is to define the NASA Civil service implementation plan of
action to implement a NASA Structured Surveillance Program at KSC. Implementation of
this plan is expected to increase first-time quality and reduce cost by getting more
efficiency into the process which will aid in decreasing the overall process flow time.
This
will be obtained by relying on the individual performing the task to provide first-time
quality. Inspection will be performed on critical items and where risk warrants.
Surveillance
and sampling will be utilized to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process.
Process Analysis/Control (PA/C) techniques will be used for areas that exceed
surveillance and, or sampling thresholds. The plan will provide requirements, details,
processes, and interfaces necessary for the NASA Civil Service work force to meet the
requirements of the KSC Structured Surveillance Program Plan." (31)
The following KSC documents delineated requirements for the Structured
Surveillance Program:
KMI 1050.7, KSC Structured Surveillance Program Plan
KMI 1710.1, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Programs
KPD 8710.1 KSC Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Programs
KHB 5310.1 Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Handbook
K-RQ-0001.3.1 Assurance Sampling and Measurement Manual
1.4 The following documents listed below were generated or modified to incorporate
the concepts and methodology of the Structured Surveillance Program. The purpose
of this approach was to provide maximum flexibility in the organization to cover the
program requirements as needed. Each organizatiorf would address each reference
requirement somewhere within their documentation. Disposition of all requirements
were subject to the review process.
K-RQ-0004.1 Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Survey and Audit
Manual
K-RQ-0004.1.1 Survey and Audit Branch Training Manual (new)
K-RQ-0004.2.1 Quality Engineering Training Manual
K-RQ-0004.2.4 Quality Engineering Technician Training Manual for MRB
Signature Authority
K-RQ-0005.1.1 Quality Surveillance System
K-RQ-0005.1.1.4 Quality Assurance Directorate Employee Training and
Development
K-RQ-0005.2 Quality Assurance Directorate Training Plan
(RO-ORB & RO-STS)
K-RQ-0005.2.1 RO-PAY Training Plan
QAP-003 RO-PAY Surveillance System
QAP-005 RO-PAY Quality Surveillance Record
QAP-007 RO-PAY Personnel Training and Certification
QAP-008 RO-ORB & RO-STS Personnel Training and Certification
QAP-009 RO-ORB & RO-STS Quality Surveillance Record Procedure
QAP-010 RO-PAY Facility and Operations Area Surveillance
Procedure
QAP-011 RO-ORB & RO-STS Surveillance System
QAP-003 RM-ENG Training Procedure
QEP-006 RM-ENG Surveillance Procedure
QEP-027 RM-ENG Process Analysis/Control
RQ-IMl-5310-3 Quality Surveillance Record (Structured Surveillance
Program User's Guide)
The following chart shows the Structured Surveillance Program documentation
tree
that was helpful in overall implementation:
NOV0 8 1993
The "Vision Statement" of the Kennedy Space Center SRM&QA Strategic Ten Year
Plan, R-RQ-0001.12
,
page ii, included the goal of promoting proactive assurance
techniques to enhance the quality of NASA products, and contributing to meeting the
cost/schedule commitments.
"Cost" and "schedule" have been important considerations throughout the American
space program, and several approaches have already been touched upon in this
history of R&QA. Now one can see a firmer reason to think ahead and plan future
R&QA techniques that would accomplish R&QA enhancement within tighter and tighter
budget restraints.
The Structured Surveillance Program introduced on November 8, 1993 was part of
this R&QA planning NASA introduced in KMI 1050.7, (Structured Surveillance
Program Plan) shown on the preceding document tree.
Mr. Raul E. Reyes, Director Quality Assurance, RO remembers his involvement in all
the planning and implementation of the proactive assurance technique, called out in
the above goal. The McDonnell Douglas Quality Assurance Plan (MDC-Y1159), for the
Payload Ground Operations Contract (PGOC), issued in May 1992 proposed the
following techniques:
a. Quality Acceptance Representatives (QARs) temporarily matrixed to the R&QA
department to perform reliability and quality assurance tasks.
b. Quality Assurance Designated Verifiers (DVs) to be used for specified areas only after
defined responsibilities and limitations were reviewed and approved by NASA RQ.
Subcontracted areas were assessed on an individual basis with recommendations for
DV/QAR designation based on task criticality, efficiency, and NASA RQ approval." (32)
At this point in R&QA history (1994), it is important to mention that KSC was
employing nine (9) major contractors to carry out its mission at Kennedy Space Center
and at Cape Canaveral. SRM&QA responsibilities were taken from the KSC
Contractor SRM&QA FY-1994 Operations Plan (MY), page 1:
1. Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance
(SRM&QA)
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality are disciplines applied to enhance
productivity by reducing the probability of mishaps, failures, maintenance
burden, and product flaws. The application of the Quality discipline, the Quality
Assurance program, is the performance of all actions necessary to assure with
reasonable confidence that a process/product will and/or does satisfy established
design/contract technical requirements. The Quality Assurance program consists
of two main components, Quality Engineering (QE) and Quality Assurance (QA),
the "hands-on" floor inspection. QE provides criteria for determining if a
product and/or process is acceptable and QA compares the product/process
against this criteria and determines acceptability or unacceptability.
I I. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) SRM&QA
o NASA: The Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Directorate (RQ)
responsibilities include ensuring appropriate SRM&QA requirements are
imposed at KSC and assuring compliance with SRM&QArequirements. The QA
function provides witness/verification (the "hands-on" floor inspection), based
on high risk and/or the product/process criticality, of tasks performed by NASA
and KSC contractor technical personnel to determine acceptability or
unacceptability. The RQDirectorate is currently manned at 371 with 189 being
Quality Assurance ("hands-on" floor inspectors).
o Contractor: The SRM&QAfunction within the KSC contractor's organizations
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the SRM&QArequirements set forth
in their contract. The QA function provides witness/verification, based on
established contract/product/process SRM&QA requirements, of tasks
performed by technical personnel under the same contract, including
subcontracts, to determine acceptability or unacceptability. (33)
NOTE: Nine major KSC contractors, each with different contract
responsibilities, provided products and services in support of the Center's
mission.
o Lockheed Space Operations Company (LSOC)and team companies under the
Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC) have the primary responsibility for launch
and landing site processing of the Space Shuttle. Responsibilities include
processing individual vehicle elements (Orbiter, ET, SRM, SSME, etc.),
integrating those elements in preparation for launch, performing payload
integration and validation activities with the Orbiter, and operating and
maintaining assigned facilities and required support equipment.
O McDonnell Douglas Space and Defense Systems (MDS&DS)under the Payload
Ground Operations Contract (PGOC) has the primary responsibility for
processing of Space Shuttle payloads (Spacelab, Spacehab, SRL-l, etc.).
Responsibilities include operation and maintenance of assigned facilities and
support equipment and, in support of the International Space Station Alpha
(ISSA), design and acquisition of launch site unique GSE and activation and
validation of launch site facilities and Government Supplied Equipment (GSE).
o EG&G Florida, Inc. under the Base Operations Contract (BOC) has the primary
responsibility for management, operation, maintenance, and engineering for KSC
utilities, facilities, specific technical and administrative operations, and health,
fire and security services.
o Rockwell International Corp. under the Orbiter Logistics Contract (OLC) is
responsible for the operations of the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD),
including the maintenance, repair, fabrication, and modification of designated
hardware for which the NSLD has been certified for and has been designated as the
repair site.
o The Bionetics Corp. under the Life Sciences Support Contract (LSSC) is
responsible for life science activities including biomedical and biological support
for prelaunch and post landing processing of flight experiments. Activities also
include support to and overall conduct of KSC assigned life sciences research,
advanced development, and special projects. Various program support is also
provided in the operations of institutional and programmatic capabilities in
facilities and laboratories for KSC life science programs.
o Harris Space Systems Corporation (HSSC) under the CORE contract is
responsible for design and development of the Test Control Monitoring System
(TCMS).
o Analex Space Systems, Inc. (ASSI) under the Safety, Reliability and Quality
Support Contract (SRQSC)provides reliability, maintainability, and quality
support to the RQ Directorate. The SRQSCdoes not perform a QA function
(witness/verify).
o Hernandez Engineering, Inc. (HEI) under the Safety Support Contract (SSC)
provides safety support to the RQDirectorate. The SSC does not perform a QA
function (witness/verify).
o I-NET, Inc. under the Engineering Support Contract (ESC)provides support to
the Engineering Development Directorate. The ESC does not perform a QA function
(witness/verify).
III. Major Itinerant Contractors
NASA Design Centers and Space Shuttle Program Level II have the following
contractor support at KSC. These personnel, with the exception of USBl, perform
an oversight function of the KSC Space Shuttle processing activities to assure
compliance with Design Center requirements. The itinerant contractors, with the
exception of USBl, do not perform a QA function, the "hands-on" floor inspection.
o Rockwell International under a Johnson Space Center (JSC)contract to
support Orbiter processing. (Five QEs and 71 Configuration Management
personnel)
o Rocketdyne under Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) contract to
support Space Shuttle Main Engine processing. (OneQE)
o Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems under a MSFC contract to
support External Tank processing. (Four Reliability Engineers)
o Thiokol Corp. under a MSFC contract to support Solid Rocket Booster
processing. (Five QEsand one Quality Engineering Technician)
o Loral Space Information Systems under a Johnson Space Center (JSC)
contract to support Space Shuttle Program Level Il activities. (Two Mission
Assurance personnel)
o USBl under a MSFC contract to perform post flight processing and
refurbishment of Solid Rocket Booster forward and aft assemblies. (Two QEs, 19
QAs,21 NDE personnel, one Safety, and one Data Systems person)
IV. QA Overlapping Activities
NASA QA performs, based on established requirements, witness/verification of
contractor-performed high risk and/or critical tasks which is also
witnessed/verified by contractor QA. Contractor QA performs a
witness/verification, based on established contract/product/process SRM&QA
requirements, of a subcontractor performed task which is also witnessed/
verified by subcontractor QA.
Redundancy may appear to occur when an integrated task is accomplished.
As an example, when an Orbiter and a Shuttle payload are undergoing an
integrated test, the contractor QA responsible for the payload (PGOC)and the
contractor QA responsible for the Orbiter interface (SPC) perform the QA
function for their responsible area. There may also be a NASA QA participating if
the task is designated as high risk and/or critical.
KSC contractors do not perform the QA function on any other KSC
contractor unless the other contractor is a subcontractor. Also the two KSC
SR&QA support contractors (SSC and SRQSC)do not perform a QA function
(witness/verify) on any activity performed by another KSC contractor.
V. Summary
The KSC SRM&QAteam is made up of NASA and KSC contractor personnel, each
with different product/process/contract responsibilities. The nine major KSC
contractors, each with different responsibilities, provide products and services
in support of the Center's mission. KSC contractors do not perform the QA
function on any other KSC contractor unless the other contractor is a
subcontractor.
QA, the "hands-on" floor inspector, compares the product/process against
established criteria and determines acceptability or unacceptability. There are
redundant QA functions which are accomplished based on high risk and/or
criticality. There are also integrated tasks which have numerous QA fu nctions
that are not redundant. KSC contractors do not perform the QA function on any
other KSC contractor unless the other contractor is a subcontractor. Also the two
KSC SR&QAsupport contractors do not perform a QA function on any activity
performed by another KSC contractor.
KSC Structured Surveillance Program
o Description
The main focus of the KSC QA program, currently being replaced by the
Structured Surveillance Program, was on critical item verification by
inspection to assure defects were identified and screened out at each level of
assembly prior to proceeding to the next level of assembly or operation,
augmented by some contractor, and civil service qualitative surveillance. The
primary responsibility for product quality inspection, normally after work
completion, was on the QAorganization. Each mandatory inspection was required
every time the assembly or operation occurred; sampling was not used.
The Structured Surveillance Program is currently being applied to all
major KSC contracts (SPC, PGOC, and BOC) and Civil Service organizations
involved in the assurance of quality at the KSC.
The purpose of the program is to decrease the overall process flow time,
increase first time quality and reduce cost by getting more efficiency and
effectiveness into the processes. The structured surveillance process is a closed
loop system providing a mechanism for fostering continuous improvement of the
KSC processes/products to yield better first-time quality. The process includes
inspection, surveillance, and Process Analysis/Control (PA/C) methods.
The primary objective of the program is to focus engineering, operations
and quality efforts toward defect prevention rather than the detection in
completed work and screening of the defects from the outgoing product.
The approach of the program is to provide a method to ensure the
technicians and engineers performing the tasks feel empowered to do the work
and sense management trusts them and will ensure they have the tools (training
and qualifications) to discharge their responsibility doing the task and verifying(stamping) that was done correctly.
o Impact
The implementation of the Structured Surveillance Program has reduced Launch
Site Space Station Program QA resources requirements, as currently projected;
and will reduce flow time due to reduction of holds for inspection/verification
and will therefore result in reduced overall cost.
o Risk
The implementation of the Structured Surveillance Program assumes a risk to
schedule and cost caused by major defects which could exist and go undetected
until later in the flow.
o Safety Assurance
Safety Assurance is the performance of all actions necessary to assure with
reasonable confidence that a process/product will be free from chance of injury
or loss of personnel, equipment or property.
o Reliability Assurance
Reliability Assurance is the performance of all actions necessanÿ to assure with
reasonable confidence that a Process/product will perform its required functions
under defined conditions at designated times for specified operating periods.
o Maintainability Assurance
Maintainability Assurance is the performance of all actions necessary to assure
with reasonable confidence that a product may be easily maintained in accordance
with prescribed requirements.
o Software Assurance
Software Assurance is the performance of all actions necessary to assure with
reasonable confidence that a process/product will and/or does satisfy established
design contract technical requirements.
o Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance is the performance of all actions necessary to assure with
reasonable confidence that a process/product will and/or does satisfy established
design/contract technical requirements.
The Quality Engineering (QE) is that portion of the Quality Assurance
program which defines technical quality requirements and provides the criteria
for assessing conformance.
Quality Assurance (QA), at KSC, is that portion of the Quality Assurance
program which assesses the implementation of technical quality requirements.
Simply put, QE provides criteria for determining if a product and/or process is
acceptable and QA compares the product/process against this criteria and
determines acceptability or unacceptability. ( 3 4)
Also in 1994, the Center was undergoing budget constraints, increasing
requirement and heightened sense of urgency that all employees needed to
focus on where the Center was going and how KCS planned to get there. Out
of these concerns grew a more formal Continual Improvement (Cl) program
for all employees, top down. The CI planning was carried out under
policies within Kennedy Management Instruction (KMI) 1270.2A.
The 1994 KSC Continual Improvement program was developed by the CI
Steering Committee appointed by the Center Director. The Center Director,
Robert Crippen, and Committee members signed the following document:
iThe Kennedy Space Center Continual Improvement Plan
serves as our road map for achieving quality products and
services. CI principles and practices will help us achieve
our strategic goals and excel as
America's Gateway to the Universe in
Preparing and Launching Missions
to Earth and Beyond.
Each of us embrace
Continual lmprovement as the way to achieve
success for our organization and the
Kennedy Space Center Team.
KSC's Continual improvement Plan, 1994
(Signature Sheet)
For the Center to achieve success in meeting the strategic goals of CI,
each KSC employee involved were required to commit knowledge, skill, and
energy to the continual improvement of the tasks, processes, and
functions wherever they were employed in their KSC area of
responsibility. Responsibilities included the following:
a. Focus on customer needs and expectations
b. Use Customer-driven measures to define quality
c. Communicate requirements to suppliers
d. Achieve initial quality rather than correcting defects
e. Initiate improvement ideas
f. Implement improvements within the organizations
g. Improvement teams
h. Communicate improvements and lessons learned for potential
applications elsewhere
i. Acquire and use Cl tools and skills in daily work
Cl management responsibilities were spelled out in detail and Management
Teams were instituted and given guidelines in carrying out their
responsibilities. Training and recognition were large parts of the CI
program at KSC, and continues throughout the Shuttle and Space Station
work areas. The President's Quality Award Program included KSC as a
finalist in the 1996 Special Achievement Award for exceptional quality
work under budget restraints.
The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA Annual Operating Agreement (AOA) For
2002 and Out-years, issued on October 15, 2001 gives more information on Shuttle
operations, page 7:
" The Shuttle Processing Directorate is responsible for overall management,
planning, technical direction, and insight of Space Shuttle processing. The
Directorate manages all aspects of Space Shuttle processing at KSC, including
preflight, launch, landing, and all recovery activities. The organization provides
logistics services that ensure flight hardware, ground support equipment,
materials, and associated planning are in place to meet all Shuttle processing
milestones. The Directorate holds the overall responsibility for safe and reliable
execution of Space Shuttle turn around and preparation for launch.
The primary objective of the Safety and Mission Assurance Division within
the Space Shuttle Processing Directorate is to ensure that this organization
conducts the flight hardware processing operations in a manner that will
achieve mission safety and success. S&MA consists of the Safety, Reliability,
Maintainability, Quality, and Software Assurance disciplines that are applied to
enhance productivity by reducing the probability of mishaps, failures,
maintenance burden, and product flaws. The S&MA Division acts as the S&MA
conscience for the Directorate, with a clear voice in NASA and contractor
operational and decision making processes. This Division also provides off-site
Procurement Quality for other directorates at KSc. (3 5)
Looking back at the AOA for FY-2000 and Outyears issued in September,
1999, one can notice a vestige of Structured Surveillance. Section 7.0,
"GENERAL" on page 5 of that document states:
"The KSC S&MA organization has undergone a significant transformation which is
aligned with the strategic goals of the agency, the NASA S&MA organization and
KSC. This has required a shift in the way S&MA has viewed their role, and while
by no means complete, KSC S&MA is well on the way to implementing these
revolutionary changes.
First, world class S&MA implementation requires that everyone take
responsibility for safety and quality. While the S&MA organization will be
responsible for establishing policy and direction, each supervisor and each
person is responsible for safety. First time quality is a goal. NASA line
organizations and all elements of the contractor work force must incorporate
safety and quality into everything they do. The KSC S&MA organization will be
most effective when used as consultants, enablers, teachers, and auditors. This
philosophy is being adopted by the center and brings about a real change in the
role of the safety and quality professionals.
Second, the agency and the center have adopted Performance Based Contracting.
NASA specifies the products they expect and the contractor determines how to
deliver this product. The contractor takes on more responsibility and the
government role shifts from oversight (in-line) verification to insight
(surveillance and auditing). All of the major KSC contracts, including the SFOC
contract, are now performance based. Since KSC is planning a major, centerwide
reorganization in 2000, these factors may influence the structure of S&MA and
its position in this reorganization. These changes will be reflected in the next AOA
revision." (36)
Research of S&MA history of this time frame revealed operational changes
across the Center. A heavy burden fell on S&MA Director, JoAnn H. Morgan,
to reduce the NASA S& MA staff by 35%, and to eliminate her mission
support contractors, Analex and Hernandez, another 98 persons. The S&MA
ANNUAL OPERATING AGREEMENT (AOA) certainly shows a constant
revolution of "management technique" shifts when succeeding
AOA's are studied. The NASA Strategic Management Process aligns all
agency planning activity at KSC. Much of the AOA is derived from the KSC
Business Objectives and Agreements (BOA). The AOA serves to assure that
safety and mission assurance are an integral part of everything done at
the Center. The Mission Assurance Program elements are shown in their
entirety on pages 36-42 of Chapter 3, "EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF R&QAMANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION."
The following chart depicts the organization of the current of S&MA
program linkages at KSC:
CENTER DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR
SPACEPORT INT'L SPACE JOINT SPACE SPACEPORT
ELV & SAFETY,
SERVICES STATION/ PERFORMANCE SHUTTLE
ENG. & PAYLOAD HEALTH
(TA) PAYLOAD MANAGEMENT PROCESSING TECHNOLOGY CARRIERS
INDEPENDENT
-
PROCESSING OFFICE (PH) (YA) (VA) ASSESSMENT
(UB) (JP) (QA)
institutional
Safety & ELV Launch ASC
Safety & SEMA
Safety & Misalon Mission Services Director.
¯¯ Quality DMslon
Assurance Assurance Directorate Safety &
Brancti
Division Project Mission
Assessment Assurance
Office
Protective
Safety As u ce
Services ----
Assurance Engineering Techniques
Branch
Division
-
(Fire &
Emergency
Prep.) Safety &
Process
Quality Assurance Assessment
-
Assura ce Division
NASA/Alf Procurement
Force Mgmt.
-
Quallty
& Comp.
Master
--
MissionPlanning AssuranceOflice Engineeting Quality(Range ---- Branch AssuranceSafety)
Organization Of The Current S&MA Program Linkages at KSC
Chapter 6
HISTORY OF R&QA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION PROGRAM
The launch of STS-88 on December 4, 1998 marked the beginning of the construction
phase of the greatest space station to date. The International Space Station (ISS) is
putting new worlds within closer reach and more knowledge within our grasp. This
step along the way to exploring the universe is a giant undertaking, pushing the
envelope in many areas of technology, both on earth-based equipment and on-orbit
technology. All of this activity on earth and on the ISS will require creative R&QA
implementation to satisfy system engineers and management.
On December 4, 1998, Shuttle Endeavor carried the U.S.- built Unity module in its
cargo bay. Upon rendezvous in earth orbit with the U.S-built Unity module, the shuttle
robot arm grabbed the Russian-made Zarya control module and linked the two
together into the first assembly of the ISS. This action marked a new dawn of the
fifteen-year effort of 16 countries to jointly construct the largest international peace-
time scientific project in the history of space travel.
During the proposed six-year course of construction, the shuttle will make about 35
flights to the station to add pieces, swap Alpha residents and keep the "lightning-rod
outpost" supplied with all on-orbit needs. Yes, the ISS will most assuredly draw the
world's attention just as a lightning-rod draws lightning to itself.
Much concentrated work effort is required in the preparation and launch of a Space
Shuttle as well as preparation of the payload intended for the ISS. Safety, Reliability,
and Quality Assurance play an important role in all the preparation, test and checkout,
and in the launch countdown process of each mission to the ISS. Page 96 reflects the
current organization structure at KSC that contains SR&QA responsibilities.
The following organization charts show how the ISS/Payloads Processing Directorate
is making advances toward getting the job done with respect to the ISS. Mr. Bruce
Jansen, UB-F, is shown leading the Safety & Mission Assurance Division where the
Safety Assurance, the Quality Assurance Branch, and the Mission Assurance Branch
give leadership to the creative R&QA program that is required to complete NASA and
contractor SR&QA tasks in the preparation and launch of the many payloads that will
be required for completion of the space station over the six-year period:
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The McDONNELL DOUGLAS Space Station Freedom Program Plan, MDC Y1159
Rev. Basic, pages 2-2 - 2-9, dated May 1992, shows the careful planning and
response to the KSC R&QA requirements invoked in support of the Payload Ground
Operations Contract (PGOC) and the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), now
called
_Alpha).
The following quotes from that document concerning R&QA confirmed
an acceptable R&QA program for this particular Contractor:
CHAPTER 2
- QUALITYASSURANCE
2.1.1
-
PLANNING: Quality Assurance activities shall be planned and developed
as an integral part of Space Station Freedom design, development, test and
evaluation, production, operational activities, and refurbishment/overhaul.
Scheduled status reporting will be used to provide visibility and assist in
controlling the Quality Assurance effort. Objectives will be to plan and establish
the Quality Assurance effort, to define the major Quality Assurance tasks and
their place as an integral part of the design and development process, and to
assure the effective implementation of Quality Assurance requirements. Quality
Assurance program planning shall address all program phases and shall provide a
comprehensive management approach to preventing, detecting, documenting, and
resolving actual or potential nonconformances.
2.1.2
-
ORGANIZATION: The Director, Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
(SR&QA),will have responsibility and authority to direct, manage, and evaluate
the quality program and make changes to ensure mission success. As shown in
Figure 2.1, the Director reports directly to the Vice President, General Manager.
This direct access to top management will ensure the effectiveness of the program
and will guarantee timely corrective action when problems are identified.
Quality Assurance will retain its autonomous and equal relationship to those
organizations whose activities and outputs are evaluated. Figure 2-2 details the
SR&QAorganization.
The Reliability & Quality Assurance organization is shown in Figure 2-3. Quality
Assurance engineers will plan the inspection (QA) tasks and coverage in
accordance with the Quality Program Requirements Document (QPRD),included
as Appendix E of this plan. Additionally, Quality Assurance engineers shall
perform design reviews, subcontract reviews, source and site inspections, end-
item acceptance, audits, surveys, corrective actions, QA alert coordination,
material review, and other related functions. Quality Assurance inspectors will
perform the on-line and off-line inspection functions which include product and
process evaluations, work document, and nonconformance report controls.
The Sustaining Engineering Project Management organization which reports to
the Director, Product Engineering and Definition (PED) is detailed in Figure 2-
4. Primary support from the PED Directorate is in the specialized area of
criticality assessments and System Assurance Analysis in support of design
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K.A. Francis, President, MDSSC
Vice President-
General Manager
Vice President
Deputy
General Manager
OMBUDSMAN
Safety, Launch OperationsProgram Reliability & Support Support contractControl Quality Assurance Services a Program
Space Advanced Production Product
Payload Station Product Support Engineering TechnicalProjects Projects Development & Definition Support
Figure 2-1
McDONNELL DOUGLAS SPACE SYSTEMS COMPANY
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
DIRECTOR
Safety, Reliability &
Quality Assurance
space Station
SRM&QA
Integration
Senior Manager
Senior Manager Senior Manager systems, Processes,
Safety & Reliability & & Procedures
Environmental Quality Assurance Improvement
Figure 2-2
1
McDONNELL DOUGLAS SPACE SYSTEMS COMPANY
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
RELIABILITY & QUALITY ASSURANCE
Senior Manager
Reliability &
Quality Assurance
Staff Manager
Manager Manager Manager
Horizontal QE/QA Support QE/QA 'Technical Data Center
Manager
Manager Experiment Processing
Vertical QE/QA QE/QA
Figurt 1-3
McDONNELL DOUGLAS SPACE SYSTEMS COMPANY
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
PRODUCT ENGINEERING AND DEFINITION
SENIOR MANAGER
SUSTAINING ENGINEERING
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER
PROJECT PAYLOAD DOCUMENTATION SRM&Q
MANAGEMENT CENTER AND DRAWING ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
CHECK
Figure 2-4
2.1.2 Continued: "The Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Integrator is the primary interface at directorate level with customer
counterparts, for the Director of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
(SR&QA), and Product Engineering and Definition (PED) on all activities
affecting Space Station systems development, activation, and operation. Some of
the Integrator's major responsibilities are:
a. Ensures that plans, programs, policies, and procedures are developed to meet
program requirements. The Integrator coordinates NASA and MDSSC-KSC tasking
requirements with all SRM&QAdisciplines and ensures task execution is in
accordance with customer requirements from Levels I, II, III, and MDSSC-KSC.
b. Ensures consistent application of Safety and Product Assurance (S&PA)
standard practices, policies, procedures, instructions, and other management
directives.
c. Ensures the development of integrated goals and formulates and communicates
Safety and Product Assurance activities to management and to customers, as
required.
d. Participates in NASA and PGOCmeetings, committees, and boards. Assures that
issues and concerns are fully addressed,
e. Ensures Program Operating Plan (POP)budget and manpower is developed and
coordinated with PGOC project management, program control, and NASA SR&QA
Project Office with synergism considered for manpower and equipment.
f. Ensures that specific approaches are undertaken in SR&QAand PED, on SCPA
activities, to consolidate, synergize, and improve cost effectiveness.
g. Serves as the spokesperson for communication between MDSSC-KSC and NASA
SR&QADirectorate on Space Station
h. Functions as the SRM&QASpace Station representative within PGOC. In this
capacity, coordinates with all directorates on issues affecting the Space Station
Freedom Program. This interface/interaction ensures the SRM&QA issues and
concerns are addressed.
i. Determine customer requirements and take initiative to gain customer
satisfaction.
2.1.3 QUALITYPROGRAMPLAN
This plan covers MDSSC-KSC Space Station Freedom Program quality assurance
functions and is a master planning and control document for these activities. It is
our objective and policy to establish, implement, document, and maintain an
efficient and effective Quality Assurance program that is fully responsive to NASA
contract requirements and McDonnell Douglas Corporation's Total Quality
Management (TQM) policy. Principle Quality Assurance functions and major
tasks that will be incorporated in SSFP quality assurance planning are:
-
Development of clearly defined Quality Assurance tasks, responsibilities, and
standard procedures.
-
Direct the definition of program quality assurance plans and other deliverable
documentation, as required, in accordance with contractual requirements and
applicable internal policies and procedures.
-
Manage/monitor the preparation of budgets and schedules, monitor per-
formance against approved budget and schedules. Assure sufficient manpower is
available using synergistic planning for all projects, payloads, and missions.
-
Provide management and supervision of Quality Engineering and Inspection
functions (QE/QA),
-
Ensure Quality Assurance technical review in design and development to ensure
incorporation of design criteria, proper implementation, and documentation.
-
Tailor Quality Assurance support for cost-effective consideration of flight,
GSE, and facility requirements with maximum use of available resources.
-
Assure the transporting, receiving, lifting, handling, storing, and processing
of flight elements and associated hardware is performed with utmost concern for
established requirements, hardware integrity, and mission success.
-
Plan, conduct, and document inspection and test support of material, articles,
equipment, and systems.
-
Provide Quality Assurance functions of audits, surveys, certifications,
recurrence control, proof testing, and source inspection.
-
Provide inspection for the early detection and subsequent meaningful
corrective action on nonconforming materiel.
-
Coordinate with Production Support to provide for segregation, control, and
processing of nonconforming raw material, articles, and equipment with
historical data and trend analysis.
-
Establish cost-effective material review and scrap/excess processing.
-
Exercise procurement quality control, including definition of quality
requirements and monitoring of supplier performance for compliance with
quality requirements.
-
Ensure positive control of Contractor-Acquired Property (CAP) and
Government-Furnished Property (GFP) in accordance with applicable
requirements.
-
Assure that any quality related problems are identified, reported to the proper
organizations, and corrected.
-
Maintain open dialog with NASA counterpart organization on significant
problems and accomplishments.
-
Ensure conformance to preservation, packaging, handling, storage, and shipping
requirements.
-
Ensure certification and control of test equipment, facility systems, tools,
gages, special processes, and personnel.
-
Assure the purchase order, invoice, and certification files are maintained in
Receiving Department.
-
Develop measurements to establish and approve supplier list in accordance
with acceptance/rejection data in the Receiving Inspection and source/field
inspection reporting.
-
Provide document archives, retrieval, and reference library services for
Acceptance Data Packages, closed work authorization documents, nonconformance
records, and specifications, standards, drawings, and microfilm services.
-
Provide positive acceptance and serviceability identification via stamps, tags,
and constraint review procedures, and Acceptance Review (AR) activity.
-
Provide general operations and shops surveillance, process monitoring,
inspection walk downs, and subcontractor field inspection support. (37)
The Safety And Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual Operating Agreement
(AOA) For FY-2002 and Out-Years, KCA-1702, Rev. A, dated October 15,
2001 states that:
" The International Space Station/Payload Processing Directorate is responsible
for the management and performance of all KSC activities supporting the Space
Shuttle Payloads/Experiments Programs, International Space Station (ISS)
Program, and ISS Payloads/Experiments Programs. The Directorate serves the
Center's focal point for Space Station and Payload related requirements, resource
allocations, and planning; and has the overall responsibility for satisfying all
Center and Program requirements, including S&MA. This Directorate is also
responsible for the performance of several ISS Program level tasks including:
oversight of the ISS Program's contractor activities at KSC; tracking and
verifying the as-launched hardware and software configuration; supporting the
ground safety Review Board; managing ihe Ground Safety Review Panel; and
surpporting the Ground Support Equipment Board.
The primary objective of the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Division
within the international Space Station/Payload Processing Directorate is to
assure that operations at sites under the Directorate's responsibility are
conducted in a manner that will achieve mission success. S&MA consists of the
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, Quality, and Software Assurance disciplines
that are applied to enhance productivity by reducing the probability of mishaps,
failures, maintenance burden, and product flaws. The S&MA Division acts as the
S&MA conscience for the Directorate, with a clear voice in NASA and contractor
operational and decision-makng processes. The ISS/Payloads Processing
Directorate provides technical safety support for ground processing of ELV
payloads at KSC through an inter-organizatonal agreement between UB and VA."
(38)
The preceding paragraphs documented the McDonnell Douglas' quality
assurance responsibilities within the ISS Program. The document, "DDC
Yl159," dated May 1992, was their official Quality Assurance Program
Plan. Later contract competition awarded the ISS Payload Ground
Operations Contract (PGOC),NAS10-11400, to the Boeing Company.
JSC's S&MA functions are achieved throughout several directorates and
S&MA organizations. The following chart allows the Center to enhance the
S&MA philosophies throughout the line organizations. Support is also
provided through KSC S&MA Contractors and other Government
SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE
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The "Introduction" and "Scope" of the Boeing Company Quality System for Contract
NAS10-11400 (BP 1001H, dated October 2000), page 1-1, provides the following:
"This Quality Plan describes the tasks and activities used to implement the Boeing Quality
System for Contract NAS10-11400, the Payload Ground Operations Contract (PGOC).
The quality system, including quality policy, which applies to all Boeing contracts, is
described in the Boeing Quality Management System (BQMS), Company Procedure
PRO-4798, the Boeing Quality Management System Model, Company Procedure PRO-
570, and the Space Coast Operations Quality Management System Supplement, SCO-
PLAN-SMA-001. Information contained in those documents is not duplicated in this plan.
This plan is written using the elements of ANSI/ISO/ASQC Q900A-1994 to allow easy
correlation of planned activities to these elements. A cross-reference is also provided in
Appendix A to other applicable quality requirements, including SSP 41173 (which
applies to NASA Payload Logistics Depot (NPLD) operations in support of the
International Space Station (ISS) Program. Appendix A also lists the implementing
procedures applicable to each section of this Quality Plan. Paragraphs in the Plan which
are only applicable to portions of the contract or which differ from the normal requirements
will be specified and specifically marked for that portion of the contract, e.g. , "Experiment
Integration Only."
The following precepts:
o Clearly defined tasks and responsibilities in procedures and instructions.
o Consideration for quality enhancements during early phases of equipment
design and development.
o Improvement of product and service quality through continuous and complete
hardware, software and process evaluations and corrective actions.
o Evaluation of hardware, software, and operations quality through
analysis, reviews, and assessments.
o Integration of quality with all technical and operational depart-
ments and with all phases of payload ground operations.
o Consideration of hardwareltask criticality and complexity and system/program
maturity during implementation of quality activities.
o Verification of flight readiness of hardware and software. (39)
Further assurance of R&C)A coverage is found on page 2-1 of Boeing's BP 1001H,
Section 2:
SECTION 2
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
The following documents are used as guidance for establishing specific tasks required for
the PGOC quality system:
ANS/ISO/ASQC Q1994, Quality Systems - Model for Quality Assurance in Design,
Development, Production, Installation, and Servicing.
ANSI/ISO/ASQC A8402
-1994 Quality management and quality assurance vocabulary,
SSP 41173 Space Station Quality Assurance Requirements
PRO 4798 Quality Management System
PRO 570 Quality Management System Model
SCO-PLAN-SMA-001 Space Coast Operations Quality
Management System Supplement (40)
Section 4 of this same document covers Quality Management Responsibility, Quality
Policy Implementation, and Organization with a strong emphasis on new Continual
Quality Improvement philosophy that empowers people and makes them responsible
for their own work, which provides rewards for excellence, and encourages Continual
Improvement of procedures and processes. Continual Improvement is a regular topic
by KSC management, and this quality philosophy is reinforced thoughout the KSC
contractor organizations.
Section 4 of the Boeing Quality Plan contains the following QA Requirements and
implementation philosophy:
SECTION 4
QUALITY SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
4.1 MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
Boeing executive management takes a leading role in defining implementing, and
administering the quality system. In this role, they have adopted and fully
embraced The Boeing Company's Quality Policy for application to the PGOC. They
have also established the following activities and organizations to carry out the
quality system.
4.1.1 Quality Policy Implementation
AII employees are provided with training on the ANSI/ISO/ASQCQ0000-1994,
standards, the Boeing Quality Policy, and how it applies to their work. New
employees are provided with this training as part of their initial New Employee
Orientation Training. A 'Continuous Quality Improvement' philosophy has been
adopted by executive management that empowers people and makes them
responsible for their work, provides rewards for excellence, and encourages
continious improvement of procedures and processes. Continuous Improvement is
a regular topic of discussion by the executive management. This quality
philosophy is reinforced throughout the organization and flowed down to
employees at all
4.1.2 Organization
The PGOC Director, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) has been appointed as
the management representative responsible for ensuring that the PGOC quality
system is established and implemented. The director also
has full responsibility
and authority to evaluate the quality system and make changes
to ensure mission
success. The S&MA Director reports directly to the PGOC Program Manager to
ensure unimpeded access to top management. S&MA maintains an autonomous and
equal relationship to other organizations whose activities and outputs
are
evaluated. Although the responsibility for providing quality products and services
is shared by all personnel and organizations, an S&MA organization
has been
established with the prime responsibility to plan and carry out specific quality
tasks related to contract requirements. This organization and
its relationships
are depicted in Figure 4. 1-1:
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To ensure that all tasks, responsibilities, and authority for quality are clearly
defined and understood, executive management has established a documentation
system that includes detailed planning documents, where appropriate, and a
series of Standard Practices and Procedures (SPPs),Standard Practices (SP's)
and desk procedures for implementation. These procedures and instructions
clearly define who is responsible for specific tasks related to the quality system.
Under PGOC, a detailed ProgralTi Operating Plan (POP) is submitted to NASA as
justifÍcation for future budget requirements. POP is estimating rationale for all
tasks to be performed, including those tasks related to quality. By reviewing all
inputs prior to submission to NASA and allowing. each organization the
opportunity to provide rationale for their budget, exective management ensures
that the resources are available to provide products and services at a quality
level expected by the customer. In addition, executive management can
redistribute resources within the organization in order to meet quality
objectives if the need is determined during periodic quality reiews.
4.L3 Management Review of The Quality System
Periodic management reviews of the quality system as applied to PGOC are conducted by
the Program Manager and senior staff twice per year as a minimum to ensure the
continuing suitability and effectiveness in satisfying the requirements of our Quality
System policy and objectives. This review provides closure of many such reviews that
have taken place at all levels of mangement. Minutes of these management reviews are
maintained as quality records. This review process is depicted in Figure 4.1-2:
Executive Management
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Management objectives.
Indicators
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Figure 4.1-2
4.2 QUALITY SYSTEM
4.2.1 GENERAL
The quality system to be used for PGOC is as described in PRO-570 and SCO-
PLAN-SMA-001 with additional details provided in subsequent section of this
plan. The quality system is implemented using written procedures to define
authority and responsibility for specific quality tasks. Written operation
instructions are used to define the applicable quality requirements for all phases
of payload ground operations and to detail the methods and individual
responsibilities for satisfying them.
4.2.2 Quality System Procedures
Planned activities to assure an acceptable level of quality for all products
provided under the PGOC are based on hardware/task criticality , and maturity of
systems and programs in the implementation of quality activities. Flight
hardware processing, other critical tasks, or work on critical systems use
procedures that establish stringent controls for carrying out and verifying the
work. Work on less critical systems allows use of alternative procedures with
less critical systems allows use of alternative procedures with less stringent
controls. These procedures and the criteria used to establish criticality of the
systems and tasks are clearly defined in NASA and Boeing requirement documents
and are implemented by SPs and SPPs.
System procedures are carried out using written work instructions, These work
instructions, called Work Authorization Documents (WADs), define the quality
requirements to be met, detail the methods for satisfying them, and specific
individual responsibilities. Quality activities are integrated with other functions
in order to provide a comprehensive program that ensures all quality
requirements will be achieved.
PGOC personnel also accomplish contractual requirement for the International
Space Station (ISS) as members of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). IPTs are
joint NASA/Boeing teams that operate under charter and technical task
agreements approved by the ISS Program Office. For ISS development activities
where concepts are being evaluated, the teams may use procedures that are not
part of the Boeing Quality Management System. However, once product or
processing requirements have been established, the products and sevices are
provided using documented procedures that are part of the Boeing Quality
Management System.
4.2.3 Quality Planning
The quality planning function for all PGOC payload processing operations, de-
velopment projects, and new contracts is carried out by Quality Engineering, a
Mission Assurance Department. Quality requirements are evaluated in advance
and documented in Quality Planning Requirements Documents (QPRDs) for
different aspects of the work accomplished under the PGOC. The QPRDsdefine the
approach and provide inplementing policy and criteria for imposing quality
conformance assessment requirements. The QPRDs,along with the associated
ground rules for application, are published separately.
Quality planning is implemented as part of documented procedures for review and
approval of all work activities and design/development efforts:
o For all work instructions, quality requirements, including inspection
activites, are incorporated by task team members as part of the documented WAD
development, review, and approval procedure. Quality Engineers and other task
team members use QPRD guidelines, knowledge and data from reliability
analyses, hardware/software criticality, program maturity, and program
requirements such as Operations and Maintenance Requirements Specifications
(OMRS)to determine the appropriate quality requirements to be included.
o For equipment design, development and modification, design teams/IPTs
determine appropriate design quality provisions by reviewing applicable
requirements documents, design specifications and standards. Key quality
requirements are documented and verified during the design and development
process Quality and Reliability engineers are an integral part of the design
review process to assure new equipment designs meet all quality and mission
assurance requirements.
o Consideration is given to updating quality control, inspection, and test
techniques, including development of new instrumentation, when the nature of the
work requires.
o When any measurement requirement involving a capability that exceeds the
known state of the art is identified, every effort will be made to ensure that there
is sufficient time in the planning to achieve this capability.
The quality planning function also includes provisions for the detection,
documentation, analysis, and correction of deficiencies, nonconformances,
conditions of marginal quality, and trends that could result in unsatisfactory
quality. These aspects of the quality system are discussed in detail in Sections
4.6, 4.10.4.13, 4,14, and 4.20 below.
4.3 CONTRACT REVIEW
4.3.1 General
Contract review requirements prescribed by SCO-PLAN-SMA-001 will be
fulfilled by the Business Management Directorate, Contracts function, in
accordance with SCO-PRO-BM-001, Estimating Proposal Process.
4.3.2 Review
Under the provisions of SCO-PRO-BM-001, all orders/contracts are reviewed
by Contracts at acceptance or prior to submission of a tender. When the order
or contract is the result of a response to a formal Request for Proposal(RFP)or
Request for Quotation (RFQ),Contracts coordinates with other affected Boeing
functions, as required, to adequately assess the organization's capability to satisfy
requirements. This review includes provisions to ensure that:
o Any difference between the order/contract and the original RFP/RFQare
satisfactorily resolved prior to the commencement of any order/contracts related
activity.
o The order/contract requirements are clearly and adequately defined and
documented in writing.
o The Boeing Company and/or its supplier(s) possess the capability to fully meet
the order's/contract's requirements.
4.3.3 Amendment to Contract
Contract amendments are made and distributed to the affected organizations in
accordance with the provisions outlined in SCO-PRO-BM-001.
4.3.4 Records
Contracts maintains records of the contract reviews as defined in SCO-PRO-BM-
001. (41)
For the balance of BP 1001H, only the topic heading will be referenced
which will give the reader a good indication that a thorough analysis of
the NASA Request for Proposal (RFP) was made, and that Boeing's Quality
Systems Requirement document BP 1001H was responsive:
4.4 DESIGN CONTROL
4.5 DOCUMENTATION AND DATA CONTROL
4.5.1 General Requirements
4.5.2 Documentation and Data Approval and Issue
4.5.3 Document and Data Changes
4.6 PURCHASING
4.6.1 General
4.6.2 Evaluation and Selection of Procurement Sources
Including Subcontractors, Suppliers, and Processors
4.6.3 Quality Records and Purchasing Data
4.6.4 Verification of Purchased Product
4.6.4.1 Quality Verification of Subcontracted Product
4.6.4.2 Government/Customer Verification of
Subcontracted Product
4.7 CONTROL OF CUSTOMER-SUPPLIED PRODUCT
4.8 PRODUCT IDENTlFICATION AND TRACEABILITY
Product identification
Traceability
4.9 PROCESSCONTROL
4.10 INSPECTION AND TESTING
4.10.1 General
4.10.1 Receiving Inspection and Testing
4.10.3 In-Process Inspection and Testing
4.10.4 Final Inspection and Testing
4.10.5 Inspection and Test Records
4.11 CONTROL OF INSPECTION, MEASURING, AND TEST
EQUIPMENT
4.11.1 General
4.1 1.2 Control Procedure
4.12 INSPECTION AND TEST STATUS
4.1 3 CONTROL OF NONCONFORMINGPRODUCT
4.13.1 General
4.13.2 Review and Disposition of Nonconforming Product
4.14 CORRECTIVEAND PREVENTIVE ACTION
4.14.1 General
4.14.2 Corrective Action
4.14.3 Preventive Action
4.15 HANDLING, STORAGE, PACKAGING, PRESERVATION, AND
DELIVERY
4.15.1 General
4.15.2 Handling
4.15.3 Storage
4.15.4 Packaging
4.15.5 Delivery
4.1 6 CONTROLOF QUALITYRECORDS
1 1
4.17 INTERNAL QUALITYAUDITS
4.18 TRAINING
4.19 SERVICING
4.20 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES
4.20.1 Identification of Need
4.20.2 Procedures (42)
Having put all the Quality System Requirements into their proper
perspective and implementation, NASA can expect a complete response
to the PGOC Contractor's document, BP 1001H. In the implementation of
each requirement listed, and with proper internal audits and surveys, as
well as assigned NASA Quality surveillance, the Shuttle and the
International Space Station work-effort should result in reliable launch
operations at KSC during the contract period.
A new S&MA management philosophy for FY-2002 and Outyears is defined
in the following KCS documents:
Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual Operating Agreement
(AOA) For FY 2002 and Out-Years (KCA-1702, Rev. A). (Oct. 2001)
Kennedy Space Center Business Management System Manual, KPD-
KSC- M-1000, Rev. G.
The Mission Assurance Program elements for the International Space
Station project are shown in their entirety on pages 36-42 of Capter 3, of
this
CHAPTER 7
HISTORY OF RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
WITHIN THE EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES AND PAYLOAD
CARRIERS DIRECTORATE
The Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV) program under Kennedy Space Center
began officially on October 1, 1965, when Dr. Robert Gray's Vanguard Operations
Group transferred to the NASA's Launch Operations Center (LOD) at Cape Canaveral
and at the Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), which was later named the John F.
Kennedy Space Center.
Conversation with Dr. Gray on October 18, 2001 revealed that prior to the transfer to
Dr. Kurt Debus', team his group relied on quality assurance support from Patrick Air
Force Base for inspection and surveillance during launch preparations and launches
for several years as needed. After transfer to Dr. Debus' team, NASA Reliability and
Quality Assurance required proper NASA coverage for both civil service work and for
the support contractors like Pan Am, RCA, CSC, and CSR.
Dr. Gray was the first Director of the ELV organization and then John Neilon, George
Page, Charles Gay, and Jim Womack in that order, became Directors.
NASA's Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) program which still operates at the Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station has a continuous history of successes over the years
beginning on December 8, 1956, when Vanguard Test Vehicle Zero(TV-0), was
launched. It was actually built as Viking 13 by Martin, a descendent of the Vanguard
rocket, Delta, built by Douglas Aircraft Co. The experience and lessons-learned over
the years from these rockets was well documented. Information passed back to the
launch vehicle developers resulted in world-class launch operations. Many of the
advances made were due to the reliability and quality assurance programs which
included approved work-authorizing documents and trained personnel.
The Kennedy Space Center assigned civil service personnel to ensure contractor
compliance for all launch operations at the NASA launch facilities at the Cape. Quality
surveillance and contractor evaluation was an important element in assuring
successful launch vehicle operations and launchings.
The support contractors over the years were Pan American World Airways (Pan AM),
Radio Corporation of America (RCA), Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC),
Computer Sciences/Raytheon Corporation (CSR), McDonnell Douglas, and Boeing.
The following organization chart shows the key organizations and personnel during
the 1980 time frame for the Telemetry, Instrumentation and Computation Services
(TlCS) contract. Notice that the R&QA organization was headed by this historian for
several years until retirement from CSC. (After my retirement from NASA, I worked a
total of ten years for CSC in the areas of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance).
The chart also shows the assignment of two R&QA Representatives (Smith and Glass)
as well as Quality Assurance Designees (QAD's) in the work areas of
Telecommunications, Software and Operations, and Electromagnetics. Each QAD was
trained and qualified to fulfill the duties of inspection, problem reporting and corrective
action system (PRACA), and overall quality support for the TICS contract at Cape
Canaveral. A Quality Circle formed of the QAD's met monthly to report advances
made, and to review status of corrective action/closure of problems. Management was
provided minutes of each meeting for their information and for action required by
management.
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Telemetry, Instrumentation, and Computation Services Organization, 1983-1986
The next organization chart shows the TICS program under new management
changes required by August 17, 1989. The QAD's are flagged in each organization.This method of R&QA coverage was successful for the ELV program over the yearsCSC held the TlCS cöntract.
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Succeeding support contractors and NASA were required to have appropriate R&QA
responsibilities over the years of ELV operations at Cape Canaveral. The SAFETY
AND MISSION ASSURANCE (S&MA) ANNUAL OPERATIONAL AGREEMENT (AOA)
FOR FY 2002 AND OUT-YEARS, (KCA-1702, Rev. A, dated October 15, 2001, gives
the following guidelines for R&QA:
The Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Program is a Human Exploration and
Development of Space (HEDS)Enterprise, Lead Center Program, responsible for
managing and acquiring ELV launch services for NASA and its customers.
Fundamental objectives include: provision of safe, reliable, and cost effective
launch services for NASA payloads; maximizing the probability of launch success
for all NASA missions; and assuring customer launch services are provided
within budget. The Payload Carriers Program is a HEDS Enterprise, Lead Center
Program responsible for providing payload carriers and support to NASA and its
customers. Fundamental objectives include providing expertise, facilities, and
associated flight and ground hardware to prepare and integrate a wide variety of
spacecraft, and space experiment payloads for flight; providing payload/payload
carrier/launch vehicle integration analysis to meet customer and vehicle
requirements; and supplying payload carrier upgrades to existing hardware or
new carriers to meet future customer demands.
The Safety and Flight Assurance Office (SFAO)of the Expendable Launch Vehicles
and Payload Carriers Directorate is the focal point for S&MA activities. SFAO
provides consultation and assistance to ELV and Payload Carriers managers in
establishing and implementing S&MA requirements. ELV SFAO participates in
launch vehicle procurement, design, production, assembly, integration, test, and
launch activities. Quality assurance and safety assurance insight and approval
activities are performed throughout the launch vehicle life cycle phases.
Additionally, SFAO provides S&MA support to the NASA Launch System (NLS)
launch vehicle qualification process. They are responsible for concurrence on
Level 1 changes serving as a voting member of each Program Requirements
Control Board (PRCB). (43)
The Organization chart on page 96 depicts the current Safety and
Mission Assurance linkages including the ELV organizations, and the
following chart taken from the above AOA presents the overall ELV
assignment matrix.
SAFETY AND MISSION ASSURANCE
ANNUAL OPERATING AGREEMENT
CENTER: KSC OFFICE: Expendable Launch Vehicles and Payload Carriers
(VA)
ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION:
S&MA Programmatic Requirements Flowdown
Contractor Process Surveillance, Assessments, Audits, Analysis
-
Implement NASA-STD-8709.2 and NPD 8610.23
-
CoFR Support
Reviews (Milestone,Launch Vehicle hardware/software).
Payload Safety Engineering
Payload Customer Hazardous Procedure ReviewlApproval
Hazardous Operations Support
Launch Countdown Support
Failure Investigation/Review
Trending of Quality-Related Precass Issues
Contingency Planning/Mishap Investigation Support (Conduct or assist in programmatic investigations)
Deviations/Waivers to Program S&MA requirements
S&MA Metrics/Trending
Procurement Quality
Risk Management
Directorate Institutional/Personnel Safety
Conipliancë with OSHA Requirement 29CFR 1960
RISK OF DOING NOTHING: Uninformed decision on GO / NO GO for launch; Failure to make our customers
aware of anomalies during processing; Increased risk to mission success; and Not identifying operational and
safety constraints could compromise operation or risk Injury to personnel and damage to facility or flight hardware.
METRICS: GOALS:
1. Percent of operations conducted without 1. 100 percent
incident or close calt
2. Percent of procedures returned by 2. 100 percent
need/due date.
3. Percent of procedures worked without 3. 100 percent
incident or close call.
4. CoinpÌiimcË ih SFAO procedures 4. 100 percent
NASA Std. 8709.2).
5. ELV Launch delays caused by Quality 5. Zero percent
problems (Call to Station through
Launch). 6. 100 percent
6. ELV Mission success rate.
7. Žero percent
7. ELV in-fiight anomaly rate.
M: Most of these goals are under development and may be-
uµdated.
TASKS: CUSTOMERS:
1. Complete and implement SFAO Codes Q, M, S, Y, GSFC, JPL, Payload Owners
procedures.
2--Establish-a-closed-loop-tracking process
to ensuri i00 compliance with NASA
STD 5705.2 per mission.
lMP OVEME T INELVAa
in FY 01.
ELV Assignment
E×pendable Launch Vehicle operations at Cape Canaveral has widely spread
responsibility for the NASA expendable launch vehicles which support both
government and industry. The following paragraphs taken from the ELV SFAO ROLES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES document, dated May 9, 2001, gives insight into ELV
operations and responsibilities:
Organizational Structure: SFAO (VB-D) is the Safety and Mission Assurance(SMA) Office for ELV & Payload Carriers Programs Directorate (VA) and reports
directly to the ELV Launch Services Director, Mike Benik (VB). SMS
communication relationships are also maintained with the Safety, Health and
Independent Assessment (SHIA)Directorate (QA) and NASA Headquarters Code Q.
Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV) Safety, and Flight Assurance Office (SFAO)
consists of government and contractor personnel. Our KSC/CCAFS Office (Eastern
Launch Site has Flight Assurance Managers (FAMs), Flight Assurance Engineers(FAEs) and Flight Assurance or Quality Assurance Specialists (QAS)/Quality
Assurance Manager and a Safety Officer. Our VAFB Office, (Western Launch Site)
has a Quality Assurance Manager, a Safety Manager, a Safety Specialist, andQuality Assurance Specialists. At each of the Chandler (Orbital), Denver(Lockheed Martin), and Huntington Beach (Boeing) Field Offices, we have a
Flight Assurance Manager (see SFAO Organization Chart Figure 1). VAFB,
Chandler, Denver and Huntington Beach are considered field or resident sites.
ELV Safety & Flight Assurance Office
LKSCCal SioubusSFAO Linda Andruske
Hortense Burt
Ralph Barksdale
Gary Hendricks
Skip Noonan
Tom Palo
Fay Jung
Bill Schmelling
Diane Walker Randy stone Stan Aulabaugh Tony Arrigo Vocant
Doug Newsome
James Nelms
Ken Lee
Abel Partida
Figure 1
Resources: In addition to the civil service and contractors that make up the
core SFAO mentioned above under Organizations Structure, SFAO has additional
AMA support. Launch vehicle and mission support is available daily from other
ELV Divisions. The International Space Station/payload Processing SMA Division
(UB-F) provides ELV ground processing safety support for payload processing
through KSC facilities at the Eastern Launch Site through a Service Agreement
between their directorates and the ELV Management Agency (DCMA)provides
support to the SFAO and the ELV Launch Services Directorate via letters of
delegation.
The following paragraphs outline KSC "Roles and Responsibilities:"
KSC Flight Assurance Managers (FAMs) Flight Assurance Engineers (FAEs):
Missions: The FAMs and FAEs have work assigned on a mission basis in order to
better comply with NASA Headquarters' ELV SMA requirements. These mission
assignments and the respective SFAO points of contact can be found in the ELV
Assignment Matrix. The FAM/FAE, for their mission, shall document compliance
with K-ELV-10.1 (NASA-STD-8709.2, NPD 8610.23A, NPD-8610,24.A,
NASA-STD-8719.8, and EWR 127-1 using SFAO KDPs, desk instructions and
checklists. All SFAO resources may be used in obtaining mission insight data. A
contingency plan shall be developed for every mission. Primary mission
presentations include the CDLVLRR and the Integrated Mission Review (IMAR)
with SHIA and code Q. Reviews and meetings are attended for independent SMA
assessment and insight into critical issues that could adversely affect mission
success. Quality Assurance Reports providing status on open problem reports,
corrective action, deviations, waivers and other open paper will be distributed at
the FRR and LRR. The mission FAM/FAE will be on console for launch and will
provide a "GO" or "NO GO" when polled by the NASA Launch Director.
Vehicles: Work is also assigned to FAMs/FAEs on a vehicle basis to facilitate
technical knowledge development and provide an SPAO contact for vehicle issues,
Attachment 2 provides an SFAO primary and back-up point of contact for seven
groups of vehicles.
Engineering Review Boards (ERBs): FAMs/FAEs will attend ERBs to ensure
quality and safety issues are addressed, to ensure ERB processes are followed, and
to maintain vehicle insight.
New LSP Vehicle Certification: SFAO roles, responsibilities, requirements
and activities for certifying new launch vehicles are covered in K-ELV-10.3.
Insight, Special Studies, Hazard and Quality Assessments, AnalYses,
Audits, SMA Issues and other work: Studies, analyses, audits, assessments
and other work will be assigned on an as needed basis.
Quality Assurance Specialist/Manager:
Missions: Flight Assurance Specialists (FAS), a title that is synonymous with
QualityAssurance Specialists (QAS), support the FAMs/FAEs on a mission basis
through spot audits and surveillance of LSP activities. The level of surveillance
increases throughout the mission phase requiring the greatest amount of
surveillance during launch site activities and culminating with the monitoring of
closeout processes on launch day. Quality Assurance Reports shall be developed,
signed by the FAE/FAM, and distributed by the FRR and LRR. The satisfactory
accomplishment of closeout processes by the contractor is reported to the
FAM/FAE on consult in support of a "GO" or 'NO GO" for launch. Spot audits and
surveillance activities are documented. The Quality Assurance Manager shall
coordinate FAS/QAScoverage for all NASA missions.
Formal Audits: The Quality Assurance Manager is responsible for spearheading
the NASA formal audits of Launch Service Providers (LSP) as required by NPD
8610.23A (Section 5.c.5). As training takes place, it is expected that all SFAO
civil service personnel will perform at least one formal audit annually. As
relationships mature, audits of LSP's subcontractors are anticipated to increase.
Additionally, audits may be required for new launch vehicle certification per K-
ELV-10.3.
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA); The Quality Assurance
Manager and the Chief of SFAO are the primary points of contact for providing:
direction to DCMA and are the Lead Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA)
representatives per NPG 8735.2. SFAO field representatives will make
recommendations to the KSC Quality Assurance Manager when they deem DCMA
support or change of support are needed. DCMA support is performed through a
Letter of Delegation (LOD). Daily DCMA operations (within the scope of the LOD)
may be addressed by the SFAO site representative. The Quality Assurance Manager
will monitor DCMA performance and compliance regarding launch vehicle issues
related to NASA ELV missions.
KSC SFAO Support Contractor: Augments the KSC SFAO by performing
quality and safety assurance activities and provides mission support and
assistance in the development of SFAO presentations, contingency plans, weekly
notes, reports, studies, assessments and analyses. The ELVIS Statement of Work(SOW) provides additional information on their responsibilities and insight
roles. VAFB
VAFB Quality Assurance Manager: Is responsible for directing and
administering SFAO's quality assurance activities at VAFB. This position ensures
that insight activities are performed and documented for flight hardware
processing activities at VAFB. The VAFB Quality Assurance Manager is
responsible for coordinating SFAO involvement (both civil service and
contractor) for Western Range Launches. This position will, assist the FAE/FAM
with Western Range launches and develop the Quality Assurance Report for
distribution at the FRR and LRR.
VAFB Launch Services Contractor:
Quality Assurance Specialists-Contractor: Are responsible for
performing quality assurance activities as stated in the ELVIS SOW and as
requested by the VAFB Quality Assurance Manager. This work includes
surveillance of spacecraft and launch vehicle flight hardware processing at VAFB.
SFAO FIELD RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES (Chandler, Denver,
Huntington Beach)
The SFAO representatives/FAMs located at the NASA ELV Field Offices are a
primary source of SFAO information. They are at the best position to obtain
timely flight assurance information from their respective LSP plant and nearby
LSP subcontractors. This information is collected, documented and forwarded to
the mission and vehicle FAE/FAMs at KSC as well as the SFAO Chief, Engineering
Field Office Chief and Vehicle Systems Engineering Lead in support of mission
reviews. The SFAO resident office representative FAMs are responsible for
performing and providing the following as a minimum:
1. Perform and document weekly surveillance of the LSP
2. Participate in local reviews, meetings, pertinent tests and local
site visits. The KSC FAEs/FAMs shall be notified of those events(with sufficient lead time to allow for travel arrangements) to
allow the KSC FEA/FAM to attend as needed.
3. Provide comprehensive weekly notes relative to flight assurance
issues
4. Perform high-level monthly process assessments
5. Provide trending of LSP LV data:
a. Nonconformance (NC) issues or problem reports (PR) per
mission compared to similar missions
b. NC or PR per LV critical subsystem
c. Corrective Action timeliness
d. Other areas and data as requested
6. Perform special studies, assessments, analyses and reports on special
LV issues as requested by the KSC SFAO Office.
7. Review the processing of GlDEP issues impacting LSPs and LV used for
NASA missions.
8. Provide a Mission Summary Report to the KSC FAE/FAM for each
mission processed by their respective LSP at least three weeks prior
to the Center Director's Launch Vehicle Launch Readiness Review
(CDLVLRR).This Report shall summarize:
a. Mission flight assurance activities
b. The number and type of reviews, meetings and tests that were
attended.
c. Trending charts
d. Special flight assurance or GIDEP issues
c. Other data as requested by the KSC FAE/FAM
9. Monitor DCMA activities making recommendations to the KSC Quality
Assurance Manager (NASA SMA Lead) and SFAO Chief when direction to
DCMA or changes to the LOD are necessary.
SFAO (All)
TRIP REPORTS:
To make the best use of travel funds and to do Government travel
effectiveness, a trip report shall be provided for each work trip. Trip reports
should be brief and include what major activities were performed and when they
were performed. Trip reports may be in bullet form with dates and if necessary
hours. You may also want to include important points of contact (names, titles
and phone numbers) if they could be beneficial for future use. "Trip reports
shall be provided to the SFAO Chief via e-mail within two business days after
returning to work from the travel." (44)
Training for both NASA and contractor employees is a primary focus during
the next few years as this new approach to Mission Assurance (MA) is put
into effect. The contract Statement of Work (SOW) provides for such
training and for any procedures or plans to assist each organization to
keep abreast with requirements and their implementation throughout the
mission.
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..¿2, 20 august, 1953.
1. 2.4.ERICL22CI
.i¾ ún time of firing t.ho R.assilo was as specified A the following
Manu-2:- r" 76.
factimor
J-:°-55000
."SS°:-.i-14 3adstone Essile Ass*y RSA7-4.1-55001 ¿1 3ooster accty' J.C-55CO2
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2. '..TSSIL2 EG""2"JET SP2CIFICATICUS
The following equipont was installed in the missile:
"Teleme
tering: anymotmd Rosen, 16-ch
-M .
Gyros: ":.ldorf-Ierna Company
Pitch Gyro
-
E-165
Tatr-Roll Gy:•o
- A"-156
Integrator: #038 (1. Ot t Kempten)
.
Conc:and Receiveras ARR-59 with KT-55 Decoders (two each) .
#- m
-•• wn.
--••---.
-.
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IhlNG TEST LF2012, EISSIL2 YO, RS-1
Radar 2cacons: DPN-17 (two).
Pro-flight Coolers Elower circulated air over dry ice (ESA
Dosign and Fabrication).
Decomposer Screen Packs Silvor-plated acroon activated with
potascium permanganate.
Expulsion Tube Assembly: Drawing No. Gi 63117 (two cylinders
with air storage).
Helium High Pressure System.
Rudder Drive (aluminum casting).
3. 03JECTIVES
RS-1 was launched for the purpose of testings
a. The power plant.
c. The missile structure.
'•
c. 3ooster control system.
d. Action of missile at low take-off acceleratica,
e. Operation of roll control system after cut-off.
f. Luto=stic separation.
4. LilSURING 22.DGPJ.2
Tollo:iing is a list of all fli2ht measurc=cata used ou Liacila No.
23-1. For detailed information regarding thace acacuraments, soo Zeacur-
ing 2:ogra= (22DSTOXLissile Instrumentation Syctc=C).
Presa. HE. in Pressure Bottloa 0-3000 psig
Propulsion Fresa. 25 Controlled 0-1000-psig
Unit Frasa. Top LOX Contai.mor O•50 psid
Press. Top Alc. Container 0-30 paid
(Cont'd)
e
2
FIRING ŸESTREPQai, MISSILL NO. ES-1
Press. Top 2eroxido Container .
0-600 psi:
Press. LOX at LOX Pu=p Inlet
0-50 poid
Press. LOX at Injector . 0-400 psig
Press. Alc. Pump Inlet .
0-50 paid--
Pro- Press. Ale. at Injector 0-400 psig
pulsion Press. Steam at
Inlet Turbine 0-600 psig
Unit NPM of Turbine
0-5000 h?¾
Pressure of Exhaust Steam
0-30 paid -
Position Main LOX Valve 0-90©
Flow Rate LOX 0-25 gal/see
Flow Rate Alc. 0-25 gal/sec
Pressure Com°custion Chamber 0-400 psig
Skin Temperature Location él
260
-7000
Skin Temperature Location #2 260 -700
Skin Temperature Location #3 260 -700
Skin Temperature Fin 04 - Upper Point 260 -550
Structure Skin Temperature Fin NL - Lower Point
2600-55
Tempera- Temperature of Jet Vane 2racket
260
-7500
tures Temperature of Flame Shield Between Fin
1 & 2 260
-1400
Temperature of Flame Shield Between Fin 3 & 4
260
•1400
Temperature of Ena O':::o Eetween Fin 1 & 2
260
-1000
Temperature of End Frame Between Fin 3 & 4
260
-1000
¾emperature of Antenna Cover
260
-1LCCCK
Vitration Imatruce à C¢=>¾.
-acca. ± 50;-150 ca:
Vibretion I::truce : Sc=>¾. Fitch - e 55-150 cpa
Structura Vitration 23ruct F:::: Letà¾. à 250;-12CO cp:
Vibra- Vitration Thrust ??a=o >¾tch é 2503-1200 opa
tiona Vitection 3aostcy 21: ¿ ± 55-50 cp:
Vîtyction Servosoto: 01
-
Longt, ± 2505-1200 opal
Vitration Servocatar 1 • ist. 250:-1200 cpa
Force Lateral Forco
-
Air Vano 01 & 1200 kg
1:Clo of L¾¾ack Pitca 7
Lagular Volocity Pitch j /soc
Flight Angular Accoloration Pitch 2 face
dochanica ingle of Attack I:- 7
Anzular Velocity, Roll 5 face
Acceleration 3ooster Lo St.
-
1.1to +5,4 ;
Tilting Procrca 0-180
Gyro Pitch Position
-
Minus Program i 10
stocring Gyro Ian Positio a 10
'Control Gyro 3oll Positio e 10
Loflection Jet Vene 01 27 to ± 5¿
Þoflection Jet Vaca d2 à 27 to ± 5¿(contid)
FINING TEST REyckT, ::SSILE NO, RS-1
Deflection Jet Vane 03 g.270 to 5¿
l
Deflection Jet Vane 04
.,
.
27° to y 54°
Steering Voltage Servo Battery 0-42 Volts
Control Total Torque Servomotor 01 60 ek:
Torque Air Vane #1 60 ok:
Take off Signal
Speeò tontacts
Signals Cut off Signals
Emergency Cut off Signal
Separation Sígnal
Zero Ceasuring Voltage
Zero Leasuring Voltage
Tele- (4) Measuring Voltage
metering (>) Measuring Voltage
Standard Voltage (+)
(-) Measuring Voltage (Tel.)
(+) Eeasuring Voltage
1
FIhlNG TECT LIPURT, VISSILS ND. RS-1
5. FLichT SA?iTX tãOVISIGNS
Flight safety is òefined as all safety measures
to be taken relative
to the missile when in flight. The AF .TG Fli.ght
Safety Officc: had the
sole responsibility over the missile curing
flight.
The flight safety syste:.a was based on a group of ground stations
for
optical and radar tracking of the missile, as well as real-time presenta-
tion of some attitude data via telemeter. For termination of
flight er.d
emergency separation, two separate co:::and receivers and transmitter sys-
tems were provided. For further details, see
a. Missile Test Request No. 305.
b. Scr.ge Safety Plan, RELSTONE, dated 7 August 1953.
c. Flight Safety hiLSTONE, dated 14 august 1953.
6. CLIpaTIC LATA
The launch time observation for Cape Canaveral, 0937 EST, 20 August
1953:
Cloudiness: 2/10 low clouds bases 3,000 feet and tops esti-
mated at 6,000 feet.
7/10 middle clouds bases 15,000 feet.
5/10 high clouds at 30,000 feet.
Visi'cility: 10 miles.
Station Fressure: 1013.7 mbs (29.935 in...).
Temperatures $3°7
Relative Euxidity: SQÁ
Lew Point; 76 7
Viinds SS'.'; at 7 knota.
6
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APPENDIX 2
MINUTES OF THE INTRA-CENTER RELIABILITY MEETING
Held October 21, 1964, 1:00 P.M.
The items described in the Agenda (attachment A) were discussed as follows:
1. Purpose
The purpose of KSC GSE Reliability Analyses was stated and no disagreement was voiced by the
NASA Division reliability representatives.
2. Schedules and Milestones
a. GE Annual Work Program.
Mr. Pat Mongillo stated the GE contract had been extended by T.0. #18, from October 1,
1964, through January 31, 1965, to cover the projected manpower levels which were submitted
in the GE Annual Work Program. This is an interim Headquarters/Center arrangement until the
KSC tasks can be structured to comply with General Phillips' directive to have the major
emphasis placed on mission oriented tasks in all possible cases. The reliability tasks received
less criticism than some other areas; however, they also need more detail in the wording and
schedules of outputs expected. Mr. Mongillo stated that if a level of effort task ( portion of a
task) is necessary, the following must be shown:
(1) The type of work that will be done,
(2) Who will do the work,
(3) How it will be done,
(5) What type of support is required, (i.e., Mechanical Engineers, Electrical Engineers,
Typists, and the number of each required),(6) The reason for requiring a level of effort task,
(7) The length of time that the level of effort will be required.
Mr. Mongillo referenced a set of policy guidelines for NASA Field Center and Headquarters
personnel regarding the future utilization of GE-ASD under NASw-410. This policy guideline is
attached as Attachment B. Mr. Mongillo further stated that an input would be required by
October 30, 1964, in the reliability area.
Action Item:
The Division Reliability Offices will submit a revised GE work statement in accordance with the
attached policy statement to the R&QAOffice by October 30, 1964. (This requires more detail
on mission oriented tasks and justification for any level of effort work. Outputs required of GE
are to be shown for two time periods: (1) November 1, 1964, to January 31, 1965, (2)
February 1, 1965, to December 31, 1965. The analysis output dates shown on the agenda are
presently in the Annual Work Program and are to be reevaluated in the Division submittals.)
2b. Detail Schedules.
The R&QAtop level GSEanalysis effort milestones and schedules were handed out and
discussed. An example of a Division type schedule at one level lower than the R&QAschedule is
attached for reference purposes, It was emphasized that all inputs listed on the example did not
necessarily apply to all Divisions.
Action Item:
Hardware oriented be submitted as a part of the annual work package by October 30, 1964,
listing effort milestones, and showing the work period for each effort (the Division schedule
attached for reference is to be used as a guide in preparing these schedules.)
3. Status Reporting
a. Management Display: The "GSE Reliability Analyses Management Display" (prepared
by GE for the KSC Apollo R&QAOffice) was discussed and is intended to be used by the R&QA
Office as a means of keeping program status. This will be forwarded to the Division Reliability
Offices in the future for comment.
b. Periodic Status Reports from NASA Organizations to the R&QAOffice.
Mr. Joyner suggested the idea of having the Divisions. submit progress or status reports on
a regular basis to the R&QAOffice to serve as the means of enabling the R&QAOffice to keep
abreast of program status and problems encountered. Mr, Hall suggested that a status report be
submitted every 30 days giving a summary of program status and problems encountered. Mr.
Hooker stated that he did not want to prepare a separate report each month to be submitted,to the
R&QAOffice. Mr. Joyner stated that GE is required to submit a monthly progress report of task
progress and that, in lieu of a report prepared by Mr. Hooker, the requirements could be met
for forwarding the GE monthly progress report.
Action Item:
A monthly progress Report covering the previous month's effort on the GSE Reliability Analysis
will be submitted by each KSC. Division reliability coordinator to the R&QAOffice during the
first week of each month. The first report should be submitted for the month of October.
4 Organizational Structure
A hand-out of the GE & KSC contact.points on GSE reliability analysis was passed out and
discussed.
ATTENDEES
INTRA-CENTER RELIABILITY MEETING
October 21, 1964, 1:00 P.M.
Name Organization Phone Number
Pat Mongillo PR3 UL 3-2552
Frank Childers ET3 UL 3-9363
Tom Tromley GE (ET3) UL 3-6611
Mike Verbosh GE (ML5) 783-2471 Ext. 365
Ray Pinder GE (P.A6) UL 3-6711
Wayne Priddy VT4 UL 3-6104
Charlie Hall FR UL 3-5678
Dave Schweizer GE (VT4) UL 3-6481
Red Fraunfelder GE (VT4) UL 3-6481
Pres Neal GE (FR) 783-2471 Ext. 370
John Hooker DR 536-7011 (Huntsville)
Bob McKinney FR UL 3-6311
Roy Lee GE (FR) 783-2471 Ext. 370
Mal Heffelman GE (FR) 783-2471 Ext. 369
Fred Christ PA6 UL 3-6104
Jin Bennett GE (PA6) 783-2471 Ext. 308
Ernie Zanetti GE (PA6) 783-2471 Ext. 3l9
Jim Joyner PA6 UL 3-6104
Intra-Center Reliability Meeting
October 21, 1964
-
1: p.m.
A GEND A
A. Objective
The objective of this meeting is to provide for the coordination and
clarification of the overall KSC reliability analysis program.
B. Agenda
1. Purpose of KSC Reliability Analysis
The purpose of the KSC reliability analysis progræn is to identify
and eliminate system "weak links" through the use of FEA's Criticality
Analyses, Contingency Plans, etc.
2. Schedules and Milestones
a. GE Annual Work Program (Handout & Discussion)
Overall schedules for initial analysis outputs established in the
Annual Work Program are:
LC 37B LC 34 LC 39
Dec. 1, 1964 Mar. 1, 1965 Mar. 1, 1965
b. Detail schedule of GSE Reliability Analyses is required.
3. Status Reporting
a. Management Display
b. A periodic status report from NASA organizations of progress (out-
puts , suc,h as FEA's completed), is most desirable.
4. Organizational Structure
Handour of Working Organization
POLICY GUIDELINES FOR NASA FIELD AND HEADQUARTERSPERSONNEL REGARDING THE
FUTURE UTILIZATION OF GE/ASDUNDER NASw-410
The following information has been developed in order to provide the several
NASA organizations with general guidance regarding the future use of GE/ASD
under NASw-410 in the Apollo Program.
Wherever possible, mission tasks should be utilized.
(a) During the course of the Apollo Program, the several NASA Centers and
the Apollo Program Office here at Headquarters will utilize the services and
talents of the General Electric Company in carrying out certain specified
portions of the program on both a level of effort and mission oriented basis.
(b) Level of effort tasks are those tasks in which the contractor is
required to provide a given amount of manpower (man-hours, man-months, etc.)for the performance of specific tasks. Mission oriented tasks
.are
those tasks
in which the Contractor is required to provide an end-product.as the result of
his efforts on a specific task. This end-product may be either the provision
of a piece of equipment or the submission of a report or other software item.
In level of effort tasks, the Contractor's performance is measured contractu-
ally on the basis of the amount of man-months supplied to a given task. In
a mission oriented task, the Contractor's performance is measured by the
acceptance by the Government of the software, reports, or equipment that has
been developed under the contract. The measurement of acceptability in this
latter case is usually by comparing the product delivered to detailed, per-
formance or objective specifications or criteria that were provided by the
Government as a part of the contract at the beginning of the task.
(c) It is the intent of NASA that all organizations within NASA doing
business with General Electric under NASw-410 make a concerted effort to have
General Electric perform future effort under mission oriented tasks.
(d) The above statement should not be construed to mean that all tasks
placed in the GE Contract must be on a mission basis. Where items of work
cannot be identified and defined sufficiently to permit the measurement of
Contractor's performance except in terms of the ænount of technical effort
contemplated, it is more appropriate under these circumstances to use a level
of effort contractual arrangement rather than to attempt to force fit the
work into a mission tasK.
(e) When level of effort tasks are used, the NASA user organization is
responsible for taking the necessary steps to make certain that the work is
administered properly and is not done on a bodyshop basis: Therefore,
1. The GE/ASD technical personnel should not receive direct day-to-
day technical supervision from NASA supervisors. The placement of work
orders or tasks should be accomplished through a contractor supervisor.
2. The GE/ASDpersonnel should not be integrated with MASA personnel
in NASA facilities. Provisionsshould be made to clearly identify and se-
gregate from other Government employees those contractor personnel whose
duties require performance in total or in part at a Government installation.
3. Provision should be made for specific task assignments to be given
where the nature of the services to be performed does not permit other than
a broad definition at the time that the contract is executed. Task assign-
ments, where required, should be in writing, under the technical direction
clause of the contract.
Technical Areas where GE/ASDmay be used.
Since General Electric began work on the Apollo Program in February 1962,
several redirections or changes in emphasis have occurred with regard to GE/
ASD's role in the program. Their role, hbwever, can be summarized to include
the following:
1. Engineering support for the RASA Headquarters, Apollo Program Office and
the three Field Centers in the general areas of integration, checkout, and
reliability assessment.
2. Checkout Hardware for the MASA Field Centers at Cape Kennedy (MILA)
and at other locations.
3. Support Operations and Tedhnical Systems for the Saturn V Test Stands
and other test area facilities at MTF.
Both NASA and GE/ASDhave had some past difficulty in attempting to define
what effort should be included within the areas of integration, checkout, or
reliability support. In many cases, the placement of a particular task into
the work statement resulted in considerable confusion as to whether the task
was more closely associated with integration, checkout, or reliability.
Beginning with the next contract year, on October 1, 1964, it is proposed to
revise the work statement for NASw-410 so that the work statement matrix will
be broken down by the four NASA user organizations and under each of these
organizations by:
1. Checkout Equipment and Related Engineering Design, and
2. Other Engineering Support.
It is felt that this organization will more clearly reflect the role of General
Electric in the Apollo Progrou and eliminate some of the apparent confusion :
that existed earlier regarding the distinction between the technical areas of
Integration, Checkout, and Reliability. (Note: The MTF portion of the con-
tract will not be affected by the revision of Section I work statement. It
will still remain as it currently is written under 5.0 of the work statement.)
The new matrix will also emphasize GE/ASD's major role in the Apollo Program--
in the areas of design and fabrication or procurement of Checkout Equipment
for MILA and other RASA specified locations. In addition to this responsi-
bility, GE/ASDcan also be used in an engineering support role by the several
NASA user organizations. NASA's use of GE/ASDin this area should be on work
that is :
1. Well defined,
2. Of significant value to the Apollo Program, and
3. Within the intent of the RASw-410 Procurement Plan and Sole Source
Justification.
One point should be clear. The revision to the work statement structure
should not be considered by the NASA user organizations as a license to
have GE/ASDdo all types of work that need to be accomplished by NASA.(The original procurement plan and sole source justification prepared for
NASw-410 are still the controlling f&ctors with regard to the use of GE/
ASD under NASw-410.) Therefore, ŒŒ/ASDshould not be requested to do any
work under the new work statement matrix for NASw-410 that could not be
included under the old work statement matrix organization of Integration,
Checkout, and Reliability.
Utilization of GE/ASDManpower and Facilities.
MASA user organizationsshould plan their work so that the manpower and
facility capability that GE/ASDhas developed under Contract NASw-410 is
utilized by NASA and utilized in an effective manner. Any buildup'or
increase of GE/ASDmanpower or facilities at Daytona Beach, or at the
three NASA Centers (KSC, MSC, and MSFC)over and above those presently
available should be accomplished only on a planned and predetennined
basis. It is, therefore, important that when a NASA user organization
plans to place work with GE/ASDunder NASw-410 that they assess the
impact of this work on the total capabilities of GE/ASD. When it is
determined that new work will require an increase in personnel or
facilities, other alternatives, such as the utilization of the capability
of other GE departments through interdepartmental purchase orders, the use
of available industrial capacity elsewhere in the country through sub-
contracting, or the provision of Government furnished equipment or material
to GE/ASD,should be explored prior to authorizing the additional work
to GE/ASD. A well-defined "make or buy" program should be developed on
each procurement which details equipment, services or materials to be
obtained by subcontract, GFE or through GE/ASDinterdepartmental purchase
orders. This will assure that GE/ASD's growth is on a planned and con-
trolled basis.
A review of long range planning information from all of the NASA user
organizations will be made periodically in order to take into considera-
tion the overall impact of NASA requirements on GE/ASDmanpower and
facility capabilities. It is expected that these reviews will be able to
focus on the proposed trend of GE/ASDbusiness with NASA under NASw-410
and relate these trends to the desirability of increasing GE/ASDdepart-
mental facilities and personnel.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
To : Mr. Frank M. Childers, IN-QAL DATE:
FROM : Contracting Officer, NAS10-4967
SUBJECT: Appointment as Reliability and Quality Surveillance
Alternate Technical Representative
Reference: (a) KSC Organization Management Notice 23
- Government/
Contractor Relationships for Nonpersonal Services
(b) R4I 5330.3, "Assignment of Quality Surveillance
Technical Representatives"
1. Pursuant to the Contracting Officer authority delegated to me by the
KSC Procurement Officer's memorandum, dated July 27, 1967, you are here-
by appointed the Reliability and Quality Surveillance Alternate
Technical Representative of the Contract Technical Manager for the
Communication 4 Instrumentation Support Serfices Contract (Instrumentation)
and delegated the following responsibilities and authorities in
connection with the administration of Contract NAS10-4967 with
Federal Electric Corporation.
a. Identify specific Reliability and Ouality work requirements to
be performed by the Contractor, levying those requirements which fall
within the contract scope of work,-and establishing priorities as
necessary for timely accomplishment. Directions or instructions to the
Contractor which are not within contractor scope, schedule, or cost will
be issued through channels by the Contracting Officer.
b. Monitor the Contractor's effective and efficient use of manpower
and Government-owned equipment. Review Contractor workload and recommend
any changes required in Contractor resources to fulfill valid requirements.
c. Monitor Contractor overtime utilization within the limitations
of the contract, and recommend approval to the Contracting Officer of
Contractor overtime requests which exceed 20 hours per person per week.
d. Monitor the Contractor to assure that the Contractor provides
the directorate reliable test support of high quality and provide an
independent estimate of Contractor capability in this activity.
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2e. Approve the Contractor Reliability Management Plan and the
Quality Assurance Inspection Plan including revisions. Request revisions
to either plan as required.
f. Provide the Contractor with such technical data and information
as may be required and necessary to enable contract performance. Provide
technical guidance to the Contractor in the interpretation of and
compliance with the Reliability and Quality provisions of the contract.
Conduct necessary liaison and coordination with all KSC organizations
and the Contractor in all aspects of reliability and quality assurance,
g. Approve or issue such technical requirements as may be required
and authorized by the contract. This includes the issuing of Reliability
and Qualitt procedures which will assiga responsibilities by organizational
element for given programs.
h. Monitor the Contractor to ensure the Contractor provides a R4QA
system to take timely and effective action to correct any unsatisfactory
reliability or quality conditions. Provide direction to increase
effectivity,
i. Monitor the Contractor to ensure the Contractor establishes and
maintains a R4QAprogram which satisfies the contractual requirements,
Monitor the implementation of the RGQAsystem to provide direction to
increase effectivity and to assure compliance with the agreed-to
program plans and individual test assignments.
2. As the delegated Reliability and Quality Surveillance Alternate
Technical Representative, your RQQAeffort will include the following:
a. Monitor the Contractor's receiving inspection activities in
sufficient depth to determine effectiveness of controls and procedures.
b. Establish controls and perform or witness inspections during
process, fabrication, assembly, testing, or operations to determine and
ensure conformance to drawings, specifications, and other contractual
documents, including design intent. Provide a continuous evaluation of
the Contractor's performance and physical verification of quality status,
c. Monitor the Contractor's change control system and ensure that
only authorized changes are made and that they are documented. Advise
the Contract Technical Manager as necessary in technical review of Con-
tractor engineering change proposals and requests for contractual
deviations or waivers.
d. Monitor the Contractor's calibration procedures, methods, tech-
niques, med schedules to ensure that procedures and accuracies are
maintained in accordance with contract provisions,
3e. Monitor the Contractor's stores control system to ensure that
it provides effective protection of materials and articles subject to
deterioration, loss of identification, or dosage,
f. Monitor the Contractor's failure reporting and corrective action
system to ensure prompt and effective reporting and follow-up action,
g. Ensure that equipment logs are maintained in all Contractor-
operated areas and reviewed for proper content and format.
h. Monitor the Contractor's Integrity Control System to assure
compliance with approved procedures.
i. Monitor and spot-check Contractor-initiated support services
requests and requests for supplies to assure that Contractor quality
assurance official has evidenced review of the requests for appropriate
reliability and quality requirements,
j. Coordinate and arrange for Government Source Inspection as
necessary,
k. Visit subcontractor's plants as necessary to ensure compliance
with Reliability and Quality provisions of the contract, Make
recommendations for corrective actions to the prime contractor,
1. Review and approve quality and reliability progran and inspection
documentation developed by the Contractor to determine and ensure that
articles and processes conform to the contract.
m. Monitor reliability and qualification testing performed by the
Contractor to assure that approved procedures were followed and that
statistical sample was adequate,
n. Monitor the Contractor's quality inspection stamping activigt
and ensure that only authorized personnel are issued quality status
stamps.
o. Monitor the Contractor's "Identification for Traceability Program"
to assure compliance with established directive.
p. Monitor the Contractor's training and certification program
to
assure that required training has been completed and that specified
proficiency is being demonstrated,
q. Ensure that the Contractor surveys his own in-house quality
assurance and reliability functions.
4.
erve as a member of the Material Review Board when such board
i authorized. Evaluate and disapprove when necessary, members of the
board.
s. Identify problem areas, resolve those that are within the scope
of your authority, and refer the remainder to the Contract Technical
Manager, with recommended solutions,
t. Assure through surveillance of the Government/Contractor operations
that compliance with the spirit and intent of NPC 401 and related KSC
policies is in evidence.
u. Identify new and potential hazards and making appropriate reports.
v. Execute and fulfill such other duties o£ the Contract Technical
Manager as may be delegated.
3. The authorities listed above shall not be construed to include the
power to execute or agree to any modifications of the contract nor attempt
to resolve any dispute concerning a question of fact or law arising under
the contract.
4. The foregoing delegation of authority will be exercised in
accordance with applicable provisions of law, NASA Regulations and
Procedures, and other governing authority, and is restricted to that
period of time during the absence of the regularly assigned Technical
Representative.
5. This appointment shall become effective upon your acceptance and
shall remain in full force and effect until completion of Contract
NAS10-4967 or until amended or revoked by me, my successor, or higher
authority. Further, the appointment will automatically terminate upon
your reassignment or separation from duty as an employee of the Kennedy
Space Center.
John F. Kolasa
Contracting Officer
CONCUR:
Contract Technical Manager
cc:
Contract Technical Manager
Personnel Office, AD-PER (for employee's personnel file)
Federal Electric Corporation
Management Support Office, TS-MSO
Procedures and Inquiries Section, AD-PRO-15
Plans and Policy Office, QA-PLN
First Stage Section, AD-PRO-21
Contract File
ACCEPTANCE
I hereby accept the appointment as Reliability and Quality Assurance
Alternate Technical Representative for Contract NAS10-4967.
Alternate Ìechnical Representative
Date
APPENDIX 4
1. POSITION NUMBER
POSITION RECORD
2. NAME OF NASA ACTIVITY 3. LOCATION
John F. Kennedy Space Center Kennedy Space Center, Florida
4. CLASSIFICATION NA/- /J-- pg §
A. NASA TITLE AST, Meas. ns r.LE M NCCNASA30CLAS-sScoom
SERVICE SERIES GRADE
B. CSC TITLE GS- 1301.1- 13
5. ORGANIZATION (Give titles of all organizational breakdownsin descending order)
KSC/Director for Information Systems
Quality Surveillance, PF
6- OFFICIAL POSITION CERTIFICATION 7.OFFICIAL CLASSIFICATION CERTIFICATION
This is a completeand accurate description of position TYPED NAME OF CLASSIFICATION SPECIALIST
TYPED NAME OF SUPERVISOR T. M. Stron gDaniel D, Collins
DAT SIG U DATE SIGN
B. DUTIES PERFORM D
Incumbent executes a quality surveillance program for th
.
irector,
Information Systems that increases and maintains a high level of reliability
in the instrumentation systems throughout the organization.
\, Maintains close liaison with Center Reliability and Quality Assurance
(R&QA) management in carrying out assigned functions, outlining methods of
implementation for R&QA policies, directives, and requirements applicable
to Information Systems, delineating areas of responsibility and lines of
communication in accomplishing tasks.
L Assures that KSC Apollo Program Directive No. 2 to report, document,
and correct all unsatisfactory conditions in launch related equipment is
implemented, serving as the focal point for numbering, editing, distributing
and status reporting. Assures implementation and review of station equipment
logs for establishing operating time, down time, system mean-time-to-repair
and deviations from established standards and configurations. Monitors
implementation of NHB 5300.2 "Apollo Metrology Requirements Manual" as
applicable and participates in the Instrument Calibration Recall System,
GP-229 as directed.
e.
.
ANNUAL POSITION REVIEW (Audit) & CERTIFICATION
INITIALS
SUPERVISOR
DATE
CLASSIFI- INITIALS
CATION 14G
OFFICER DATE
NASA FORM692 (REV. JUL 65) PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. GPO 895-267DISTRIBUTION· Organization, Supervisor, Employee, Of'icial, Master, 201
Position Record
2
'3, Insures that appropriate quality assurance and reliability program
requirements are invoked in launch essential equipment procurements,
tailoring requirements to each procurement commensurate with hardware
criticality and fulfillment of program needs. Participates in pre-award
surveys, bidder conferences, and contract negotiations. Insures thathardware contractors comply with reliability and quality assurance require-
ments by monitoring their performance through implementation of ProgramReviews and assessments at the vendor's facility. Performs analysis of
resultant reliability and quality assurance data such as Failure Mode Effect
and Criticality Analysis, Design Specifications, Failure Reports, EquipmentLogs, and parts or materials information to establish a background confidencebase on the supplied hardware.
Maintains technical cognizance over all quality assurance and reliability
reporting activities of the operation and maintenance service contractors,keeping records of certified personnel with periodic review of their work as
applicable, reviewing work in terms of personal or delegated assessment offinished projects or work in progress, results shown in reports, degree of
observed ability of individual personnel and proper utilization of skills of
such personnel. Keeps informed of latest innovations in soldering, welding,
conformal coating, and advancements in quality standards, human engineering,
and maintainability.
da Maintains liaison with personnel of other operating divisions of the Center
working in related areas through attendance at meetings and evaluation oftechnical literature originating within the Center, requiring a thoroughknowledge of the overall ground instrumentation systems in determining
requirements and limitations imposed on the Directorate.
L Reviews and evaluates technical literature originating within the NASACenterp, other government activities, and industry pertaining to space vehicle
and ground support systems to determine whether concepts, principles, andtheories developed by others may be incorporated in the accomplishment of
assigned functions. Investigates by correspondence or personal contact,developmental phases which warrant further research. Maintains information
on state-of-art and advances in instrumentation components and systems, which
enhance overall system reliability.
.Position Record
1. Participates in a critical parts and materials program for all instrumen-
tation systems collecting pertinent data on preferred parts, components,
hi-reliability parts, latest materials and processes. The program requires
a knowledge of automatic data storage and retreival. Participates in the
inter-NASA ALERT Program for dissemination of information on known
condemned parts and materials.
Í • Keeps informed of prototype tracking, timing, instrument calibration,
facility and environmental measurement, data transmission, calibration
standards, telemetry, data display, electromagnetic compatibility and other
RF system details through participation in design reviews and study of resultant
documentation. Reviews for adequacy the maintenance, calibration, and
operational procedures, and monitors qualification testing of systems,
submitting resultant recommendations to cognizant design personnel for
possible implementation. Provides task direction in performing part or
component failure analysis and in preparing reliability test plan specifications
in participation with the design engineers, where system testing is required
to evaluate the level of reliability, assuring that efficient methods are used,
that test criteria are valid, and sample sizes are suitable for the requirements
of the instrumentation systems involved.
Participates in system tests and launch tests to provide system reliability
and quality assurance visibility to the Directorate and performs assessment of
specified Apollo Tests at LC-34, 37, and 39, submitting consolidated reports
summarizing results of tests covered.
N• Technically directs other personnel of the Quality Surveillance Office on
a project basis when required and provides specific task direction to contractor
personnel in carrying out assigned functions.
Performs other duties as assigned.
Works under general supervision of the organizational segment Chief who
issues assignments in the form of a requirement. Incumbent plans approach
and method of accomplishing assignments. Finished work is reviewed only
for adequacy. Guidance is available in unprecedented situations.
OPTIONAL FOftM NO Lo 3010-107
MAY 1987 EDITION
GEA GEN REG NO 37
L'NITF.D STATF.S Gt ERNMENT
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APPENDIX 5
To : Mr. IL Wojtasinski, ES3 DATE: March 17, 1965
utoM : Instrumentation Heliability & Quality
Coordination Office, ET3
SUB)ECT: Reliability Program Requirements for
Hydrogen Fire Detection System
1. The specnication for the above system was reviewed by this
office. Based on information provided by you (that this system is
basically made up of "off-the-shelf" subsystems) the following
reliability requirements are recommended for the "RFP" as per
paragraph 1. 2 (a) of NPC 250-1, Reliability Program Provisions
for Spa ce System Contractors:
a. A pre<1icted or operational reliability statement (i. e. , mean-
time between failures and associated confidence level) for the system
and seperately identifiable equipments within the systems will be
supplied. Testing, prediction, and application history which will
support the reliability statement must be included. In the case of
"off-the-shelf" items, performance experience in operational environ-
ments would be satisfactory background for the reliability prediction.
This information should be submitted with the technical proposal.
b. Paragraph 3. 2, NPC 250-1 - Design Specifications - The
contractor's reliability organization shall review and concur with all
contractor generated design specifications. All specifications shall ad-
equately cover performance and environmental profile requirements,
safety margins, derating factors, and apportioned reliability goals for
the system. These specifications shall be updated as necessary,
and shall be subject to NASA review.
c. Paragraph 3. 6, NPC 250-1
- Design Review Program -
The contractor shall establish and conduct a formal program of
planned, scheduled, and documented design reviews at the system level.
The design reviews shall be participated in by appropriate personnel
from KSC (or a designated representative) and the contractors reliability
and design organizations. (All reliability information accumulated on the
equipment to be reviewed shall be presented in the design review meeting. )
Design review reports shall be signed by such personnel to indicate
concurrence with the completeness of the review and actions taken.
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d. Paragraph 3. 4, NPC 250-1 - Failure Mode, Effect, and
Criticality Analysis - A failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA)
shall be performed on the newly designed portions
of the equipment.
A list of FMEA's that were performed during
the design of "off-the-
shelf" equipment should be provided.
Additionally, as an integral
part of conceptual design process, the contractor
shall develop pro-
jected analysis at the system level to determine possible mode of
failure and their effects on the overall system performance.
e. Paragraph 3. 5, NPC 250e1 - Maintainability and
Elimin-
ation of Human Induced Failure - The reliability program
shall apply
the principles of human engineering and maintainability
in all operations
during design, development, manufacture, test, and operation of
the
system or subsystem. The design shall
incorporate human engineer-
ing features that minimize the possibility of degrading reliability
through
human error during operation or maintenance,
f. Paragraph 3. 7, NPC 250-1 - Failure Reporting - Failure
reporting shall be initiated during all phases of
the contractor's effort
for newly designed equipment in accordance with paragraph
3. 7 of
NPC 250-1. Failure reporting shall be initiated for
"off-the-shelf"
items during integration and system tests in the same manner.
A
copy of each failure report must be submitted
for KSC information.
g. Paragraph 3. 9. 3, NPC 250-1- Parts Selection
-
A description
of the selection effort used to purchase parts and materials
for each
piece of newly designed equipment, and a description of
the parts and
materials application reviews conducted to assure proper application
in each piece of equipment will be furnished.
h. Paragraph 3. 10, NPC 250-1 - Equipment Logs - Equipment
logs shall be initiated and maintained on all equipment performing a
seperately identifiable function in accordance with paragraph
3. 10
of NPC 250-1, and turned over to KSC upon contract completion.
i. Paragraph 4. 3 - Testing - Formal reliability demonstration
tests will be included to the extent required by the contract.
Reliability
demonstration tests will be conducted at the highest practicable level
of assembly.
3j. The contractor shall include as a seperate section of
his proposal, a detailed description of his proposed reliability program
that will be employed to meet the reliability requirements of this pro-
curement. The section provided shall satisfy the requirements of
NPC 250-1, Appendix B.
k. The contractor shall, upon contract completion, submit
the appropriate documentation as listed in NPC 250-1, Appendix F,
such as to satisfy (b), (d), (f), (g), and (h).
1. Existing contractor methods for failure reporting,
equipment logs, design reviews, etc. should be applied to KSC require- .
ments whenever possible.
m. It is the intention of NASA to have the contractor pro-
vide a reliable system. If sufficient performance data for
"off-the-shelf"
equipment is ayailable to ensure NASA of the reliability of this equip-
ment, submittal of this data to NASA will satisfy our needs. The only
additional data required is equipment performance when used within
the system. For this reason the requirements above concentrate on
new design efforts and overall systems test.
2. The Quality Assurance Office, MQ3, will submit the appro-
priate quality assurance requirements directly to you.
F. M. Childers
cc:
T. Michalek, ES3
D. D. Collins, ET '
R. L. Body, PA6
T. Walls, MQ3.
APPENDIX 6
TECHNICAL PAPER
PREPARED BY FRANK M. CHILDERS, IN-QAL 1975
Incorporation of Reliability Requirements into KSC Procurements
PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to set forth some basic NASA and KSC
requirements and some basic criteria for ensuring that appropriate
reliability requirements are incorporated into KSC procurements of
Space Shuttle ground Support Equipment (GSE).
POLICY
KMI 5310. 12A/QA "Incorporation of Reliability and Quality Assurance
Requirements in KSC Procurements" states that it is KSC policy to
incorporate appropriate reliability requirements in procureme nts. It
further states that requirements will be tailored to the criticality,
complexity, state-of-the-art, cost, schedules, and the amount of
research and development required.
REFERENCE
NHB 5100. 2, NASA Procurement Regulations
NHB 5300. 4(1D), Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Provisions for the Space Shuttle Program
KMI 5310. 12A/QA, Incorporation of Reliability and Quality Assurance
Requirements in KSC Procurements
GENERAL
.NHB 5100. 2, "NASA Procurement
Regulations" requires that reliability
requirements be considered early in procurement and design stages of
critical systems/hardware. Further, NHB 5300. 4(1D), "Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Provisions for the Space Shuttle
Program" requires definition of major reliability lasks and their place
as an integral part of the design and development process.
NHB 5300. 4(1D) RELIABlLITY PROVISIONS AND SUGGESTED
IMPLEMENTATION METHODS
21. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D300. 1
Reliability Management
The contractor shall maintain a reliability activity planned and de-
veloped in conjunction with other contractor elements. Reliability
functions shall be an integral part of the design and development
process and shall include the evaluation of hardware reliability through
analysis, review, and assessment. Timely status reporting will be
utilized to facilitate control of the reliability effort. Major elements
of Reliability Management are:
The contractor shall be responsible for the planning, management,
and effective execution of the reliability effort. The accomplishment
of some reliability tasks may not be the responsibility of the reliability
activity, but Reliability shall monitor and ensure that the tasks are
effectively accomplished.
Implementation
This paragraph of responsibility is clear enough for contract language
and will not require tailoring for contractor implementation.
2. NHB 5300. 4(1D),Par. 1D300. 2
Reliability Plan
a. The contractor shall prepare and maintain a Reliability Plan which
describes how the reliability requirements will be implemented and con-
trolled. The plan shall be prepared in accordance with the applicable
information requirements list/information requirement description
(IRL/IRD).
b. Reliability effort at each remote test site shall be governed by a
self-contained separate section of the overall Reliability Plan or by a
separate plan written for each site. The contractor shall identify those
sites which require a separate plan.
Implementation
3Supplement or substitute the above NHB 5300. 4(1D) requirements
with the following:
The contractor shall provide, as a portion of his proposed reliability
program plan, a detailed listing of specific tasks, man-loading per
task, procedures to implement and control these tasks, and organiza-
tional unit the authority and responsibility for executing each task.
The contractor shall include, as a separate section of his technical
proposal, a Preliminary Reliability Plan that will be employed to meet
the reliability requirements of the procurement.
The prospective contractors selected for contract negotiations shall
submit to KSC, thirty days prior to contract negotiations, an Intermediate
Reliability Program Plan. The Plan shall, as a minimum, cover all
reliability requirements specified in the statement of work/request
for proposal (RFP).
Within sixty days after contract award, a final Reliability Program
Plan shall be submitted to KSC for approval. Approval or disapproval
shall be stated by KSC within three weeks after receipt. In the event
of disapproval, the contractor shall submit a revised Reliability Program
Plan, incorporating KSC comments, within thirty days after notification
of disapproval.
The allowance of sixty days for preparation of this formal plan shall not
relieve the contractor óf the responsibility for immediate initation of
those reliability program actions agreed upon at contract negotiations
which require initiation at the conceptual design stage for full effectiveness.
3. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D300. 3
Reliability Audits
The contractor shall conduct audits of his internal reliability activity
and those activities of his suppliers. These reviews shall evaluate
progress and effectiveness and shall determine the need for adjustments
or changes in the reliability activities. Audits shall be conducted at
approppi-ate intervals (at least annually).
4Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may be supplemented with a require-
ment for NASA participation in contractor audits as required. Appropriate
intervals should be agreed to upon approval of final Reliability Program
Plan.
4. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D300. 4
Reliability Progress Reporting
The contractor shall report on the progress of the reliability effort
through periodic management meetings.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may be implemented with the following:
"The contractor shall submit a reliability activity and status report
monthly for the purpose of managment review and program control.
The periodic progress report shall include information on the technical
progress of the reliability program including significant accomplishments,
milestones reached, problem areas, and possible program slippages.
These reports may be combined with other program documentation pro-
vided all pertinent information is contained or summarized in one report,
a section of a report, and supporting information is adequately cross-
referenced and readily available. "
5. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D300. 5
Supplier CControl
a. The contractor shall ensure that the reliability of system elements
obtained from subcontractors and suppliers meets the reliability re-
quirements of the overall system. This applies to items obtained from
any supplier whether in the first or any subsequent tier or whether the
item is obtained by an intra-company order from any element of the
contractor's parent organization. The contractor shall provide require-
ments, guidance, and controls to ensure the adequacy of subcontractor
reliability implementation. The level of reliability requirements imposed
on subcontractors and suppliers shall be appropriately tailored and
identified to be consistent with those imposed on the prime contractor
and shall include the state of hardware development and complexity,
supplier experience, hardware unit cost, and hardware use.
b. Where off-the-shelf hardware is anticipated, the contractor in
the selection process shall examine historical data such as other
contractor and program requirements and experience as well as
reliability history, including failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA),
maintainability, problem reporting and corrective action, ellectrical,
electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts control, materials
specifications and applications, test data (certification and acceptance
testing), and design data. The results of this examination shall be
documented and additional reliability controls, as appropriate, shall
be applied.
Implementation
This provision of NHB 5300. 4(1D) may be supplemented or replaced
with the following:
For basically off-thedshelf equipment (that is little or no research and
development involved), the bidder shall state those provisions of NHB
5300. 4(1D) or provisions of the RFP that were satisfied during the
design of each separately identifiable piece of equipment. The reliability
should include, but not be limited to the following:
a. Predicted or operational reliability statement (i. e., meantime be-
tween failure and associated confidence level) for the system and
separately identifiable equipment within the system to be supplied. Testing
and application history which will support the reliability statement must
be included.
b. List of failure mode and effect analyses conducted on each piece of
equipment and resultant effect on the design of that equipment.
c. A description of the selection effort used to purchase parts and
materials for each piece of equipment supplied. A descriptim of the
parts and materials application reviews conducted to assure proper app-
lication in each piece of equipment.
6d. Derating factors used and safety margins present in design,
e. Application, location, and types of redundancy.
f. The type of design reviewsaheld and at what states of
design
development. Effects of these reviews on equipment design.
6. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D300. 6
Reliability of Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE).
The contractor shall be responsible for the identification of
the
reliability data needed on GFE. Where examination of
these data
or testing by contractor indicates inconsistency of the reliati
lity of
GFE with the reliability requirements of the overall system,
NASA
shall be formally and promptly notified for appropriate
action.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1DN Fravision is adequate for incorporation in KSC
procurements without revision or supþlementation.
7. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 1
Reliability Engineering
The contractor shall accomplish the following reliability engineering
tasks on all flight equipment and launch essential ground support
equipment (GSE), spares, and GFE, as specified:
Reliability Design Criteria
Reliability design criteria for each subsystem shall be
developed and
utilized in the design and shall serve as a checklist
to ensure compliance
of the design to the criteria. The contractor's reliability effort
shall
include a system for the review and concurrence of
design specifications
and changes. The review shall ensure that the set of specifications
covers all items of hardware and contains applicable reliability
design
criteria and requirements.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may be supplemented with the following:
The contractor' s reliability organization shall review and concur with
all contractor-generated design specifications. All specifications shall
adequately cover performance and environmental profile requirements,
safety margins, derating factors and apportioned reliability goals for
the equipment. These specifications shall be updated as necessary, and
shall be subject to NASA review.
8. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 2
Trade Studies
The reliability effort shall include participation in design trades and
shall utilize reliability numerical estimates, as appropriate.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate for incorporation into KSC
procurements, as desired.
9. NHB 5300. 4(1D), par. 1D301. 3
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL)
The contractor shall establish a system for the preparations, maintenance
and control of FMEA's and CIL's.
The contractor shall prepare design FMEA's at the lowest level of
system definition required to support the potential uses (e. g. , testing,
failure reporting and corrective action, preparation of mandatory in-
spection points, etc. ). FMEA's will be performed to the "black box"
level and within the "black box" to pursue all critical functions. The
identification of failure modes to the piece part level will be accomplished
when these failure modes are criticality 1 or 2. The FMEA shall include
an integration of all flight hardware, including GFE, and launch essential
GSE. The contractor effort shall include the necessary interface with the
GFE contractors to ensure compatibility so that the integration can be
accomplished effectively.
8Based on results of the FMEA's, a CIL shall be prepared consisting
of a Single Failure Point Summary (SFPS) and a summary of redundant
elements in life or mission essential components where:
a. The redundant elements are not capable of checkout during the
normal mission turnaround sequence; or
b. Loss of a redundant element is not readily detectable by the flight
or ground crew; or
c. All redundant elements can be lost by a single credible cause or
event such as contamination or explosion.
Equipment appearing on the CIL will be given special attention in
establishing hardware specifications and qualification requirements;
in manufacturing, inspection and test planning; and in the formulation
of operating and maintenance procedures and mission rules.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate for major critical and costly
procurement but may not be economical or even required in this depth
for alless costly system. In this event, the following may be substituted:
A failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) shall be performe d on the
newly designed portions of the equipment. Additionally, as an integral
part of conceptual design process, the contractor shall develop FMEA's
at the system level to determine possible modes of failure and their ·
effects on the overall system performance. Based on results of the
FMEA's, a single failure point summaryv will be provided to design elements
for appropriate consideration in design reviews and trade studies.
10.• NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 4a
Reliability-Maintainability Interf ace
The contractor shall provide reliability engineering inputs and participaG
tion in establishing maintainability criteria and plans to obtain maximum
benefit from both design disciplines. Interfacing reliability tasks such
as FMEA and redundancy studies shall be coordinated closely with
corresponding maintainability trade-offs.
9Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate if it is really needed in
a procurement.
11. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 4. b
Limited Life Items
The contractor shall identifyllimited life items, including GFE specified
by NASA, which require control from equipment date of manufacture
throughout operational use, including storage. Provisions will be made
for replacement or refurbishment of hardware after a specified age or
operating time/cycle. The contractor shall report to NASA the status
of limited life items and waivers on limited life items.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate as stated.
12. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 5
Design Review and Readiness Review
The contractor's reliability activities shall include support of internal
and supplier design reviews at the system, subsystem, and component
levels and NASA design and readiness reviews. This activity shall in-
clude an assurance function for compliance of the design to the design
criteria defined for the system, subsystem, and component levels. Each
engineering change package shall contain a reliability assessment of the
effect of the proposed change.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate, but when a requirement for
KSC participation is desired, the following may be added:
"Notification shall be made to KSC fifteen days in advance of each
Design Review, as to the system element to be reviewed, firm date,
time, location and descriptive information on the review in question. "
Further tailoring of this NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may be necessary
depending on YSC requirement to participate in subcontractor formal
design reviews.
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13. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 6
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
The contractor shall provide a closed-loop system for the reporting
of all problems (failures and unsatisfactory condition reports) and the
establishment of corrective action for all problems conc erning flight,
test, simulator, and training hardware where that hardware is representa-
tive of flight hardware, GSE, applicable GFE, and spare hardware. The
contractor shall be responsible for ensuring that problem reporting and
corrective action systems of suppliers will meet the pequirements of
this section.
a. Problem Reporting - Reporting of problems shall be in accordance
with the applicable IRL/IRD.
b. Problem Analysis - An analysis of each problem reported to NASA
shall be performed to determine the cause of the problem add to im-
plement adequate measures to prevent its recurrence. Primary emphasis
shall be placed on hardware tear down analysis; however, where the cause
of the problem is understood or where sufficient prior analysis experience
has been obtained, additional hardware teardown for analysis may not be
required.
c. Problem Resolution - The contractor shall resolve each problem by
one of two methods: closeout or explanation. The contractor shall direct
all efforts toward closing a pr oblem in lieu of an explanation, and in no
case shall the contractor attempt to "explain" a gproblem until it becomes
impracticable to close the problem.
d. Problem Status
-
The contractor shall maintain a status on all open
problems. The method(s) employed by the contractor in maintaining the
status of problems shall be compatible to the contractor's needs as well
as
those of NASA in responding to requests for information. The contractor
shall submit to NASA a listing of all open problems in accordance with
the applicable IRL/IRD.
Implementation
-
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provisionais adequate for large procurements but
may be tailored for small ones where IRL/IRD's are not required and when
the procurement is primarily for off-the-shelf hardware:
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"Problem reporting shall be initiated during all phases of the con-
tractor's effort for newly designed equipment in accordance with
paragraph 1D301. 6 of NHB 5300. 4(1D). Problem reporting shall be
initiated for'bff-the-shelf" items during integration and system tests
in the same manner. A copy of each problem report must be sub-
mitted to KSC for information. "
14. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 7
Reporting and Resolving NASA Parts and Materials Problems(ALERTS)
Problems with parts, materials, or equipment which are of mutual concern
to NASA and associated contractors are reported by utilizing the NASA
ALERT System (NASA Form 863). The contractor shall establish a
systematic approach to evaluate and respond to all NASA ALERTS and
to investigate, resolve, and document parts and materials problems.
Previously published ALERTS will be reviewed to assure that lots,
batches, or other groupings of hardware noted as suspect in the ALERT
are not used. A summary of previously published ALERTS will be
provided by NASAa
a. Investigation
-
Upon receipt of a problem ALERT, the contractor
will initiate an immediate investigation to determine the use significance
of the problem item identified by the ALERT in its in-house program and
in that of its subcontractors and suppliers.
b. Resolution
-
Subsequent to the start of acceptance tests when in-
vestigation discloses known or suspected usage of the problem item
identified in the problem ALERT, a problem report will be issued against
equipment having such usage. The reports will be prepared, resolved,
and closed in conformance to the method defined in the Reliability Plan.
c. Response
-
The contractor shall provide a documented response on
each ALERT investigation and resolution to NASA in accordance with
the applicable IRL/IRD.
d. Contractor-Initiated ALERTS
-
When the contractor encounters a
significant problem with a part or material which may adversely affect
equipment, the contractor shall initiate an ALERT and submit it to the
NASA ALERT coordinator. The contractor shall not release an ALERT
on equipment without prior NASA approval.
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Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate as stated. This provision
may or may not be a contract requirement based on criticality and
cost of procurement.
15. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 8. a. b. c. d. e. f
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts and
IVIechanical Parts Control
a. General
-
The contractor shall implement a system for controlling
the selection, reduction in number of types, specification, application
review, analyzing failures, stocking and handling methods, installation
procedures, and establishing reliability requirements for EEE and
mechanical parts to be used in contract and off-the-shelf hardware.
b. EEE Parts Selection
-
The contractor and suppliers shall select
EEE parts for the contract hardware on the basis of suitability for their
application(s) and proven qualification of each to the requirements of its
specification. Wherever practicable, items selected shall be already
qualified to pertinent specifications, selection shall minimize the number
of styles and generic types, and consideration shall be given to industry
and Government preferred parts lists (e. g. , MSFC document 85MO3936).
When selecting items previously qualified, the contractor shall devote
particular attention to the currentness of data, applicability of basis of
qualification, and adequacy of specifications. The results of the selection
effort will determine requirements for additional qualification testing and
will be the basis for the EEE parts list for the system. (Seeparagraph
1D301. 8d. ) The contractor is fully responsible for the satisfactory per-
formance of each part regardless of the source from which the part was
selected or who wrote or approved the controlling documentation.
c. EEE Parts Specifications
(1) Each EEE part shall be controlled by a specification (or combination
of specifications) which delineates as a minimum: complete identification
of the part; physkcal, environmental, and performance requirements;
reliability requirements including inspections and tests for qualification,
acceptance, and lot sampling where required; explicit requirements
to be satisfied in accepting parts for use in the contract hardware
including 100 per cent screen and burn-in; packaging, storage, and
handling requirements; traceability requirement; and data retention
and submittal requirements.
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(2) Where a combination of specifications is used collectively to
provide all of the above requirements for a single part type, the
detail specification (slash sheet, specification control drawing,
etc. ) for that part type shall provide detailed cross-reference to
all other applicable specifications.
(3) Each specification shall be identified by a unique number, and
all specifications shall be subject to a formal system of change
control.
(4) All EEE parts specifications shall be available for NASA
review upon request.
d. EEE Parts Qualification
(1) Qualification of EEE parts shall be at the part level to the
requirements of the applicable specifications. Where adequate
qualification data are not available (as determined jointly by the
contractor and NASA), the contractor shall be responsible for the
development and conduct of qualification tests on parts to determine
their adequapy in meeting specification requirements and for the
development of criteria to be used in acceptance testing. The
contractor shall prepare test plans for those parts which it will
subject to qualification testing.
(2) Requalification of parts shall be conducted as necessary to en-
sure continued control over design, materials, manufacturing processes,
and quality controls after initial qualification.
(3) Qualification test plans and test reports shall be in accordance
with the applicable IRL/IRD. In the event a part is used which deviates
from this requirement, the contractor will submit a waiver request for
the deviation.
(4) The contractor shall maintain a data file which identifies the basis
and substantiates the status of qualification for each EEE part type
used on the project. The file for each part type shall:
(t) Completely identify the part by generic part type and name, con-
trolling specification name and number, common designation (closest
commercial equivalent), and manufacturer's name and part number.
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(b) Contain a summary of and provide complete cross-reference
to all existing data used to substantiate the qualification of the part
to the controlling specification. When the basis of qualification is
similar to an already qualified part, complete identification and
supporting data for the similar part shall be included together with
the analysis that establishes similarity.
e. EEE Parts List and Where-Used Parts Lists
The contractor and suppliers shall prepare and maintain a project EEE
parts list and composite where-used parts list will be prepared in
accordance with the applicable IRL/IRD.
f. EEE Parts Application Review
The contractor (or supplier, if appropriate) shall conduct thorough parts
application reviews on the design of each component (black box) at
appropriate milestones during its design and development. The results
of these reviews will be an input to the design reviews. (see paragraph
1D301. 5). The application of each part shall be examined in light of its
rated capabilities in comparison to the design requirements of that
application and conformance to the established derating criteria. The
derating criteria shall, as a minimum, require a 25 per cent margin
between all upper and lower worst-case application stress levels and the
corresponding specification stress level for which the part has been
qualified. Consideration shall be given to anticipated life requirements,
functional and environmental usage stresses, and historic and current
failures which have occurred in higher level assemblies on the same
system or other projects). Special attention shall be given to any parts
used which are not selected from the project parts lists, and the review
output documentation shall include or refer to justification for each such
usage. The contractor shall take immediate action to correct identified
deficiencies.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) qþrovision is adaptable to procurements of major
critical systems but may be too costly for small procurements. In this
case, the following may be substituted:
"The contractor's reliability organization shall review and concur with all
contractor-generated EEE parts design specifications. All specifications
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shall adequately cover performance and environmental profile require-
me nts, safety margins, and derating factors for the system. These
specifications shall be updated as necessary, and shall be subject to
NASA review. "
16. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 8. g
a. EEE Parts Handling and Traceability
(1) The contractor shall specify minimum requirements for control
of storage, stocking, and installation procedures for parts. These
controls shall prevent use of parts which may be in a questionable
condition and prevent degradation of parts due to environments or
faulty manufacturing or assembly techniques.
b. (2) The contractor shall assure that backward traceability data can
be provided for all EEE garts. (Seeparagraph 1D502. ) Provisions
shall be made to record and retrieve information relating to the
specific tests performed, test results, and processes on each lot of
parts. Identification of the part manufacturer's production, assembly,
or test lot shall be availab le for each part installed in deliverable
end items including qualification and test articles.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may or may not be a KSC requirements
based on criticality and cost of the procurement. Otherwise intis adequate
as written.
17. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 8. h
EEE Barts Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
The contractor shall investigate the cause of each þart failure and
determine remedial and preventive action. The significance of the
failure as related to like parts or materials used elsewhere in the system
and the possibility of the occurrence of additional failures shall be deter-
mined and documented as part of the problem disposition in accordance
with paragraph 1D301-6, Problem Reporting and Corrective Action.
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Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may or may not be required as a
separate provision from paragraph 1D301-6. It may be used as is
if it is necessary for control of EEE parts.
18. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301-8. i.
EEE Parts Deviations and Substitutions
The contractor shall establish and maintain an adequate system to
monitor and control the use of deviated and substituted parts in con-
tractor, subcontractor, and supplier equipment at all levels of procure-
ment, test, and fabrication. The system shall provide for the prompt
identification, reporting, review, and approval/disapproval disposition
of the deviated or substituted parts. The þrovisions of this paragraph
will be invoked when EEE parts do not conform to paragraph 1D301-8c,
Parts Specification, and paragraph 1D301-8d, EEE Parts Qualification.
(SeeGlossary of Terms for definitions) Subsequent to the CDE, all
requests for EEE part changes, deviations, or substitutions shall be
submitted to NASA for approval.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1d) provision is adequate but must be invdted only
when EEE parts do not conform to paragraph 1D301-8c, Parts Sjbecifications,
and paragraph 1D301-8d, EEE Parts Qualification.
18. NHB 5300. 4(10), Par. 1D301-8j:
EEE Parts Control for Off-the-Shelf Equipment
a. EEE parts used in off-the-shelf equipment shall conform to the re-
quirements of paragraphs 1D301-8c and 8d. A where-used parts list in
accordance with paragraph 1D301-8c is required. A parts application
review in accordance with paragraph 1D301-8f must be accomplished and
must assess the adequacy of each part in each application and assure
compliance with any applicable NASA restriction on specific parts usage
or application. The requirements of paragraph 1D301-8g apply to any
new manufacture of equipment to an existing design.
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b. Problem reporting and corrective action in accordance with paragraph
1D301-8h and control of substitutions and deviations in accordance with
paragraph 1D301-8i are required.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision is adequate to invoke in a major pro-
curement if such detailed control is requiredd Tailoring of the provision
may be required in order to attain desired flexibility of control.
19. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 8k
Mechanical Parts
MIL-STD 143. "Standards and Specifications, Order of Precedence for
the Selection of, " shall apply in selecting specifications for standard
mechanical parts. Rationale for the selection of company specifications
and standards over existing higher order of precedent standards and
specifications shall be made available to the procuring activity upon
request. This rationale shall include an identification of each higher
order of precedent specification or standard examinèd and state why
each was unacceptable.
Implementation
KSC may desire to substitute the KSC approved Parts List (KAPL) for
specifying mechanical parts. Otherwise this NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision
is adequate.
20. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D301. 9
Materials Specifications and Application Reviews
a. Materials Specifications
-
The contractor shall review design speci-
fications to determine compliance with all required materials specifications.
These specifications shall constitute the basis for description and control
of all materials to be used in the contract hardware. Where adequate
specifications do not exist (as determined jointly by the contractor an d
NASA), the contractor shall make appropriate recommendations to NASA.
b. Materials Application Reviews
-
The Icontractor shall review all
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materials applications for compliance with flammability and material
specifications. The contractor (or supplier, if appropriate) shall conduct
thorough materials application reviews on the design of each component(black box) at appropriate milestones during its design and development.
Consideration shall be given to anticipated life requirements, functional
and environmental usage stresses, and historic and current failure
experience (i. e.
, results of analysis of materials faildres which have
occurred in higher level assemblies on the same system or project).Special attention shall be given to the continuous review and assessment
of flammability and off-gassing properties of materials. This shall
include, but not be limited to, material usage, status, test, evaluation,
substitution, and verification. The results of these reviews will be an
input to the design reviews. (Seeparagraph 1D301-5, Design Review
and Readiness Review. )
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may require tailoring for KSC procurements
since it is primarily written for flight hardware or for GSE to be located
in hazardous areas.
21. NHB 5300. 4(1D), Par. 1D302
The contractor shall participate in the conduct of the certification and
acceptance test program as follows:
a. Certification
-
The contrqctor shall monitor and support the certifica-
tion program established to demonstrate that the design of flight hardwqre
is capable of performing its intended mission. The contractor shall assure
that adequate documentation is maintained to substantiate and track activities
in meeting certification requirements imposed by contract.
b. Acceptance Testing
-
The contractor shall review all acceptance test
requirements to assure that they are adequate for performance verification
and to detect manufacturing defects.
Implementation
This NHB 5300. 4(1D) provision may require tailoring to specific KSC
requirements. i. e.
,
Final acceptance testing may be required at KSC
rather than at the vendor's plant and might require KSC approval of
acceptance testing requirements.
APPENDIX 7
RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT AND SURVEY PROGRAM
The organizational evolution of the QA/SF survey/audit functions at KSC
from 1968 to 1980 was published on October 30, 1980. The following data
is important history for that significant period in the Apollo, Skylab,
ASTP, and Shuttle Programs:
1968 - 1975
Mail Code Orqanization Element Head
QA Director, Quality Assurance J.R. Atkins
QA-PLN Plans & Policy Office (6 people) A. Mayes
SF-SUR Survey Office,1968 (10 people) G. J. Mayer
1975 (6 people)
In 1975, Safety, QA, and Security were combined into one Directorate, i.e,
SF, which resulted in the following:
1975 - 1978
Mail Code Organization Element Head
SF Safety, R&QA, & Protective Services J.R. Atkins
SF Associate for S, R&QA, & Protective R.A. McDaris
Services
SF-PRA Product Assurance Office R.A. McDaris
SF-PRA-1 Plans & Policy Branch (6 people) O. Snellgrove
SF-PRA-2 Survey Branch (1975/6 people) T.F. Goldcamp
1975/6 people,1978.7 people
SF-ENG Engineering Office(1978/7 people) A.G. Smith
In 1978, Mr. McDaris retired and Mr. Atkins functioned as SF-PRA Chief.
The "Associate Director" function was eliminated.
In 1979, Mr. Atkins had an internal SF reorganization which resulted in
the following :
January 1979 - October 1979
Mail Code Orqanization Element Head
SF Safety,R&QA, and Protective Services J.R. Atkins
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SF-ENG Engineering Office ( took over R&QA A.G. Smith
Plans and Policy function - 10 people
(Resigned)
SF-SUR Survey and Audit Staff (6 people) T.F. Goldcamp(act.)
In October, 1979, J.R. Atkins retired and W. Rock acted as SF Director until June 1980,
when L. C. parker became Director
1979 - 1980
Mail Code Orqanization Element Head
SF Safety, R&QA & Protective Services L.C. Parker
SF Technical Assistant T.F. Goldcamp(Act.)
SF-ENG Engineering Office(still has R&QA Plans A.G. Smith
and policy and audit function (2 people)
SF-SUR Survey and Audit Staff (6 people) B.L. Jansen
In order to know the extent of activities covered by a typical Safety and R&QA Survey,
the following SF Survey Guidelines for the period March 9 - 20, 1980 is provided
below:
SF Survey Guidelines, March 9-20, 1981
SF-SUR will survey the following areas:
1. Proqram Manaqement Documentation
a. Review for adequacy and up-to-date status:
KMI 1710.1C, KSC Safety, R&QA Plan and
associated KMI's, KHB's,lMI's
KMI 1150.19, KSC Safety/Health Committee
KHB 1710.2A, KSC Safety Practices Handbook
KMI 1710.6, Decontamination, Neutralization, and Disposal of
Toxic Propellants, and other Hazardous Liquids
KMI 1910-PA, Roof Safeguards/Access Control
KMI 1710.P1A, Demonstration/Test Involving Hazardous Materials
KMI 1710.13A, Safety Review of KSC TOP's
KMI 1710.14A, Hazardous Tasks
KHB 1711.1A, Mishaps Investigation/Reporting
KMI 1711.1B, Investigation of Accidents/Incidents
KMI 1712.1D. Reporting of Occupational Injuries by Gov't Employees
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KMI 1730.1D, Protective Clothing/Safety Equipment
KMI 5308.1A, Lifting of Hardware
KHB 5310.1A, KSC R&QAHandbook
KMI 5310.9B, Safety Hazard and Rel, Analyses of GSE and Facility, and Integ. Hazards Analyses
KMI 5390.P18, PRACA
KMI 5310.12C, R&QA Requirements in KSC Procurements
KM18618.9A, TOP Policy
KMI 8838.1 B, Fire Protection, Fire Prevention, and Rescue
SF IMl's
b. Check for S, R&QAareas that have no policy or guidance.
2. Confiquration Manaqement
Membership on the KSC Level lll Configuration Control Board Implementation.
3. Safety
Safety Operations
Hazard Aassessment
Risk Reduction
Safety Audits
Safety investigations (Mishaps/accidents
Procedure Review
DOD Coordination
Safety Review of Waivers, Deviations, Exemptions
Review of Safety Plans/Procedures from Contractors
Review of Contractual Safety Clauses OSHA Requirements
4. Reliability ALERTs
GlDEP
FMEAs/CILs
Safety Hazards Analyses/integrated Hazards Anal.
Reliability and QA Cost Models Associated with Failures and Appraisal/Preventive Actions
5. Nonconformance Reportinq (PRACA)
Management and Direction of Overall KSC System
Waivers/Deviations Control and Processing
Prepare/Distribute Trend Data/Status Reports
Planning Effort for Future Programs
6. Safety, R&OA, and Confiquration Manaqement Surveys and Audits Procedures
This trail of survey and audit involvement remained in effect until 1989
when Mr. Bruce Jansen was tasked to document concerns regarding
manpower levels of survey and audit activities envisioned for the future,
including the upcoming Space Station Program. Mr. Jansen's letter to
senior KSC management included the following comment:
3
"KSC has the best SR&QAsurvey and audit program within NASA as citedby NASA Headquarters during their last three surveys of KSC - 1981,1984, and 1987." The following survey/audit activity areas werehighlighted for KSC implementation into the future:
Reliability Proqram
1. Reliability Management
o Plans/Procedures
o Audits
2. Reliability Analysis
o FMEA's/CIL's
o Design Reviews
o GiDEP/ALERT's
o Maintainability
o Parts/Materials Control
o Certification and Acceptance Testing
3,. Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
o Reporting
o Failure Analysis
o Resolution
o Status
Quality Proqram
1. Management and Planning
o Plans/Procedures
o Audits/Contractor Evaluation
o Training, and Certification
o Software Controls
2 Design and Development Controls
o Design Review
o ORMSD o Change Control
o Acceptance Review
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3. identification and Data Retrieval
o Record Center Operations
o identification Methods
o identification Controls
4. Procurement Controls
o Receiving Inspection System
o Shipping
o QA Involvement
o GSE
o R&QA Requirements
o Records
o Vendor Controls
o ADP's
5. Fabrication Controls
o Planning
o Process Controls
o Cleanliness/Contamination Controls
oNDE
o Requests for Supporto Temporary Installations
o Inspection Role
6. Inspections and Tests
o Planning (QPRD)
o Performance and Maintenance
o Records and Data
o Integrity /Access Control
o OMI Distribution
o DV Program
o TAIR Book System
7. Nonconforming Articles and Materials
o Material Review Board
o Waiver and Deviations
o MRB Holding Area
o Repair Controls
8. Metrology Controls
o Controls
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o Records
o Recall System
o ID and Labeling
o Standards/Traceability
9. Stamp Controls/Lead Seal Pliers
o Issuance
o Security
o Usage
o Audits
o Records
10. Handling, Storage, and Preservation of Materials
o Controls
o Marking and Labeling
o Packaging
o Age/Shelf Life
o Surveillance
11. Government Property Control
12. Flight Test/Ground Operations
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Appendix 8 (1)
Biographical Sketch of Author
Frank Childers earned the B.S. Degree in Radio Engineering in 1949, at Indiana
Institute of Technology, Ft. Wayne, Indiana. His first job was with the Department of
Commerce, Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as a Radio Engineer. He then
transferred to the Department of the Army's Redstone Arsenal where he was assigned
to Dr. Von Braun's Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) as an Electronic Engineer.
Frank was an original member of the Missile Firing Laboratory and participated either
actively, or in support of, all Redstone, Jupiter, Pershing, and Saturn-Apollo launches.
He served as Chief of the first Instrument Calibration and Standards Lab at Cape
Canaveral Army facilities until he was assigned as Chief of Instrumentation Reliability,
In that capacity, Frank instituted the first Electrical Instrument Recall System and
conducted the first reliability tasks such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Problem
Reporting and Corrective Action, Critical parts and Materials Program,and the Inter-
NASA Data E×change Program (INDEX), formerly known as the parts' ALERT System.
In 1972, Frank was certified as a Reliability Engineer by the American Society for
Quality Control. Frank's title for most of his KSC career remained as Aerospace
Engineer (Reliability) where he gave many hours to developing Program Plans,
Procedures, Standards and other publications in the KSC Reliability and Quality
Assurance Program. For many years, Frank served as Contract Technical
Representative (Reliability) for forty one (41) ground support instrumentation systems
during the buildup for the Apollo/Saturn Program.
Frank retired from NASA in 1976 after serving thirty two (32) years in government
service. In 1977, Frank was recruited to work for Computer Sciences Corporation in
the areas of Reliability and Quality Assurance, Safety, Security, and Employee
Training over a new ten-year career.
Frank's writing career began while still employed by NASA with his unpublished
booklets, "History of Quality Assurance at the Kennedy Space Center," (1974), and
"Kennedy Space Center Beginnings," (1986). After retirement Frank continued writing
for publication as follows:
The Bioqraphy of Dr. William S. Huqhlett, of Cocoa, Florida. Dr Hughlett served
forty (40) years as a Medical Missionary to the Belgian Congo, (Published,1985).
History of the Cape Canaveral Liqhthouse, (Published,1983).
Faith in Space, 170 page book about our space scientists', engineers' and astronauts'
belief in God and in an orderly universe, (Published,1997).
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January 13, 1972
NW. Frank M. Childers
33 Little John Lane
Rockledge, Florida 12955
Dear Member:
The Officers and Board of Directors of the American Society for
qwm ty Control extend their congratulations to you on your advance-
ment to the grade of Senior Member in the Society.
Your becoming a Senior Member not only reflects continued interest
in the field of quality control but also represents recognition of
your dedication by the fellow members of your Section through its
Examining Committee.
This important step that you have taken will open many vistas for
you, not only in Society activities, but in the fields of science
and engineering.
We look forward to your continued participation in the activities
of your Society,
el s
Ro rt W. Shearman
Administrative Secretary
HWS:JT:bg
FOOTNOTES (1)
1. ORDM 4-12, Quality Assurance Technical Procedure.
2. FROM A-4 TO EXPLORER 1, Dr. Kurt Debus Memoir Paper, pages 22-25.3. MOONPORT, History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations, page 139.4. IBlD, pages 45-46.
5. QUALITY PROGRESS, February 1972 by Dr. Deter Grau of MSFC.6, THIS NEW OCEAN, NASA SP-4201, 1966, page 178.
7. IBlD, beginning on page 179.
8. KMI 1710.1, Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance Programs
9. Reliability and Quality Assurance Audit and Survey Program, R.A. McDaris'
Memorandum of October 30, 1980. Appendix 7.
10. February 17, 1984 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS.
11. November 2, 1990 Spaceport News, pages 1 & 4.
12. IBID, pages 1 & 7.
13 February 10, 1995 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS.
14. October 24, 1997 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS.
15. Annual Operating Agreement For FY-2002 and Out-Years. Rev. G.
16. KSC Business System Manual (KDP-KSC-M-1000
17. May 25, 1967 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS
18. August 31, 1967 issue of SPACEPORT NEWS
19. NASA Newsletter of March 1971
20. Moonport, History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations, pages 398-399.21. LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE, A History of Skylab.
22. ON THE SHOULDERS OF TITANS, NASA SP-1203.
23, POST-CHALENGER EVALUATION OF SPACE SHUTTLE RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MANAGEMENT.
24. December 15. 2000 issue of Spaceport News, page 4.
25. REPORT AT A GLANCE, By The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, Chapter Vll, The Silent Safety Program.
26. Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Organization Task Team Review Report,
September 1986.
27. REPORT AT A GLANCE, By Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident.
28. SRM&QA FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW AT KENNEDY SPACE
CENTER, November 4-8, 1991 by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety andMission Quality.
29. Kennedy Space Center SRM&QA Strategic Ten Year Plan, K-RQ-0001.12, page 130. KSC SRM&QA Strategic Ten Year Plan, K-RQ-0001.12.
31 KSC Structured Surveillance Program, SR&QA Directorate, Implementation Plan,
RQ-0001.3, introduction.
32. McDonnell Douglas Quality Assurance Program Plan, MDC-Y1159, May,
1992
33. KSC Contractor SRM&QA Operations Plan (FY-1994), page 1.
(2)
34. IBID, pages 1-6.
35. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual Operating Agreement (AOA) For
2002 and Out-Years. October 15, 2001.
36. S&MA Annual Operating Agreement (AOA) For FY2000 and Outyears, Dated
Sepetember, 1999, Section 7.0, page 5.
37. McDonnel Douglas Space Station Freedom Program Plan, MDC Y1159, Dated
May 1992.
38. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Annual Operating Agreement (AOA) for
FY-2002 and Out-Years, KCA-1702, Rev. A Dated October 15. 2001.
39. Boeing Company PGOC Quality Plan, BP 1001H, dated October, 2000.
40. IBID, pages 2-1.
41. IBID, pages 4-1 - 4-7 (Section 4).
42. IBID, pages 4-7 - 4-33, (only responsibilities are listed here).
43. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA)Annual Operating Agreement (AOA) for
FY-2002 and Out-Years, KCA-1702, Rev. a, dated October 15, 2001.
44. ELV SFAO ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES document, dated May 9, 2001.
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